The Unstoppable Flood of the AfghanTaliban. 2nd Part.

(CONTINUATION)

Another characteristic of the social organization of these frontier semi independent tribes is that they stimulate a relative endogamy. With it they seek to isolate, to protect, to support or to increase their idiosyncrasy, influence and patrimony. But, without been biological harmful its use. As it would be between the members of the same family or small or nearby clan. In effect, the marriages not only suppose and carry individuals exchanges between the families of the married. They also produce exchanges and flows of gifts, visits, relations and power plots. In a few little evolved societies, living in a difficult way and, sometimes surrounded temporarily by hostile, the matrimonial relations produce a «revenue», an increases of social positions, influences and goods, which are very estimated by the families.

Taliban Operational.

The highland villages are numerous, small and spread for both sides of the common border. In them can be camouflaged a small group of «regulars» Taliban, waiting that the jerky military flood passes away. Apart, the Taliban enjoy a complicated system of natural caves, reinforced by communication tunnels, endowed with extended zones for waiting and the storage of all classes of goods. This system is used to facilitate the traffic between both countries, without having to use the frontier passages or the most habitual and known gorges, as «parts» of the complete journey. And as temporary refuge, when the Allies carry out reprisal or rebels searching operations, on Pashtun zones where they have been more active. Taliban are Pashtuns. Only are distinguished from the local tribes by their major religious proselytism and military activity. Some of the villagers whom the soldiers meet in their patrols and searches, could be «part-time» Taliban or sympathizers. Two or three men of a native group that pass along a rural way, can be a Taliban team moving across.

The operational key of the Taliban resides in their innumerable local chiefs, with their small guerrillas bands. They are the persons in charge of intimidating, teaching, scaring, attacking and occupying more or less temporarily some of the numerous settlements and hamlets. According to the pressure degree that they should exercise on the villagers in order that they inform them, hide them and support them. Evidently its elementary degree of operational development keeps the movement at the defensive. Without being able to dispute to any of the present foreign Armies in these areas, any territory or village. Without being able to realize other attack actions beyond ambushes, assaults to very small enemy isolated units, harassment by medium range fire, kidnapping, short duration isolated incursions and the mined of ways and paths. Ideologically concentrated in the conversion to their movement, to their semi nomadic cells, of the most related or nearby Pashtuns.

Though they are willing to die for their ideals, with the promise of stay in one of the Seven Heavens of Islam, in the first of which resides Abraham, visited daily by 50,000 angels, the Taliban do not hesitate to retreat in the face of a decided attack or the determined and tenacious resistance of their military enemy.

Continúa la expansión talibán en Afganistán tras la retirada de las tropas internacionales

Their usual procedure to assault a weak defended or without spirit position is this: at dawn they bombard with the fixed rocket launchers heavy fire, then they approach to use mortars, finally, the assault is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance in a broken line shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL grenade-launchers. Heavy weapons are fired from the sides of the sections and fire is directed from top to bottom or bottom to top or on verify target. To avoid own casualties by friend fire.

The struggle for the minds and wills.

The Taliban managed to implant their «global radical theocratic» regime by fighting the regional warlords and unifying Afghanistan. They established a lax and weak socio-political structure, but enough, to give the country some preence. Regionally and locally, they controlled the tribal organs of power and, at the same time, possessed small garrisons of irregulars and militia. That were enough to control and govern that state structure.

Displaced from power 20 years ago, their tenuous and sufficient religious political structure remains and their guerrillas and semi-regular forces operationally advance and retreat. Adapting plasticly to the fight against a national regular army of shoddy. That was supported by air and ground heavy fire from the forces of the NATO countries deployed in the country. And with the elite forces of those, for punctual actions of “search and destruction” of the Islamist guerrillas. Operations that were generally of mediocre effectiveness, below what was planned at headquarters.

There are no real academies of officers and non-commissioned officers in Afghanistan. In its Army, it thrives by adapting to the immediate commands. The salaries of the troops are squandered by their superiors. There his short pay and role as a uniformed soldier is a sign of prosperity and social power among his clans.

Afghan army says it killed 100 militants in 24 hours | CNN — ***Modern Afghan Army Forces…marching in parade…***

Chiefs, officers and non-commissioned officers lack a «national morale» that impels them to full defense of Afghanistan against the Black Death of the Taliban. There is no professional honor, a «corps spirit» that galvanizes them with their fellow unit members in a quest for victory.

In short, there is not in the entire administration an exemplary, honorable and suffered behavior (paradoxically, although the country is ruled by misery) on the part of the superior chiefs and the civil authorities. To urge them to fulfil all their professional and social duties towards their distant compatriots or towards the democratic Afghanistan. That today it is the shell of an empty, exhausted and sterile socio-political structure.

The Civil, Ideological and Military Campaign against the Bands.

Here, the enemy is evasive, dispersed, worse armed than military, bad trained, unruly. But, he is native, is tough and scanty, hides and disguises easily. He is a born predator, with an atavistic cunning and usually does not defend his positions. He uses them to wear down the regular enemy and will leave them at the least perceived danger; in the form of flanking movement, deliberate frontal or on the rear attacks.

The operations of the military great units and units let escape the guerrilla teams through the infinity tactical «interstices». It is necessary to operate with nearness at his microtactical military and social level. To the diffuse, tenuous, but omnipresent «swarm» of the Taliban is necessary to interpose a civic military «swarm«. Formed by voluntary elements, more qualified, professional and trained than the guerrillas.

It is necessary to create small «action units«, for combined “social military” actions. That are capable of reaching the Taliban habitat and to expel them from it, progressively and firmly. Interposing between them and the tribes, his real guerrilla habitat. Units that, in its basic model, would be formed by a platoon of light infantry local loyal trained forces, a squad of professional foreign infantries and a group of civil technical personnel for tribe promotion and education with suitable material. Its logistics and support will be based on ground units and helicopter-borne forces, centrally controlled from 2 or 3 near regional operational bases. And complemented by mobile columns in vehicles or of cavalry, forming a support patrols’ network in a region.

Once made firm these small flexible units, can arrive there major forces and brigades of work and education, to go garrison the zone and stimulating its social improvement. It is necessary to possess money to buy the will of collaborators and sympathizers. This can become facilitating work and social distinction to them. And to realize the necessary of development plans.

To eradicate the opium crops can be an independent strategic goal. And it is necessary to value very well its opportunity and possibility for every small zone. It is necessary to offer the natives an alternative of peace, progress and well-being, within their beliefs and ways, in order that they expel the Taliban. That are really for the Pashtuns, war mercenaries and exploiters of civilians, clans and tribes; foreign to the Popular Islam professed by the Pashtuns tribes.

Conclusion.

Liberal democratic values, which are supposed to sustain the legal government in Kabul, are «republican ideological convictions«. They are not felt, and they are not lived by almost anyone in Afghanistan. They are foreign to the Afghan people, to whom they bring neither prosperity, nor security, nor more desirable identity.

Doce de Montesquieu para empezar el año — ***Montesquieu insisted that democratic values should be transmitted by example. So that they did not remain mere messages.***

Americans and their local allies have erected and superimposed a «centralized administrative and political edifice» on the identity and social arena of Afghanistan. And that at the first blow of a serious economic or social setback or of the Taliban military battering ram, it will start to throw out of balance, crack and sink in the eyes of everyone.

In the last weeks, the Taliban are occupying border posts in northern Afghanistan and are conducting a partial, loose encirclement of some of the country’s largest populations. This allows them to intimidate the Afghan armed forces and send a message of determination and power into and out of the country.

In general, international analysts are pessimistic about the ability of the Kabul government and, more importantly, its military to withstand a determined and prepared onslaught, a flood, by the Taliban. To take political and social power in Afghanistan. The discrepancy between these analysts is only when the Taliban will launch that Unstoppable Flood.

The End.

The Unstoppable Flood of the AfghanTaliban

Introduction.

After almost 20 years of US military presence in Afghanistan, its last troops will leave Afghanistan in a few days. Their «war and pacification effort» is condensed into about $800 billion spent in Afghanistan and more than 2400 military personnel killed in acts of service throughout this period. Germany and Italy have also recently withdrawn their last deployments in the country.

One of the targets of his attack on this Asian country was the overthrow of the Salafi jihadist regime of the Afghan Taliban.

Their radical ideology was studied in some madrasas or Qur’anic schools in Pakistan. Young Afghan Pashtun exiles were studying there. Taliban are the students of these radicalized madrasas. And in Pakistan there are now similar political social movements, such as the Terikh e Taliban Pakistan or the Pakistani Taliban Movement. Who have fraternal relations with the Afghan Taliban.

These, in turn, would have given shelter to al-Qaeda headquarters, in the form of a «safe guerrilla base«, with various locations in Afghanistan. And, with an extensive last «position of withdrawal«, located in the bordering mountains, by the so-called Line of Durand, among both Islamic countries. Their defense was based not only on the fighting form at difficult heights, but also on a capillary network of tunnels. That served as hiding places for the terrorists and that allowed them a hidden and protected communication by their area of deployment.

From the times before the Terrorist Network’s Suicide Attack on the New Yorker Twin Towers Complex to the Pentagon, in Washington, on September 11, 2001. And, in particular, Osama ben Laden and Aymar al-Sawahiri, an Egyptian doctor, who acted as an al-Qaeda’s «executive member«.

The capture and neutralization of these two individuals was another of the main objectives of the US invasion of Afghanistan.

And, having destroyed the weak, limited and poor social political structure created by the Afghan Taliban, the Americans had, as a corollary of their military actions, a third target. Distant, but surely more important and transcendent.

Talibanes rechazan alto el fuego ofrecido por el gobierno — ***Taliban reject the Government offer of cease fire.***

To seriously and actively help to create a «modern Muslim society» in Afghanistan, transcending the regime of regional and local tribes and clans. And, that will be refractory to the radical spells of the modern jihadits.

And finally, with a resilient social tissue that guarantees the rights, duties and freedoms of all citizens in this «modern Muslim society«.

Capriciously and unfortunately, the failure of this last mentioned objective will squander all the efforts, in species and blood, dedicated earlier. And it’s going to put all of us at the difficult and unwanted starting point of 2001.

Social anthropologic particularities of the Pashtuns tribes.

The internal relations of the groups, families and local families groups and clans, are characterized by incorporating into them certain rites, rules, attitudes and taboos. These gather, value and quantify their vital needs, their primary emotions and their beliefs. The Islam is followed in the wide zone we treat. They are all of the sunni branch, that accepts the Koran and the Prophet Sunna. The differences reside in the rigor with which they examine and accept the sources of the Sunna. This assumption forms a part of the social inculturation, strengthening and cohesion of these groups.

These societies agree and are ruled by an authority, more or less respected and obeyed.

The more be perfected and advance towards the exterior the society, the power of this authority will become strong and grow and will spread in influence areas. The smaller and isolated is the group, the authority power will be more moderating and integrating, acting as the first between the «equal ones». In these last cases, the meeting of the active members (men, hunters) of the clan in assemblies, “jurgas” (in its language), etc., has supreme and sanctioning value of the deviant or solvent conducts for the group. Evidently, in these local councils, the prestige and the power of each individual member count, and in them some are «more «equal» than others. These local chiefs or Maliks are like favored negotiators with the different governments, who enjoy a personal more than institutional authority, and whose agreements can be ignored by the adult males, if are not confirmed by the assemblies.

Los talibanes aseguran que controlan el 85% de Afganistán | Noticias Diario de Ávila — ***More than 85% of Afghanistan is controled (not occupied) by Taliban.***

Their code of customs and honor is the Pashtunwali. It establishes to the individual certain rights and demands from him certain social duties towards the family, the clan and the tribe. The basic disputes on women, gold or valid money and lands are in the origin of the durable hatreds in these tribes. And that must be kept up to avenging the perceived affront. The own fragility and weakness of these society demands the appearance of the protective values.

These might be the hospitality, the loyalty, the friendship, the scorn of the strange as unknwon, the revenge of affronts and damages, the individual and collective honor. Each of them protects and enlarges in some measure or shade the small human group. As we will see, the relations are interpersonal, in the areas of the family, the clan and the region. They are projected by the opportunity, the nearness, the exchange of goods and the relation. And become strong with the loyalty, the respect of the accepted procedures and the treatment time. And depending on the accumulation of these elementary successive acts. A stranger can aspire this way to his integration, in a personal manner. And not for the quality or importance of his category or institutional position.

Los pastunes contra todos: rebelión frente a los talibanes y al aparato militar de Pakistán — ***Pashtuns are against militar***y actions by Gobvernment and Taliban

The hospitality takes implicit the reciprocity, when one travels, is alone and is not aggressive. This sometimes is perfected by the endowment of an escort to the traveler through insecure zones. The violation of this «escort» by an assault supposes a serious affront for the clan that provided it. The loyalty between the members of the group, sometimes very unstable, cohesion it. The honor inflates the self esteem and appearance before everybody. The revenge, in absence of a real justice, search to punish and then to repair the damages and affronts real or perceived. The scorn of strange, not adorned with good qualities or menacing the group, seeks to prevent a priori their integration in it, as a passive defense form. The friendship embraces the ties with the equals and within the group. If someone joins these elementary groups, he is object of loyalty and friendship in a personal way. These values would increase by his performance, ways and personal behavior. It would be the case of a native forces chief, accepted by them for the pays, the honor and the status that they offer and project on the regional clans. The acceptance is not with the position, but with the person.

(To be continued)

The modern Hybrid Warfare. 3rd. Part.

(THE END)

The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

In general, the attacks are realized to the software of a system, looking for a «weakness» of this one. And using the malicious codes, the back entrances, etc. A penetration or attack to the software is prevented in general with an antivirus adapted to the received virus. To attack the hardware is necessary to act on the «physical component» of the computer. And his detection, with the nowadays existing miniaturization, turns out to be very improbable and long in the time, until the devastation is detected. The best way of acceding to the hardware is realizing the intrusion in the factories of components and of assemblies. But these are protected by control measures of components and external equipment, based on the nationality and the producer of them.

The cyberattacks go to cybernetic networks of the society, both public and private, to the communications and means of control of equipment and networks. Becoming concrete definite in the facilities of different out-standing or strategic sectors of a country or alliance; like, industrial centers, military communications, administrative public negotiations, social opened networks, energy distributors, intranets of banks and economic means. And they seek to paralyze or to disturb the functioning of them or to distribute in them more or less opened tendentious information, to alter or to direct the public or particular general opinion in favor of the interests not always evident of the attackers.

The cyberattact is a «total attack» of swarm type; that is, of multiple and simultaneous or sequential character. It is directed on the economic, administrative, civil and military structures, which hold and allow that a «social group» should work. It is a «form of fight» in the cybernetic area. Where «one» seeks «to occupy» tactical or strategic «advantageous positions«. And «to damage» the enemy, preventing him from keep his pace, his «habitual tempo» of functioning and stealing and depriving him sometimes of the costly goods of research and development created by him. And that were allowing him to keep a competitive advantage in national «intervention means» in the industrial, economic and military fields. A branch of the cyberattack is the industrial espionage.

With them is achieved to seriously concern and debilitate the diplomatic, economic, military and civil sectors of a society. In the civilian is the original humus, the social essence, as creator of the «national morale» and the «will of defense» of the social group. Being those sectors the «means of intervention» with which a State counts for his global, holistic defense, against the aggression and external and internal dangers.

It is known the supposedly American attack using an advanced virus against the software of the Iranian centrifugal machines. That were operating to separate the isotopes of the Uranium 235 and Uranium 239 (not fissionable), using his different “molecular mass”. Seeking to obtain U235 enough pure to create «self fissionable critical masses«, the explosive of the atomic bombs, for his supposed nuclear devices. As the % of purity between an industrial use, to generate electricity, for example, and the great purity that needs a «critical mass», both «activities of successive enrichment» are perfectly recognizable by the foreign intelligence. In May, 2010 it was detected by the Iranians a malicious virus, called Stuxnet, in the of Nataz’s nuclear station. And that gave to a thousand of them the «order» of self-destructing. But, already in January of this year, the inspectors of the Atomic International Energy Agency (the AIEA) and the Iranian technical personnel had detected that many centrifugal machines were working slowly or badly and without a certain motive.

China takes a privileged singular position as a «great universal factory» in the global economy. And the same sells cheap products of immediate consumption on a large scale, that compete principally in price, which makes already products of high added value with the most modern technologies. This allowed him to lead one of the most significant and consistent cases of cyberattacks on a large scale against a country or coalition. The history was published by Bloomberg.

The agents of a unit of espionage and cybernetic war of the Chinese Popular Army managed to place some malicious «components» in the motherboards of IT equipment of the Supermike company, of San Jose, California. Who buys to Chinese factories, which have, in turn, subcontracts and suppliers of components in China. This way, the IT equipment with this «Trojan horse» allowed the cybernetic Chinese spies to accede for 3 years to industrial and governmental secrets of the EE. UU.

The anomalies emerged in 2015, when Elementary Technologies, who was designing software to compress files, reported of them in the baseplates of his cybernetic servants. Around 30 technological companies existed, between them Amazon and Apple, and diverse agencies of American intelligence, «invaded» in the Chinese attack. It was verified that the cybernetic servants of Elementary were mounted by Supermike, which is the major world producer of cybernetic servants.

It was found that some plates of the cybernetic servants had installed a «perfected component» that did not appear in his design and that it was not a chip. This multifunctional «foreign corps» would have been placed in 4 factories of China that mount the cybernetic servants of Supermike.

THE SUPPOSED CHINESE COMPONENT INTRODUCED IN THE HARDWARE.

The physical interventions in the hardware are more difficult, because all customers theoretically verify the equipment that they make or buy. Attack to the other people’s hardware foreign are doing usually during his traffic from the manufacturer to the client. That is the method that the American agencies use. But this malicious and comfortable manipulation of the Chinese spies can be effected because China is the great manufacturer (with license or without her) of hardware (computers, mobiles). And the directors and controls of his factories collaborate of well or badly degree with the «requests of the authorities», in a wide sense.

And, finally, some days ago was important the recidivist case, still not close, of the Chinese giant of the telecommunications Hua Wei. This way, the agencies of intelligence of the U.S.A- has warned that must not be used the products and services of Huawei and ZTE. Accusing that the terminals of these brands might be working as «cybernetic concealed agents«, spying for the Chinese government. Also, the Pentagon has prohibited to his personnel to introduce in the military bases the products of these brands.

China, as a great power example, of realizing his own and adapted «combinations» of means of intervention in his different stages.

CHINA’S ASPIRATIONS…

One first Chinese national foreign objective is to promote the multipolarity in the world structure of the great powers and his allies. Looking that does not exist a world hegemonic power, like the USA, that hinders him in the extension of his influence and power from his «nodal center«.

For it, he will create alliances and will establish agreements with others countries in detriment or in substitution of that hegemonic power. And he will be a «obstructionist intransigent actor» in all the actions that that power promotes unilaterally in the international forums (UNO, Atomic International Energy Agency). This way, the actions of the western nations in the Syrian conflict were frustrated and limited by the systematic veto of China to his approval in the Security Council. Though the Chinese communists consider to be out of the fight for the direct influence in the Moslem Middle East. And, the Chinese decision to renew his relations with the Sub-Saharan Africa, it was partly a strategic corollary of the «war to the terror» of the USA and the NATO in Middle East, as supplier region of crude oil and gas to the whole world.

A CHINESE NAVAL GROUP OF STRATEGIC PROJECTION SAILS IN THE CHINA’S SOUTH SEA, AFTER CROSS THE TAIWAN’S STRAIT.

China is for Russia and Russia is for China a partner, competitor and rival, if it is worth this polyvalent definition, which does that none of the expressions is in fullness. Both are «emergent powers«, according to the new nomenclature, determined in growing, in not get damage directly for the moment and in eroding the hegemonic power and his Europeans allied.

This way, the Chinese would not act directly, not by third interposed countries, in Syria, in the boiling cauldron of the Asia of the Southwest, scene of the global contest that sunnis and Shiites develop for the control and the supremacy in the Islam. But they will do it collaborating up to a point with the interests and the diplomatic propositions of the Russians. Reinforcing this way a political common position of counterweight and neutralization of the influence of West in the zone. And in exchange for a certain Russian reciprocity in favor of the Chinese interests, in other countries in which do not shock the national influences of both. Resultado de imagen de china Paracelso y Spratly. A CHINESE NAVAL BASE OF MISILES IN A SMALL ISLAND OF THE PARACELSO’S ARCHIPELAGO .

A strategic exterior Chinese preference goes towards the Indian subcontinent and to the nations of the first Asian circle of terrestrial and maritime nearness. The India is a radical rival at his measure, with whom it beared several frontier wars in the middle of the 20th century. The India has a political structure more advanced than China, the liberal participant democracy, still in spite of all his contradictions, ethnic, religious and social discrimination and lacks of all kinds. And it possesses a demographic strength that overcomes China’s people grow. Though lately the Chinese begin to realize the irrational of his «pseudo scientists» methods of the control of the birthrate. That the communist China applied in altars of a material rational progress. Progress which only enjoys in diverse degrees at the present, the members of the communist party and his families, the technical personnel who design, stimulate and develop it, the chiefs and officials of the armed forces and a minority of entrepreneurs and men of business. That have prospered at the shade of an institutional inveterate clientele of the mentioned public elites.

At the west of China, close with his Sinkiang’s immense region (Xinjiang), in the Oriental Turkestan, there is a rosary of former soviet socialist republics of 2 thousands Km long, that get until the Caspian Sea. They are, from east to west, Kazajistan, Kirguistan, Tadzikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. And there form these countries a monolithic set of several etnias, gathered in the names of them, but extended over several simultaneously, of Turkoman origin, of the central steppes of Asia. And agglutinated also by his belonging to the Islam sunní. All this form a multinational defensive and refractory shield to the expansive activity and to the significant presence of the Chinese in his internal matters or in his exterior trade, always with effects of political guardianship. These Turkoman Muslims are rather potentials allied of the Great Russia, with only she puts a bit of care and dedication to attract and to attend them.

CHINA PROJECTS IN AFRICA HER ECONOMY AND INFLUENCE. DISPLAYING HERSELF AS A COUNTRY THAT NEVER WAS COLONISLIST.

Another great strategic preference of Beijing is to extend his influence and increase the economic and diplomatic bows with the development nations, specially those who have «natural resources and primary cultures«, that are necessary for the manufacturing production, the supply and the general development of the nations. She has taken it even far beyond his geographical borders of political influence or strategical military.

With the interminable income of his exports and with the knowledge of the development in many areas, China does intelligent and massive strategic national «landings» in diverse countries of Africa and Spanish America. With them it establishes «binding alliances» of backing, advising and support. Trying to anchor firmly and creating allies or «friends» by all this world in development.

Going firmly by the political, economic, diplomatic and military way of turning to what China really seeks to be:

one (or the) hegemonic power in the 21st century.

The litigious, even violent, and, at least, very menacing, that China keeps with the countries of the East Asian, demonstrate how awkward, despotic and subjecting can be his presence in the short distances. When China thinks that com into play his national interests or his national pride. Whose loss in hands of the «foreign powers» until almost middle of last century, is one of the neurotic tics of the exterior politics of Beijing, from October 1, 1949.

In the Sea of the South of China, this power is expansive and hegemonic. And keeps litigious more or less important with the rest of the Asian countries bathed by this sea. That are The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

This sea has 3500 thousands Km2. And China thinks that it is his «Second Persian Gulf«, for the sub aquatic oil and natural gas deposits, existing and estimated. For comparison and perspective, the Mediterranean Sea only has 2500 thousands Km2 and his coasts bathe to 24 countries in three continents. None of which is hegemonic or expansive.

In order to settle itself in the «disputed archipelagos«, China follows a strategy of small and consolidated advances. Installing in them, in islands and rocky islands, military air or naval bases and extending the logistic capacities of some of them, substracting area to the sea. This has forced to some coastal countries to realize occupations in the islands of his regional seas. Destined, rather, to indicate his presence and sovereignty.

Two of the most showy cases are the archipelagos of Spratly and Paracelso.

The Spratly has hundreds of islands and rocky islands spread by more than 400 thousand Km2, near the Philippines. In relation to this archipelago, the Court of Arbitration of The Hague already pronounced that does not exist a legal base for the Chinese claims. And that the Spratly are not islands with economic projection. But, China, simply, does not recognize it.

The Paracelso’s archipelago, at 700 Km south of Hong Kong, is placed at the west of the southern Sea of China, in the entry of Tonkin’s gulf (Vietnam). There, China has crude oil platforms in dispute with the Vietnamese government. Near the Chinese facilities have been diverse incidents between the Vietnamese fishing boats and patrols and the Chinese ships of escort. That have dispersed them using water cannons.

The modern Hybrid Warfare. 2nd Part.

The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

(CONTINUATION)

The abuses against the civil population are always counter-productive in a counterinsurgency struggle and more in an internal revolt. Sometimes, the hurries to form new troops lead to a deficient or incomplete training of these. They are not vaccinated against the stress, specially here the mental one, nor against the frustration of the not fulfilled plans or of the enemy ungrateful surprises. This leads to discharge almost inevitably the anger and the enervating impotence in the civil population, intermingled voluntary or by force with the rebels.

Russians in Syria. First, they devastate and then his infantry advances to sweep away and occupy. The Syrian civil dead do not matter for them.

With embarrassing frequency, when the human or technological «sensors» of Russia, Arabia Saudi or the West countries detect some probable activity from Iraqi, Syrian, Huttis or Zaidies rebels or the foreign “muyahidin”, first they devastate the building, the «block», the zone. Then they go to sweep up and to do the «body count», for their statistics. Sometimes, among the rubbles, they can get the corpses of an Arabic innocent and numerous family. They abuses of the attrition, which is indiscriminate and perverse when the enemy fuses with the civil people. They neglect the unexpected active patrolling, which needs proportionally less material and human means, but more trade, moral courage, freedom of action and creativity in the low and intermediate commands and NCO and in the men.

A necessary complement of the regular net are the false rebels bands. These would be destined to operate in zones inclined to the insurgency, from where some of their members come from. Their activity and concealment would be favored by the decentralized character of the rebel groups. Their missions would be to obtain information, to prove the loyalty of the civil ones and to annihilate small enemy groups or lone suicidal terrorists. They should not be bigger than a reinforced squad or section, except in combat special occasions.ç

Two disembarkation vessels of the Black Sea’s Russian Fleet load troops for Tartus’s Syrian port. «To defend the national Russian interests in Syria».

There were prominent the practices of counter insurgency of the Portuguese in his immense colonies of Africa, between some of which there were a distance of 3 thousand Km. Raising great logistic problems like for a small nation, which was not possessing excessive resources or friends. It was important the politics of «national integration» (with mottoes as «Portugal is not an European nation» or «It is not a small nation»; «Portugal is a big multicultural nation»). And that was practiced by the Portuguese troops, on the basis of the respect the population, the lack of unnecessary or necessary not explained reprisals and the improvement or the development of the autochthonous civil population. Counting with the «economic, of education, of civil engineering, logistic means» available, always loins and in penury. That is to say, the Portuguese «means of intervention» were acting together in an operational «mix». Done in accordance with his capacities and the functions and national aims of this Hybrid War, directed by a central coordinating command.

But, the population understood the politics of «sincere approximation» and it reasonably helped the Portuguese troops to isolate and border on the «irregular bands» of the different rebel movements in the most distant or inhospitable regions of the different countries. That could not gain the battle for «the hearts and the minds» of the Angolans and other peoples.

Column of Portuguese troops on the verge of continuing the march.

This made a «impasse», a dead point, in the military development of the colonial classic «guerrilla wars». The rebels bands could not create stable «guerrilla bases». That could allowing them to have a cozy rear and a permanent and sure refuge. And to indoctrinate, to grow and fortify and to spread over the different regions of each country. Depriving the military enemy, little by little, of the domain over the native and their lands. And the Portuguese could not surround and annihilate the guerrillas placed in the remote zones of the territories. Which simply slipped and changed of sure location.

The first that saw this perspective of his future were the Africanists and the metropolis officials. And this led, finally, to the «revolution of the carnations» of April 25, 1974, to the overthrow of the Marcelo Caetano’s corporate salazarist regime and to the decolonization of Portugal. For whom the long wars meant an intolerable bleeding of humans and materials resources, in the perspective of an indefinite stagnation.

But, when the colonial independence came (Angola, Guinea and Mozambique), as consequence of this point of balance reached, the valid speakers to negotiate it with the Portuguese were relatively not much, badly prepared and with a weak and superficial organization, which was not supported without the foreign «socialist» help.

The diplomatic Warfare, the normal and the heterodox.

One of the «means of intervention» of a world or regional power to obtain his «national and strategic aims» are the «Foreign Relations«. That has a concept qualitatively more extensive than the Diplomacy. This refers to the State or government affairs, that treat 2 or more nations (alliances). And the diplomatic «function» is to negotiate by the political way what communicates to him his State. department or secretary. Asking and receiving successive instructions, if it was necessary, to support and continue the negotiation. And being kept or not in his execution and protocol relations, within the qualities of discretion, prudence and tact that characterize his trade.

The international Diplomacy gets entangled.

The Foreign Relations also include other relations and more heterodox actions. That is necessary to look for, to keep and to support in the exterior to obtain our national aims. This way, a function of the foreign relations is to appear for it, new opportunities and more secondary ways or routes and «means of intervention«. The Foreign Relations collaborate directly, since always it has been done, using the means and the in force national strategy, with the Intelligence, the Economy and the national Armed Forces. That is to say, acting together in a «mix» of functions and means of intervention, the war always has been Hybrid from the Prehistory. Creating new opportunities and ways, to apply and use the whole creative and potential capacity of the State, to achieve his strategic and operational aims.

A succinct example between thousands of situations. The «central operational command of combined war» can request to Foreign Relations the search of dissident or domestic enemy in a potential enemy country. Located one o more of these, there are valued his capacities, circumstances, implantation and operational possibilities. This way, FF. RR. would present a report to the central command in the shape of a «founded resolution”, involving in it. That is, valuing schematically the existing cases and being decided by one or two, depending on his qualities and our general or punctual convenience.

Prince Klemens Wenzel Metternich (1773-1859). As diplomat was more important in his achievements, that Napoleon in his wars.

These dissidents or enemies will be politicians or also armed rebels. In the first case, our nation might grant to them asylum, scholarships, economic support and advice to his groups. In the second one, in a phase of major confrontation, we could also send supply and armaments, advisers and trainers and «special operations» or of «foreign volunteers» units, to support and/or reinforce them in his insurgents activities.

The Propaganda as a «mean of intervention«.

At the beginning of the 16th century the «reformists and heretical» ideas of the priest Martin Luther propagated in the center and north of Europe, with the help of the press. The origin of the word propaganda arises during the Counter Reformation. It is a reference to the spread of the catholic faith. With the Jesuits in the forefront of this task of catechizing. Facing to the deviations from the preexisting orthodoxy, taught by the Lutherans, Huguenots, Calvinists, Erasmists, etc. Today, the Propaganda Fide is the Vatican Catholic Congregation for the Evangelization of the Peoples.

It is not up to the I World war when the term acquires a negative or pejorative significance. It originates in the popular indignation towards the systematic efforts of the belligerent powers in that one, to manipulate in his favor the ideas and, with it, the attitudes of all, the neutral, enemies and its own population. This might be the certain modern origin of the “false news«, tendentious, insidious, sectarian, equivocal… That the Spanish-speaking snobs name «fake news» now .

This way, in the 30s of last century, the propaganda «of war» or «national» evoked in the majority of the persons the vision of malevolent forces, which were supposed strange and alienating, trying to wash their brains. The need arisen with the outbreak of the World War II, to cooperate to the effort of total war with all the available means, in an imposed conflict that was threatening the survival of the democracies, and the new advance in the sociological and psychological fields during the period between the wars, they will go progressively and firmly to the acceptance by the Western nations and his Armed Forces of the application of the psychological warfare.

The Roman Palace of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide.

The propaganda always handles basic, essential information, that are easy and simple by definition. This is due to the fact that his «aim» (the «target») is always large and numerous: the population of a certain country or region, or a religious, economic, racial or socially different extensive group. They are those that it is necessary to inform, convince and, according with the cases, to protect.

The National Economy as a «mean of intervention».

The Economy is an important and classic “mean of intervention» of the State and of the Nation. It means and involves in the effort of war the capacity of obtaining and producing all kinds of goods and services, intermediates and finals, that the technologies and processes in effect in each stage are capable of get and obtain.

Reagan and Gorbachev.

The Economy is tied here directly with the applied, specific education, of the skilled workforce, who is needed and could be achieved in a nation. The own aptitude to obtain goods or services (even with tourism, raw materials, trade) appetizing to other nations or social groups, will serve for the direct exchange or for barter of the goods and services in which a society is showing a deficit. As an example, energy or specifically qualified workforce.

Also, in cases of need and usefulness, a nation can decide to assign more productive resources to the production of a certain good. But, all more it is required specialization in the production, the performances, both neat and economic (as cost of them) will be minor. By virtue of the laws of the diminishing performance and of the increasing costs that suffer these «specialized reconverted productive processes«.

It is very easy to use the cement in producing military goods of static defense (bunkers, defensive armed lines) and not to raise buildings with it; it is relatively easy to convert the industrial vehicles factories of into armored vehicles plants. And it is very difficult to obtain great performances from a dairy changed in an arms plant.

It is evident that all this process of restructuring the capacity of production of a nation, will require the control by a political determined and firm command. And the confirmation and the support of a temporal laws of war, which decide and support it firmly. Approved by a sufficient majority of the Legislative Power.

Paradigmatic is the example of the USA and the Soviet Union, of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, in the decade of the 80 in the 20th century. The armament career that imposed the first nation collapsed the economy of the second one. That could not continue, with his economic capacity without competition (in the productive capital), nor incentives (to the workforce), the pace to which it was forcing to produce the goods and planned services. And a whole economic social politics system, as the “real socialism”, implosion and ruined. Taking with him, in a few years, the whole political military framework mounted by Moscow. In order that it was his influence sphere, his western tampons «defense» and his political social empire, after the World War II. Years later, a Soviet ex-diplomat opened his heart: «we did not have even to eat…»

The Cybernetic War, a characteristic “mean” of the modern Hybrid War.

A «mean of intervention» against the enemies or to change or to influence wills, which was not known, for unthinkable, until a few years ago, is The Cybernetic War.

The cybernetic attacks can go to the software or the hardware of the personal IT, managerial or institutional systems. The software is the «logical support» of an IT system, which makes possible the accomplishment of the different tasks. This «logical support» includes the operating system and the applications or IT programs that those realize. The hardware is the machinery or the set of physical components of the computer. This way, summarizing, the software generates instructions that are executed by the hardware or physical support of the system.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The modern Hybrid Warfare.

The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

The modern Warfare.

Till now, the wars were making between big and small «nations». They were the only capable of generating a «will of defense». This made concrete in the Armed Forces and in the economy, the diplomacy and the people support of their societies. Looking for the defense of their strategic and national interests and their survival. A procedure or protocol existed for the war declaration and for the signature of the peace agreement. The one that was not respecting the honor procedure was considered to be infamous. And if he was turning out to be defeated, could wait for a severe punishment. President Roosevelt, on Monday, the 8th of December, 1941, at 12:30 pm. hour of Washington, in his speech before the American Congress assembled in Joint Session, and transmitted by radio to the nation, was declaring: «Yesterday was a day marked by the infamy…I request you declare the existence of a State of War between the United States of America and Germany, Italy, the Japanese Empire and all their Allies». And at the end were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Resultado de imagen de george clemenceau

The contemporary wars lasted a few years. After which, exhausted the industrial capacity and the will of defense of the defeated nations, not necessarily invaded or occupied, these were accepting their defeat and the peace was signed. When the armistice or the peace conditions were too leonine and humiliating, they were originating new vital defense «impulses or take-offs» in the defeated people. Seeking to overcome and avenge the received damages and offenses. Those were the sure germ of a future war within a generation, measured in around 25 years. Just remember the treaty of Versailles or «Diktat» against Germany, signed on June 29, 1919, promoted by Georges Clemenceau, called the Tiger. Whose last payments referred to interests of the already liquidated principal debt, the reunified Germany has just done at the end of September, 2010, approximately 90 years after accepted.

The threat of the use of the atomic weapon in the war between the industrial powers, removed indefinitely the historical and recurrent danger of a war of interests of any class between them. The civil and military leaders of all of them, have exhibited throughout more than 65 years an exquisite tact, supported by the nationals diplomacy and economy, in the international relations and in the resolution of the raised conflicts. No «minor» relative question was deserving to assume the risk of an uncertain, costly nuclear warfare and without clear «victors». In any case, the big hegemonic powers or the principal ones in a strategic zone, were solving regionally his ideological and of interests fighting. And they were doing it by means of regionally limited sectoral wars.

Resultado de imagen de cuba en etiopía Cuban «internationalists» Forces supporting Ethiopia against Somalia in 1977.

Where were fighting their partners and like-minded, local, not atomic and subsidiary nations, even out of their strategic natural zone. There we have the case of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, after the decolonization of the first one. Also the fight in the Horn of Africa between Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Ethiopia, Cuba and Siad Barre’s Somalia. The latter’s overthrow, after his defeat in the war for getting the Ogaden Desert in 1991, precipitated Somalia in the chaos in which still is. And we have the Israel and the Arabic bordering countries case, which threaten her from time to time with her elimination and with throwing to the sea the surviving Jews.

The modern communications have rushed, marking character, into the contemporary wars: the wireless or waves of wide spectrum; the road networks and the diverse engine vehicles. A special challenge, which appears in all the coercive conflicts, not necessarily armed in all his phases, is the so called cybernetic war. Made concrete in the attacks to the «enemy» across the universal wireless communications network. These aggression are capable of penetrating the first and second levels of security lines, most known or common. And to commit an outrage against the databases and the processes of the normal computers of companies, individuals and institutions. Until a few years ago, only the developed states had access to this vanguard technology. And this also connects the 3th and 4th generations wars: the employment of the cyberattacks is not already only in hands of the big powers. As example, driving mad the computers of the hostile plants of enrichment of the uranium 235. Today, small nations and groups of fanned rebels or of conceited little rascals, with certain knowledge and lean resources, can realize successfully cybernetic assaults at certain level.

Resultado de imagen de guerra guerrillas Vietnam North Vietnameses regular Forces equiped with Soviet design’s PPSh-41 sub machineguns.

In the last decades, the wars are showing in very asymmetric levels of means and efforts confronted. So much is so, that the Americans call them wars of 4th generation or asymmetric wars. But they are nothing more than the old guerrilla wars of the History. And, often also, of national liberation. Let’s not forget that always the rebel and insolent enemy is despised. He is judged by the laws of armed sedition and attack against the National Security. From May, 1808 Napoleon so had in consideration the Spanish. Or the European powers to the nascent nations in Africa and Asia, after the World War II, from Algeria up to Indonesia, passing to Angola (the Portuguese were saying that she was a national province) and Vietnam.

Birth and Situation of The Hybrid Warfare.

The First Generation of wars would be marked by the development and consolidation of the State concept. The wars of The Second Generation would be characterized by the commitment of the societies in the Cause or the Mother land. His model is the French Revolution; there appear the manufacturer and transport revolutions, which made possible the extension of the operations theater, not so much the maneuvers speed, and they extended the spectrum of the objectives. In them were used literally armies of masses, where the shock had great importance and independently that the cavalry or the infantry was the principal weapon. In the wars of Third Generation, at the end of the 19th century and in the 20th, the modern technology supports and modifies the actions. And the factor that contributes to the definition of the wars of Fourth generation is the globalization and the return to the man as decisive actor.

Resultado de imagen de guerra guerrillas Afganistan contra URSS The Soviet tanks fight against an evasive and fleeting irregular enemy in Afghanistan. Who will win?

Russian Now, closing the historical and definer curl, the wars of V generation are called hybrid or multi functional wars, which, really, always have existed. With the major or minor participation of each one of the «available means of intervention» (Foreign Relations, regular and irregular Armed Forces, Economy, Cybernetics, etc) in the social group, to obtain the «functions of intervention» search for. Forming a “means” mix, adapted to all situations and confrontation theaters.

Not for nominating nowadays with an exotic and new word, preferably foreign, one makes this way a «mean or a function of intervention» fresh and promising. The problem is that the ignorance of the history, still the recent one, impoverishes the new concepts, ideas and situations of conflict. Without winning in application, efficiency and cognitive capacity with it. With this, only it falls or repeats the previous history, returning to learn it. And that, as in a spiral screw, only changes the phenomenon temporal «plane of execution«. Where are kept safe and now partly secret, the different «essential parameters» of the phenomena of the conflicts and fights.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet «experience» of fight against the insurgency between December, 1979 and January, 1989, as invading and oppressive military force, supporting a regime of his orbit, turned out to be a complete disaster for the U.S.S.R., on not having obtained any of his strategic or national aims. But, in Syria, the insurgents were settling themselves and controlling some nearly definite territories. And they were defending them well until the year 2016, after the intervention of Russia…

And the Russians from his successful, but very short experience there, praise nowadays the employment of a «center of coordinating control» in each operations theater. That would be entrusted to coordinate, in a convergent and global effort, the specific means at the disposal of the command of the theater. Every «mean of intervention» will be specialized here depending on the tasks to completing.

Resultado de imagen de rusia guerra de siria Russian Forces fight in Syria in support of al-Assad’s regime.

The tasks to coordinate in the theater, to stimulate the policies adapted to the interests of Russia and to the coexistence and the peace, would be: of military ordinary or special character and of advice; diplomatics; of cooperation with civil administrations and governmental forces or others present; of reconstruction and support of the population. Here would intervene the diplomats, civil engineers, technical personnel of administration, educators, units of rural policemen, economic advisers and sociologists. Forming mixed «functional packages» to integrate in the » coordinating center » of intervention and collaboration.

To all that the Russians call the Valery Guerasimov’s doctrine. Though it is not more than a collection of policies, trends and actions of before and now.

The military forces will be destined to the regular operations of assault and defense. Included the custody of sensitive aims, so much personal and industrial groups, as of structure and infrastructure; the establishment and defense of control positions, both fixed and itinerant; the assault to the bases, concentrations and movements of important enemy forces; the combat and/or recognnoissance patrolling that covers the territory in hands or threatened by the irregulars and the occupation of enemy taken positions.

The American multi subject doctrine is contained in the concept, the regulations and the updates of the Modern Air Land Battle. And they apply in his politics and actions the same «means of intervention» that all the great powers. The general James Mattis, Secretary of Defense until Thursday, the 20th of December, 2018, in which it was fulfilled the glass of his discrepancies with Trump. For his not consulted order of retreat of the contingent of 2 thousand American soldiers in Syria.

Mattis explained in his letter of resignation, in a condensed, easy and deep way the ideas of the Pentagon on the hybrid or multifunctional war. In order that Trump could understand it. «Our strength is joined to the strength of our system of alliances. And, in similar form, we must be unequivocal and decisive with the countries which interests and trends are opposite or are in tension with ours«.

Resultado de imagen de seal navy The SEALs.

Almost all the «means of intervention» of the State, used to obtain his national aims, already were present in the panoply of means at his disposition, a long before this new name of the Hybrid War. The «functions of intervention» were developed by «means» adapted to the real possibilities of his epoch. And they were obtaining the looked aims, though they were very specific. There we have the actions of the SAS (Special Air Service) as «special forces of punctual intervention with limited objectives” in the enemy rearguard. Fighting against this one and to support and help the local «forces of resistance to the occupant». In the USA we have to the SEALs, the Rangers, the Delta force and the Special Forces, among others. In Germany is the GSG 9 group. In Australia and New Zealand they have the same name that the British corps.

The strategic and tactical needs of the war and the functions of the «means of intervention» are slightly variable. And his variability is a function of the improvements in general training, scope, speed, capacity of shock and fire on the enemy, communications between «means», protection of these, etc. That offer the successive technologies applicable to the «means».

And all the colonial metropolis, fighting in the wars of liberation raised after the World War II, developed with variables degree and fortune, methods and policies of civil development, of link the overseas natives to the nation, of «gaining the hearts and the minds» of the autochthonous population.

The Guerrillas Wars.

The pompously so called fourth generation wars are the counterinsurgency wars or guerrilla warfare or irregular wars or armed revolts or liberation wars or organized banditry, which always have existed, coexisting with the conventional variants of warfare. They are those that the USA has lost or not gained lately: Vietnam, The Lebanon (peace disembarkation of “marines”, then demolished in their barrack) and Somalia (the uncontrollable and unforeseeable wasp’s nest of «all against all» by the local lords of the war and the Islamic militias). They are uneven wars (they call them now «asymmetrical warfare») against an enemy of lower technological military level, relative to the regular enemy forces, always rooted in the own or occupied civil population and slight militarily intense but very extensive in the space and the time.

The wars against the armed irregular are by its Nature long, painful and difficult. Its prolong character originates from the need that a popular force, departing almost from nothing, develops and spreads. Managing to moral or militarily defeat a regular own or of occupation army. The difficulty and the cruel evil arise from the high civil component that takes part in them. They are wars located in the home courtyard, in the own or occupied rear.

It is necessary, therefore, to avoid the prolongation of the conflict, which is mining the conviction of the own forces and allowing that the enemy should spread, strengthen and prevail.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

News on Modern Conflicts. Novedades en Conflictos Modernos.

Utilizamos esta Sección de Novedades para dar a conocer en avance los próximos artículos que irán apareciendo en las distintas «categorías» de temas de esta página, dedicada a los conflictos y crisis modernos.

THE WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAN. An apocalyptic war?

LA GUERRA DE ISRAEL E IRÁN. ¿Una guerra apocalíptica?

Introducción.

Tenemos delante, frente a frente, a los dos rivales más peligrosos y extraordinarios que existen sobre la Tierra. Ellos son los judíos o israelitas y los islamistas Chiíes.

¿Qué les da semejanza a los dos? Ambos tienen una religiosidad recia, a prueba de cualquier cosa, que es parte de su identidad y la esencia de su vida.

ACTION INTERFACES as Zones of TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT against the Enemy.

The action interface is a spatial concept that defines the zone and space where we develop violent action against the enemy and his means, following tactical criteria adapted to the nature of our objectives. The effective action factor in the action interfaces is the combined arms or inter-arms system.

In a penetrating attack, for example, the surface of the interfaces is quantitatively limited and these are selected in the enemy’s depth, according to their critical points and those that hinder the advance of our forces, for example, observatories and anti-tank firing points. In defense, we quantitatively increase the potential interfaces in our depth and in a somewhat laminar way.

The interface is what makes tactical action and the destruction of the enemy possible, applying a pure, chosen, selective and favorable attrition. The absence of interfaces, on the contrary, gives a certain security to any force. With the presence of the enemy, even close by, being a threat.

Terrorismo, Guerrillas y Violencia

El Terrorismo es una compleja operación Política y Violenta de amplia Variedad de acciones. Sus acciones violentas deben ser deliberadas, Continuas o Sistemáticas y buscando Influenciar a una amplia audiencia (mucho mayor que los afectados Directamente por dichas acciones violentas) y generando miedo, hasta miedo insuperable, en dicha “población blanco u objetivo”. Para que realicen y tomen las actitudes y acciones que los terroristas buscan.

Así, una acción aislada o sin interés político no es terrorismo. Será vandalismo,odio vesánico, brote psicótico… pero no es, ni será técnica o jurídicamente terrorismo.

Terrorism, Guerrillas and Violence

Terrorism is a complex Political and Violent operation with a wide Variety of actions. Their violent actions must be deliberate, Continuous or Systematic and seeking to Influence a wide audience (much larger than those directly affected by the violent actions) and generating fear, even insurmountable fear, in the “target or target population.” So that they carry out and take the attitudes and actions that the terrorists seek.

Thus, an isolated action or one without political interest is not terrorism. It will be vandalism, mad hatred, a psychotic break… but it is not, nor will it be, technically or legally, terrorism.

Inteligencia militar y nacional, fallos y resultados.

Los servicios de inteligencia de los grandes países suelen acertar muchas veces en sus opiniones y pronósticos.

Los trabajos concretos de inteligencia a los que se dedican unos pocos agentes modernos, suelen terminar con un éxito parcial o total.

Los trabajos complejos con ramificaciones y desarrollos, que esconden un futuro estimable, pero, no seguro, fallan estrepitosamente. Por esta particularidad compleja y futurible. Y, porque la capacidad de observar y medir un parámetro del alma humana es algo inaprensible, dudoso e incómodo. Seguidamente veremos varios casos concretos.

Las razones para que se produzca la divergencia de aciertos entre los casos singulares y la proyección al futuro (solución prevista) de los asuntos complejos, trascendentes al tiempo, están en parte en la dificultad de su concepción, el riesgo que se corre en aventurar y en la exposición no contrastada a los mandos. Evidentemente, existe aquí una dialéctica entre el ocultamiento realizado y el proceso cognitivo e intuitivo de su imaginación, desarrollo y proyección (solución estimada).

Military and National Intelligence, failures and results.

The intelligence services of large countries are often correct in their opinions and forecasts.

The specific intelligence tasks to which a few modern agents are dedicated usually end with partial or total success.

Complex works with ramifications and developments, which hide an estimable but not certain future, fail miserably. Because of this complex and future peculiarity. And, because the ability to observe and measure a parameter of the human soul is something elusive, doubtful and uncomfortable. Next we will see several specific cases.

The reasons for the divergence of successes between singular cases and the projection into the future (foreseen solution) of complex issues, transcending time, are partly in the difficulty of their conception, in the risk that is run in venturing and in the non contrasted exposure to the commands. Obviously, there is a dialectic here between the concealment carried out and the cognitive and intuitive process of its imagination, development and projection (estimated solution).

HAMAS ATACA A ISRAEL EN 2023.

Los distintos atacantes llevaron a cabo un “ataque de enjambre” sobre posiciones en el centro y sur de Israel. Varios, de los principios o normas de las fuerzas militares en un ataque convencional fueron desatendidos. Por ejemplo, la unidad del objetivo y la unidad del mando de las fuerzas y el mantenimiento de una estructura, de un despliegue para todas las fuerzas atacantes. Aquí, cada pequeña “unidad de acción” islamista tenía su propio jefe y su particular objetivo. Y, es el conjunto de acciones del “enjambre atacante” el que define la estrategia y el complejo objetivo real de Hamas.

LA GUERRA DE MANIOBRAS. EL CONCEPTO DE LA BATALLA AÉREO TERRESTRE MODERNA. UNA INTERPRETACIÓN DEL MARISCAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

Un ejemplo poco conocido de la trascendencia omnipresente de la logística y de su línea de comunicación (más o menos ramificada) en las operaciones y muy importante por sus resultados finales, es la operación denominada DONBASS (la gran zona operativa) por los soviéticos, desarrollada entre el 29 de enero y mediados de marzo de 1943, al sudoeste del río Donetz. Ella forma parte de lo que los alemanes llamaron la batalla del DONETZ: el último éxito estratégico de Von Manstein, que fue malogrado por Hitler en Kursk.

THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE. AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

A little known example illustrates the omnipresent transcendence of logistics and the line of communication (more or less branched out) in operations and their final results. Between January 29 and mid-March 1943, the Soviets developed an operation called Donbass at the southwest of the Donetz. This operation forms part of what the Germans called the battle of the Donetz. And was Marschal von Manstein’s last strategic success. Which wasted by Hitler in Kursk.

Valery Gerasimov, comandante militar ruso en Ucrania.

Con todas las derrotas acumuladas padecidas por el Ejército de la Federación rusa en su “operación militar especial” en Ucrania desde el 24 de febrero de 2022 hasta ahora, Vladimiro Putin no descansa, se irrita y no tiene paz.

Su último “as en la manga” es el general de ejército Valery Gerasimov, nacido en la ciudad rusa de Kazan, hace 67 años y jefe del Estado Mayor General desde 2012.

Una edad casi ideal para el trabajo que se le viene encima. Definido por organización, cambios estructurales, disciplina, flujo suficiente de medios y mano dura.

Valery Gerasimov, Russian military commander in Ukraine.

With all the accumulated defeats suffered by the Army of the Russian Federation in its «special military operation» in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 until now, Vladimir Putin does not rest, he is irritated and has no peace.

LA PSICOLOGÍA DE LOS TERRORISTAS ISLAMISTAS

La civilización y sus estructuras vital y social en sus interacciones con los individuos y su psicología.

El fallo de los yihadistas en integrarse en un «grupo con creencias y virtudes (los valores permanentes) compartidos». Que le den identidad, sentido y pertenencia a sus vidas.

¿Por qué se comportan así? ¿Cómo tratar a los recuperables? ¿Cómo combatir a los vitandos o recalcitrantes?

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIST TERRORISTS

The civilization and his vital and social structures , in his interactions with the individuals and their psychology.

The failure of the jihadists in joining a «group with shared beliefs and virtues» (the permanent values). That give to their lives identity, sense and belonging.

Why do they behave this way? How to treat the recoverable ones? How to attack the hatefuls or recalcitrant terroris

THE PERSECUTIONS TO THE MODERN CHRISTIANS.

There is taking place in the last months a real «planetary conjunction». It is about the «temporal coincidence» of a bloody and fierce pursuit of the Christians, whose «green outbreaks» are in the Arabic Islamic countries. That is coincidental with the solvent, quiet and cunning action of the European «trendies», against the virtues of the European societies. Both actions are surely a «cosmic part» of the so called «Mysterium iniquitatis» or agree to the Darkness.

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY OF RUSSIA.

The first national foreign aim of Russian is to promote the «multipolarity in the world structure» of the great powers and his allies. Looking that does not exist a world hegemonic power as the USA, which hinders her in the extension of her influence and power from his «Euro-Asian center». For it, she will create alliances and will establish agreements and treaties with third parties in detriment or in substitution of that hegemonic power. And she will be a «intransigent obstructionist actor» in all the actions that this unilaterally promotes in the international forums (UNO, Atomic International Energy Agency).

NOTHING CALMING…

Another great strategic preference of Moscow is to extend his influence and to enlarge the economic and diplomatic bonds with the nations in development, specially those who have «natural resources and primary crops», that are necessary for the manufacturing production, the feeding and the general development of the nations. She has taken them and will take them even far, beyond of her geographical borders of political influence or military strategic.

The loss of her «controlled allies» in the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, after the cold war, only leave Russia to geographically look for «new influences» towards the Central Asia, from Syria to the India and Vietnam. Turkey is a proverbial enemy of the Russians. In Afghanistan they could never have situated. Which is social political constant for other powers that have tried it in other moments. Also the Russians try to win and to keep in his «political and commercial sphere» the new Central Asiatic Islamic Turkoman republics and to the ex-Soviets Slavonic republics, these with almost none possibilities.

In the Turkestán Oriental, one finds a rosary of former Soviet socialist republics of approximately 2 thousand Kms of length, which reaches up to the oriental shore of the Caspian Sea. They are, from east to west, Kazajistan, Kirguistan, Tadzikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. That form a set of several ethnics, gathered in the names of them, but simultaneously extended over several countries. That are of Turkoman origin, from the central steppes of Asia, and agglutinated also by their belonging to the sunni Islam. These Turkoman Muslims are potentials allieds of Russia, in all that this puts a bit of dedication and neatness to attract and to attend them. And, till now, the Customs Union created by Russia includes only the White Russia or Byelorussia and Kazajistan. In addition, Russia has signed military agreements with Byelorussia, Armenia, Kazajistan, Kirguistan and Tajikistan. Established in the frame of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). And that guarantee to these countries at the East of Europe and in the Central Asia a defense against external or internal aggressions. And they offer to Russia an extension of her international influence.

PRESIDENTS OF RUSSIA, BIELORRUSIA, KAZAJISTAN, KIRGUISTAN, UZBEKISTAN, ARMENIA AND TAJIKISTAN ASSEMBLED FOR ANTITERRORIST COOPERATION .

If Russia thinks that there are at stake her national interests or her national pride, it proves to be stuck-up and deigns and, even, aggressive. One of the neurotic tics of the exterior politics of Moscow is the dismemberment of the Soviet empire 25 years ago. That many attribute, not to her implosion, for lack of resources and economic expired structures, and of social motivation. But to international abuses, which benefited of her relating to the moment weakness.

When the Russians meet strategic international problems, they demonstrate more freedom of action, initiative, creativity and flexibility in his offers and actions. Russia uses the whole set of means and capacities of a modern State to go forward, to tease, to complicate and to deactivate the actions and the resources used by the West. This way, Russia uses the propaganda of State, employing: a great profusion of audio-visual communications, which we do not know in Spain; immediate refutations of the rivals’ arguments; employment of credible arguments to deny her relation with the observable facts; sending of humanitarian help in great and showy caravans to the zones in conflict. The diplomacy, where there faces John Kerry, a provisional struck politician, with Serguei Lavrov’s extensive career, and keeping meetings and visits with western chief executive agents and of the regional involved countries; doing declarations and agreements, which ended suspended, protested or broken; realizing attempts of bribe to European politicians of second level. The economy, as in the cases of China and of Spanish America. And answering to the western sanctions for her militar actions in Ukraine with measured suspensions and charges of her European imports, which are afraid by the Europe of the merchants. Military, sending: «paramilitary voluntary» forces; regular forces and military modern equipments, sometimes accompanied by the experts in their using or for their training; delivering weapon and military material to hier sponsored; and realizing «diffuse violations» of the air space of the countries at the west of her European border, more concretely in the Baltic sea and his coastal countries.

KERRY AND LAVROV.

Not they all are goodness and advantages in a super presidential regime. The concentrated and decisive power has to be administered in small doses, not to abuse, neither to damage, nor to fall down in the temptation of looking for his indefinite continuity. The despotism (that arises from the rotten conviction of the commands that «they» have «saved» a «his» mother land), the corruption and the clientelism, spread over the power circles and his boundaries, become manifest and customary in the society. The political and ideological opposition, with his critiques, parliamentary actions and street protests, can become almost unbearable. For whom are centered in planning, deciding and executing in altars of the people, but not with the people. The jail and the properties confiscation are reprisals used in all the times, which its origin gets lost in the night of the times, in the prehistory. Used against the dissidents, uncontrollable and disobedient and for all the potential (imagined or not) and real enemies of the regime.

In her relations with the West, Russia distinguishes two great «geopolitical spaces»: the USA and the European Union. The USA is the great rival, but not yet enemy. With that she tries to compete and whom she tries to erode in all the occasions to which she can reach. Russia follows the politic strategic theory of the multipolar world. That would possess several great «radiant centers» of influence and control. Where there would no be hegemonic global powers, which they could control and/or dominate more or less, according to their interests. This global strategy is well see by all the continental and, yet, regional powers, that possess sufficient capacities and international aspirations of projection and ascendancy.

Before the united Europe, Russia is seen herself as an equal. The first one exceeds her in demography and in economic capacity. And Russia has to her favor an AAFF, even the Branch of Strategic Missiles, sufficient and with only one Command. That are supported by her economy and diplomacy. Since she possesses a political, enough monolithic or integrated leadership. That, before a confrontation or an arisen opportunity, can operate with more major forcefulness and rapidity that the endogamic and paralyzed bureaucracy of the Union Europe. And opposite to the great geopolitical region of the Eastern Europe, formed by her former allied in the Warsaw Pact and the Comecom (the former economic communist union based in the specialization in national activities), has to act with a strategy of successive actions or of the artichoke. Because an excess of «pressure» over them, only would achieve that they agglutinate between them more; and link themselves more economic and militarily to the western nations…

But, also Russia uses the more or less veiled interference in the internal matters of her rivals. Seeking to create social problems and centrifugal trends, still heart-breaking, in their social fabric. Taking advantage for it of the freedom of expression, which is one of the values of the western civilization. This way, Russia acts against Europe supporting the most promising solvent movements. Some are populist and antisystem, which operate against the shared values and beliefs, which shape and form the western civilization. Others are nationalists and sovereignists, that fight against Europa’s multinational integration and his construction. This way, in Germany Police has materialized an «alliance» between the Youths of the Party Alternative for Germany (AfD) with the Young Guard of Russia. The man of connection between Moscow and the AfD is his vice-president, Alexander Garland. That re-joins regularly with Alexander Dugin, a man with the confidence of Putin. And the members and Euro MPs of the AfD support the movement of British euroexceptics and hinder the approval of the measures for the European construction in the Eurochamber of Brussels.

The political military extern action.

The operational strategy of Russia consists in acting by means of «emphasized» allies in a given geopolitical theatre. This way, she regionally uses these «interposed actors», more or less strong, independent and «sovereign». In order that they give her in the intervention in the conflict, (that her is seemingly foreign, as Russia is a middle-high continental power), a stamp of international category and legality and of reliability and seriousness before the international community, specially with the not western countries.

Also Moscow acts in the «diffuse external limits» of his former «imperial living space». She does it «supporting», with a great range of possibilities, almost made-to-measure, at different Russian or Christian communities, which are «separated» from the mother land. This way, there are some republics or «ethnic communities», apart from the two that we will mention in the case of Georgia, which receive the opportune help of Russia. They are the Transnistria, of etnia Russian, placed at the East of Moldavia, which is of Rumanian population, and Nagorno Karabaj, where live the karabajos Armenians, that is in the center of Azerbaijan, which is of sunni religion. Azerbaijan is frontier with Russia and with Turkey and receives the support of the last one.

Georgia:

In 2008, in her asymmetric and overwhelming war against Georgia, Russia was served by the «independents» of South Osetia and Abjasia (embraced at the North-East of the Black Sea), two «rebels» Georgian provinces. The pretext was to come to the defense of these nations, which had many Russian habitants, to defend them from the Georgian «arbitrarinesses and assaults». Already existed since years «Russian forces of pacification» in Ossetia of the South, which immediately took sides with the independents.

GEORGIAN TROOPS BAIL OUT A VEHICLE AT OUTSKIRTS OF GORI

Ukraine:

Following his direct, imperious and operating manners, in the middle of December, 2013, Putin threw a strong bet to Ukraine. In order that she was happening to form part of the Russian «sphere of coprosperity«: Putin offered her to lower 33 % the price of transfer of the Russian gas, of which Ukraine is recipient and reseller. And, to save her from the financial bankruptcy and she did not have to be thrown for it in hands of the Community Troika, he would yield her until $15 billions in beneficial credits. But, in Ukraine the social politics problems arisen have led to a strong polarization of the country, being formed two almost antagonistic halves. Where the part al the west of Crimea, wants to move away from Moscow and the half at the east of this peninsula, seeks to increase the bonds with Russia. Ukraine is for history and demography part of the Europe limited at the east part by the Urals. And Ukraine is by political opportunity and historical moment, part of the democratic and liberal western center Europe. That forms together with the United States, which operates as another fundamental «vibrant pole» at the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the «Western Civilization «.

For Russia, Ukraine is something more than a strategic ally. Ukraine is a part of the national Russian essence. In Ukraine was born many hundreds years ago, the strong and promising germ of the Russian nation, the Rus. And Russia has bet high. Trying to return for his rights, traditions and influences. Or she will have to accept with turning into a «national state«, without «coprosperity sphere» dependent, participative and profitable for all. So, a «regional or second-class power», as named her the president Obama at the beginnings of this crisis.

From the spring of 2014, the opposition armed in the Novarussia (this way, the prorussians separatists autoname his territory in the basin of the Donbass and adjacent zones) is supported by the Russians. That openly send military equipments (intermingled sometimes with convoy of humanitarian help for the civil population of the region); groups of internationalists «volunteers»: Cossaks, Russians, even prorussians veteran Chechenians; specialists (engineers, gunners, instructors, servants of short range missils and of anti-aircraft weapons, elite forces) for the high level military tasks. And pressing the central Ukrainians in the common border with movements and parkings of her motorized troops, at the west of Rostov on the Don. It deserves indicating that Novarussia’s republic is not internationally recognized.

The «national rebels» and the central government of Kiev, with the president Petró Poroshenko at head, have followed till now an operational strategy of give and take, of the strategic «cachumbambe«. Where everything is enough measured and reasonably controlled. To be advancing each part by short and few steps. Without the beast of the open warfare between nations and alliances irreversibly runs away. And so we are and will continue for long time. This way, the points of the Agreements of Minsk are dissolved and in «stand by» or in neutralized wait. Looking that do not break them, for the continuous small violations of the truce agreed by the parts.

POROSHENKO AND PUTIN…

A great problem appears now, not only to Ukraine, but to his neighbors at the east and west parts. And it is to obtain that the today antagonists and irreconcilable forces, that face in Ukraine, crushing his mother land, turn into complementary and necessary forces between them. And it is a great joint, disinterested labor, with height sights and directed by statesmen, which is necessary to develop to obtain it. In the case of not be obtaining this «merger of interests», the alternative would be bad for all, nationals and nearby and distant neighbors. And the wound only would be falsely closed and for an unforseeable time.

Syria:

From the beginnings of July, 2015, the Russians have been increasing his military direct presence in Syria. His armed forces have established themselves principally in the Latakia, covering Tarsus’s surroundings, his only naval base in the Mediterranean and his military airport. They include fighter-bombers, assault and carrier and rescue helicopters (with a centener of machines always operational), not driven aircraft of reconnaissance and bombardment and the corresponding ground units of support and of security. And now, from the ends of September, they are bombarding the positions of the armed rebels to the regime of al-Assad, at Alepo’s southwest; in the Latakia; near to Hama, Homs and Damascus, in the basin of the Orontes; in Idlib’s province and in the Turkoman zone close to the border; in Raqqa and other positions of the IS, in the North-East of the country and in the great desert of Syria. Recovering Palmira at the end of March, 2016, which fell down in May, 2015 in hands of the Daesh or ISSI. A spokesperson of the Russian Defense Department declared that «they would not operate there indefinitely» and that they were calculating that they would need «approximately 100 days» of air assaults. These days have doubled, up to almost the spring of 2015, before Putin was initiating a partial and sufficient withdraw of his military means. The Kurdish peshmerrgas of the YPG, the national allies of the USA, deployed by the whole center oriental border with Turkey, have not been bothered by the Russians. Between those who have suffered his unexpected assaults are the irregular forces of the Front al-Nusrah for the Liberation of the Peoples of the East, the national subsidiary of al-Qaeda. So dangerous and ideologically radical as the muyahidines of the Islamic State, but less cruel and less capable militarily.

To the reproaches of some western countries against this intervention, Putin and Lavrov argued that the «multinational Coalition of the 60 allies» was coming bombarding the salafists jihadists from September, 2014, without having for it a mandate of the UNO. Sure that Obama’s coalition was attacking in Iraq, with the theoretic and «previous daily permission» of the Iraqi government. In fact, the general of four stars James Terry, who is the chief of the American forces in Iraq from November, 2014, acts as an undeserved speaker for his high graduation, with the government and the discredited armed forces and Iraqi militias. But the assaults on Syria of the allies were not possessing the consent of his regime. And were going operationally supporting the peshmergas and debilitating the ISSI. Let’s emphasize that the Russians, as the mentioned leaders have justified themselves, «are very polite and are operating in Syria for invitation of his government».

It is of remembering that Syria was during decades the allied one in the Middle East of the USSR, and today, of Russia. And that Syria was considered also during decades a terrorist antiwestern state. Of the style of North Korea. That literally flooded the whole geopolitical Islamic region with the assault rifles AK and the grenade-launchers of hollow load RPG, for the guerrilla groups of “popular liberation”.

FRIENDS FOR EVER…

Russia wants to recover her international protagonism and respect. In spite of her diminished demographic, economic and structural capacities. And her loss of prestige democratic and politic, gained with the conflict of Crimea and Ukraine. But, with the military intervention in Syria, Putin attacks the root of the problem of the “fled Syrians”: that is the pressure of a cruel and long civil war on them. And it allows him to calm the Europeans with the short-term containment of the massive and constant invasion of those. Looking for an attenuation of the economic sanctions of the European Union to the government of Putin for his shameless actions in Ukraine.

Russia also supports and gives a strong accolade to the Syrian regime with her intervention. After 5 years of war, the National Syrian Army is exhausted and weaked by a bleeding of more than 70 thousand dead men, suffering continuous desertions towards the different rebels groups (from the Free Syrian Army to the jihadists groups) and having great difficulties to mobilize recruits. The soldiers at arms in April, 2011, if still are suitable, have not been licensed of the service. The militias sent by Hezbola’s shiis in 2014 to support them have not been sufficient to change the course of the war against al-Assad. The government already did not have enough men to realize counterinsurgency effective operations, against the armed rebels. Who were harassing him from numerous and divided «attack strips» through the whole Syrian geography. Especially, he lacks the «specialists» and means of the artillery and of the ground assault aviation.

Obama said: «the moral leadership is a weapon much more powerful than the brute force». This is true, when the concerned speakers possess and exhibit the same civil virtues that a democrat. But, when it is a question of beasts, of selfish, of madmen, of unscrupulous opportunists, of peoples that still perceive the force as the instrument of the strongest, this is not useful. It does not matter in the social level in which they are. The leadership is to convince, to direct with the example, to attract the persons towards oneself, for pure pleasure, affinity or mission. To realize a joint labor in benefit of the social group to which one belongs.

And this social role is left out by Obama in Syria. And also some time ago that he ignores, for carelessness or disability and lack of conscience of his identity, the European Union. The one that is not waited in “these fights and by these homes”. But, the political thing, the res politica, has horror and abominates of the «emptinesses», of the «absences». And, this way, he has been attracted by the suction of both, the opportunist of Putin, anxious to lead another more international episode. For that his people, from the first of 2014, proudly endorses him. To compensate his impoverished national revenue and his diminishing demography, Putin gives them international protagonism and national pride.

On March 14, Putin began to dismantle his military deployment in Syria. But left it sufficiently capable, in order that the NSA could expel from Palmira, a few days later, the guerrillas of the ISSI. Possessing the support of the Russians elite infantry forces and heavy air fire for his ground motorized forces. With it, Putin partly removes himself of the peace conversations of Geneva for Syria. And stays, as the only speaker with the not miscible and schizophrenic miscellany of the rebels, the regime of al-Assad. Because, if not, with whom are the jihadists and the National Council of Syria going to negotiate? In this absurd mixture are, between others, the Army of the Conquest, the Muyahidines of Syria, the Army of the Islam, the local Kurds, the Islamist Front anti al-Qaeda and local groups of «partners» to someone. Only in Idbil’s province, at the North-East of the country, in the border with Turkey, there existed more than 100 «different» rebel «groups». And Putin saves himself to return, if he considers necessarily. As he only withdrew around a third of his air operational forces. And he goes forward the movements of the Coalition, which still has not put foot in land. Though Arabia and Qatar offered in February to send ground troops to the conflict. But, how were they going to coordinate and operate in a «polyhostile» territory and without authorization of his government?

Russia uses the Economy as one of the means of her National Strategy.

Using the economy, one of the forces of the national strategy or great strategy of a country, helped by the diplomacy, other one of the potentials of her, Russia seeks to create with the emergent countries «cores of action and shared prosperity». Those Initiated or cultivated in a world that Russia wishes that would be «multipolarized» in diverse «cores and centers of geopolitical power». That they necessarily reduce this way, for their mere existence, the great western powers, today «dependents of the world trade».

The relations with communist China:

China is for Russia a partner, competitor and rival, if serves this polyvalent definition, which does that none of the expressions used is in fullness. Both are «emergent powers», according to the new nomenclature. Determined in growing, in not be directly damaging for the moment and in eroding the hegemonic power and his Europeans allied. This way, the Chinese would not act directly, not by third interposed countries, in Syria or in Iraq, in the boiling cauldron of the Asia of the Southwest: scene of the global contest that sunnis and shiites develop for the control and the supremacy in the Islam.

But they will do it collaborating uo to a point with the interests and the diplomatic propositions of the Russians. Reinforcing this way a political common position of counterweight and neutralization of the influence of West in the zone. And in exchange for a certain Russian reciprocity in favour of the Chinese interests, in other countries in which do not collide the national influences of both.

PUTIN AND XI JIPING, AFTER SIGNED THE GAS AGREEMENT

With his habitual opportunity and operational agility, Putin signed with the president Xi Jinping on Wednesday, the 21st of May, 2014 a strategic contract (30 years of validity) to supply to China around 38 billions of ms3 of Russian gas every year. Certain it is that the negotiations of this transcendental contract have extended during a decade, but the opportunity of his signature for both partners is undeniable. Russia has determined his signature lowering a little the price of transfer, which has not leaked out, and that was the principal obstacle for the agreement between Russian State entity Gazprom and the National Corporation of the Oil of China. There will be begun immediately the installation of a new gas pipeline between Siberia and China, which will cost 55 $ billion and that will be operational in 4 years. China obtains this way a stable supply of part of his energetic primary needs (about 25 %), which will allow him to be reducing his strategic dependence of his national coal. Whose combustion is the principal generating factor of the massive pollution that suffer nowadays the great cities and the industrialized coast of China. It is calculated, according to the official estimations, that China will need 400 billions of ms3 of gas by the year 2020, doubling the current consumption of gas. Which opens the possibility for new extensions of the Russian supply In the frame of this agreement. By his part, looking for alternative markets for his primary energy, Putin reduces transcendency and efficiency with this commercial operation, to the babbling actions of the European Union. For replace part of the supply of the Russian gas, using other hypothetical suppliers of allende the seas. And, in addition, any strangulation of the current service by his buyers, will force the EU to increase his help to Ukraine, to compensate his «reduced income» for the passage of the gas by his territory.

This agreement of energetic supply between Russia and China untied on Thursday, the 21st of May of this year the fears of the European Union and stood out his disability of joint and efficient reaction. The president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, sent a letter to Vladimir Putin, demanding from the Russian president that ihe fulfills his commitments and assures «the supply to the European companies in the decided level». Barroso received the order from the European chiefs of Government of answering in their name to Putin. In spite of that this had gone directly to several members states, to indicate them the problem that they would untie with the establishment of economic sanctions to Russia. «I write you in name of the European Union and his 28 States members«, Durao Barroso headed his letter. «I ask you for a constructive approach» to the created situation. And it was useful to indicate him that the fact that Gazprom should assure «a responsible supply» goes «in interest of all», included Russia. In a conference that took place the same day in Poland, the president of the Commission (The Concil of European Commissioners or Secretaries) he said that Moscow exports 80% of his oil and 70% of his gas to the EU. And that «is by far the most attractive market for Russia».

THE CHINDITS: FORCES OF DEEP INCURSION.

AN OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION OF THE ENEMY REAR

A process that we will call of «cascade surprise» was created at the south of the operations theater of the Far East by the British general Orde Wingate at the beginning of 1.944. For it he used the deep incursion force, type light reinforced division, called the Chindits. This name is taken from the Burman god Chinthe, the protective god of the religion (or of the State), that could attack the enemies from nine different directions… His principal mission was to cut the internal communications of units (advance and retreat) and supplies (supports, substitutions and replacements) of the Japanese forces, that were opposed to the advance, at the north of Burma, of the Americans Chinese forces of general Stilwell. These were advancing from China towards the south, with the aim to conquer the Burman populations of Mogaung and Myitkyina and also to occupy and assure the zone at the south of these railway knots, so creating for them an area of stable rear. With it, they were seeking to be able to permanently open and extend a road and a pipeline from the north of Assam, in India, to Yunan, in China.

THEIR PATCH, FROM CINTHE GOD.

This would allow to supply a fleet of American bombardiers and their fighters escorts with base in Yunan. That would be destined to reinforce the effort of war of the wrecked Chinese, who were fighting from 1.937 their own war, against the Japanese expansionism in the continental Asia. And that were now unmotivated up to a point, that Chiang Kai Check wanted to go out of the war. This hypothetical armistice would liberate around 25 Japanese divisions, that were situated in China, operating and placed, to be destined where the Imperial High Staff considers to be suitable. For example, to accelerate the invasion of India, to include it in the «Co prosperity’s Asian Zone» that the Empire of the Japan was praising for the “Oriental and the Pacific Asia”. Under his politician and economic influence, opposite to the Western alien Powers.

OPERATIONS ZONE.

A conventional advance from India, by the Fourteen British Indian Army of the general Slim against this deep Japanese rear and from an expected and protected flank, was impracticable. Due to the distance to cross; to the area to winning and assuring; to the tenacity of the Japanese infantry soldiers; to the number of the Japanese deployed forces «in the same way and opposed direction”, as the Nippon were trying to reach the already nearby border of India with Burma, and to the difficulty of the the jungle fighting. That was a «thick» enviroment for the movements of the ground forces of both rivals, with obstructed and very nearby sights and where were abounding the tropical diseases.

The Development of the Operations.

The «second Chindit expedition» was inserted in March of 1.944, on the basis of the operational experience acquired the previous year with the first one. Where Wingate verified two essential parameters for the foreseen operations: that British Indian «line forces”, specifically trained for these tasks of deep incursion, could fight the Japanese in the jungle; and that these forces could indefinitely be supplied by air, as the Allies had the air supremacy in his operations zone and possessed enough air transport capacity for the task. They took part as incursion forces, the brigades 16, that from the first of February advanced afoot around 1.000 km towards Indaw, 77 and 111 of the British Indian Army, strong in more than 12 thousand men. That were joining in the 3th British Indian Division, of his «battle order». In April of 1.944 the 14 brigade joined it, landing in Aberdeen’s base, close to the way obstruction of White City, and immediately attacked several Japanese supplies depots. Wingate always thought in the employment of regular units, not about elite troops. And that their replacements were coming from the different units of the Army, specially the Fourteen Army of Slim. But did not count with the «perverse» trend of the units commands, of preferably being doing without the idlers and the problematic men, handing them over to other units. This way, the Chindits’ recruitment units had to reject at part of the candidates, as well as also those that were overcoming 40 years. Which is really an age very advanced to begin in the difficulties of the war in the jungles.

MARCHING ON: CROSSING A STREAM…

The gliders, freight planes and light aircrafts, due escorted, began to come to Broadway, in the north, and to Picadilly, in the south, of the chosen landing zone. It was a question of establishing a “fortified bolt” over the railroad and the road between Indaw, at the south, and Mohyen, towards the north, in the rear of the Japanese forces that were advancing towards the north, to China, and eastward, to India. The location of the place of the promising operational obstruction was discovered in the air reconnaissance done by Wingate, which chose her opposite to another alternative, because in the small valleys included in his perimeter, could be established, cover from the sights, all the auxiliary services of the defensive zone, as the mules, the health, the exterior communications, the stores, etc. White City, the defensive position, was due fortified by the engineers and equipped with 40 mm. anti-aircraft Bofors cannons, 75 mm. mortars and 25 pounds cannons (> 11 Kg and > 90 mm.) and Vickers 7, 7 mm. heavy machine guns. Between the hills that were framing the enclosure and that were integrating it, was installed even a runway for small airplanes.

A PACK OF MULES…

For the transport in broken and jungle ground, the Chindits were using packs of mules in all his marching columns. Each animal was in charge of a given muleteer, entrusted of his guide, care and subsistence. And not always, specially at the end of their operations, the muleteers were due trained for his trade. The packs were transporting the ammunitions, the provisioning, the heavy weapons, the supplies, the radio devices and other equipments and consumables. The train of mules of every unit was very vulnerable to a Japanese assault. Also, the animals of the redoubts, where it was difficult to bury them or to due protect them under covers, were vulnerable to the Japanese heavy fire. With it, the mules trains was turning into a serious vulnerability of the units. Since without it the operations of march and attack, consubstantial with the Chindits ethos, were impossible in this fighting ground of so difficult transitability. Bad going is not as precise definition and concept.

In the operations zone, the climate was hard, the comfort, which relieves the efforts of the war, was scanty, the life was rough and the woodland diseases seriously and repeatedly affected the men and the beasts, in high percentage and intensity, during the few months of operations in the Burma jungles. And the general task of harassment and weakening of the Japanese forces in their communication and supplies lines of towards Chinese and Indian fronts was carried out. The strategic operational concept that sublied was the exploitation of the Japanese deep rear, where were abounding his tactical and operational vulnerabilities and the absence of combat availability or readiness, on having been removed his forces from the combats fronts. The Chindits managed to fix indefinitely in this rear around two and half Japanese divisions, dedicated to their control and pursuit, or, around 2,5 times their own combat capacity.

Analysis and Interpretation of the Chindit Second Campaign.

The Chindits operations are exploitation actions in the enemy rear by enough and mobile forces. These are inserted deeply in it by their own aviation. This is not the usual case of the attack and breakthrough of a sector or strip of the enemy front. And then the irruption of “mobile corp”. That advances within the enemy rear to exploit his vulnerabilities; to destroy his units in reform or in march to their initial bases; to turn up the fighting fronts of his units at the defensive, so collaborating in annihilating them; to capture or destroy all kinds of logistic enemy means; to attack his valuable and vulnerable units (artillery, engineers, command and control, communications); to temporarily occupy ground communications hubs, defiles, mountain ports and riverheads and lakeheads, etc.

The necessary coordination of the “mobile corp” with his «support mass” or “immediate supporting rear”, is realized in this campaign by a stable, sufficient and not bothered airway. Whose link of union with the Chindits operational brigades (-) and battalions (+) are the fortified blocking bases (White City, Broadway, Aberdeen, Blackpool) established within the Japanese zone. And that were acting as “initial bases of depart” of their attack operations.

It was calculated that the Chindits caused more than 12 thousand losses to the Japanese forces, with their loss in combat of only a few hundreds of men. But the Chindits neither defeated decisively any Japanese great unit, nor conquered any relevant enemy position. So his transcendence, for the Allied military plans and the importance of the actions against the enemy, remained dispersed, appeased and darkened by the great maneuvers of the war in this South Asian theater and for the strategic and operational interests of the three great actors in it: British and Indians, American and Chinese.

GENERAL ORDE WINGATE.

After Wingate’s unexpected death in a plane crash, his successor, general Lentaigne, established in Blackpool, at around 100 km at north of White City, another fortified obstructionist position, as alternative and reinforcement of this. And since the Chindits operations and the interest of the war was moving more towards the border with China, the Chindits stayed already under the command of the Americans. And Stilwell, gave to them the task of a “great light conventional unit”, coordinated with the effort towards Birmania of the American Chinese forces. With the missions to attack in force from the south the positions over which those were advancing. It is of indicating that the same Lentaigne, which did not have the creativity, the ancestry, the respect between his equals and the will of Wingate, managed to partly accepted Stilwell’s conventional and orthodox points of view, in relation to the operational employment of the Chindits.

At the beginning of 1.944 Stiwell had one unit of «deep raiders”, the so called «Merrill’s Marauders». But they did not have the scope, the projection, the capacity and the operational conception that the Chindits had from the beginning, in his second incursion of this year. In addition, without the substitutions and replacements needed, used as another American Chinese advance spear in the Burma campaign and plagued by the infectious diseases, the combative efficiency of the Chindits plummeted very soon. And, a few months later, in 1.945, they were already totally demobilized.

PREFERENCIAS ESTRATÉGICAS DE LOS YIHADISTAS II.

(CONTINUACIÓN)

8) Las comunicaciones estratégicas de las guerrillas son precarias o ausentes, insuficientes, descuidadas y vulnerables en los grupos yihadistas. Y todo se debe a su constitución en red, desparramada, confusa y difusa que les caracteriza. Y no se trata de los mensajes, recados o alertas, que siempre pueden ser remitidos y recibidos, que sólo tienen trascendencia táctica. Y no es consecuencia de la alternancia de los despliegues y concentraciones en las acciones militares. Dichas comunicaciones son: Con las bases, para su descanso, refugio, reorganización, adoctrinamiento, información, apoyo logístico y su protección imprescindible contra el agostador “vagabundeo” estéril. Con las bandas afines o asociadas, para el apoyo en general, la información y su concentración operativa para las distintas tareas. Con el pueblo, para su descanso, refugio temporal, soporte y medios varios, información y la acción ideológica religiosa, para facilitar la necesaria extensión territorial y humana posterior.

9) Uno de sus objetivos estratégicos es golpear a cualquier gobierno, de cualquier origen y sociedad, con tal de que los “objetivos posibles” les sean asequibles. Puesto que el califato radical y agresivo del Dar el–Islam de los inicios del Califato sunní, no existe hoy en día y no se pueden integrar en él para su “defensa”.

10) Tienen un afán arraigado, aguzado y consistente de hacer publicidad de sus acciones con éxito. Con el que Occidente colabora insensible y gustoso de extender y defender la libre información. Logrando con todo ello la magnificación y la exaltación de unos resultados dolorosos e inconexos. Que les brindan un protagonismo social y religioso muy superior a la trascendencia operativa de ellos. Esto no es más que la extensión del terror y de sus consecuencias políticas e ideológicas, mediante las “ondas de conmoción” que transmiten sin filtrar nuestras modernas comunicaciones a todos los pueblos, especialmente a nosotros, los europeos. Pero, todas las posiciones y actitudes sicológicas e ideológicas son también objetivos a defender y a conquistar por Occidente, en esta guerra de baja intensidad por la extensión de un dominio radical, anticuado, excluyente e impuesto.

Los “lobos solitarios” y la libertad de expresión ilimitable en Occidente.

Los lobos solitarios terroristas suicidas surgen por la conjunción de varias deficiencias, desdichas e ideología humanas. Casi todos son jóvenes llenos de idealismo (sacrificio por su grupo familiar y social y búsqueda de un futuro prometedor) y de intereses vitales, que están en plena ebullición de realizaciones. Su situación social y cultural suele ser deficiente e imprecisa. Sufren una marginación real y/o magnificada por la imaginación. Casi todos nosotros, puestos a ello, podemos esgrimir un montón de insuficiencias o carencias personales y colectivas, sicológicas y materiales, no resueltas. Y, como no nos las resuelven los demás, decir que estamos excluidos de la sociedad, es una acogedora huida de la realidad y un íntimo y verdadero dudar de nuestras propias capacidades (esto, jamás lo aceptarán), para culpar a los demás de nuestras desventuras. Además, la búsqueda de las carencias nos llevaría siempre a empantanarnos en añorar y conseguir los “deseos” omnipresentes e inextinguibles. Y esta “búsqueda negativa” nos puede impedir volcarnos en salir adelante, teniendo metas asequibles y progresivas, desarrollarnos como personas interior y exteriormente y estimar al prójimo con lealtad y confianza. Con lo que superaremos aquellas “carencias”, por la orientación, la intención y el esfuerzo que damos a nuestras ideas y realizaciones.

En aquel terreno abonado y germinal se pueden sembrar fácilmente las ideas sesgadas de una interpretación religiosa asequible, vindicativa, que brinda un propósito y una misión en la vida y que premia a sus “muhaydines” caídos en combate, especialmente a los mártires o testigos, con un premio sensible, claro, seguro, vistoso (esta cualidad de pura vanidad es muy atractiva), y cómodo (no es necesario dedicar a ello una vida de esfuerzo, entrega y renunciación). Las organizaciones yihadistas suelen también facilitar jugosos premios a las familias de sus “mártires”, con lo que éstos tienen también asegurado el bienestar relativo de su familia más directa por bastante tiempo. El resultado es que a los “perdedores”, “extraviados”, “desarraigados”, “agraviados”, “sin empatía hacia el prójimo”, no les cuesta demasiado tomar la decisión de convertirse en un mártir de la Yihad. Y el caso es que la propagación, la explicación y la impregnación, que diría Lorenz, de aquellas ideas venenosas y adictivas, se realizan con la mayor facilidad en nuestras sociedades modernas. Todos lo sabemos. Y éste es el centro de gravedad de la lucha contra los lobos solitarios. Cazarlos preventiva y aisladamente es muy difícil, porque no dejan apenas rastros. Hay que luchar contra los inductores necesarios de sus ideas (desde personas, compañeros, medios de comunicación, viajes a sus centros extranjeros). Para ello es necesario adecuar las legislaciones, como se ha hecho contra los maltratadores o los delitos financieros alambicados, apoyados por la comunicación inmediata y en línea. Sin perjudicar con ello la detección y el seguimiento debidos de maestros, discípulos, comunicaciones de todo tipo y sus antros. Y de esto, como de casi todo, tenemos experiencia sobrada. En julio de 1884, el entonces gobierno liberal de Sagasta, implantó la primera ley española contra los atentados con explosivos, protagonizados generalmente por los anarquistas. En ella se castigaba acertadamente, no sólo a los autores materiales de las tropelías, sino también a sus inductores.

La adaptación ideológica de la Yihad a los tiempos actuales.

El Islam tiene que asumir que la Yihad, como esfuerzo de sangre en el camino de Allah, fue necesaria para la instauración y la defensa de la primitiva comunidad de creyentes. Estableciendo el Profeta el estado islámico a partir de la destrucción violenta de la jahiliyya. Esta era la “barbarie existente anterior al Islam árabe”. Y que aún pudo ser útil la Yihad para su rápida extensión por el mundo, debido al estado existente de cultura y desarrollo de las civilizaciones medievales. Pero que su oportunidad histórica no existe actualmente. Y entonces debe ser reemplazado por “otro tipo de esfuerzo en el camino de Allah”. Es el esfuerzo de desarrollo personal interior (ascético), buscando la purificación y la superación de los creyentes. Este concepto existe en la Sunna y podría ser impulsado por los ulemas y los muftíes piadosos.

Desde el surgimiento de las principales escuelas teológicas sunnies, cobró también fuerza el principio del esfuerzo de reflexión personal, el ichtihad, en el Islam. El ichtihad va a permitir el desarrollo de la cultura árabe, tanto en lo tocante a los aspectos civiles (ciencias, comercio, literatura, arte) como al enriquecimiento de su “teología”; es la base de jurisconsultos como al-Chafii. El ichtihad es fuente de lucidez, creatividad, enriquecimiento, progreso y paz en “el camino del esfuerzo personal y colectivo hacia Allah” (que es realmente el núcleo religioso y la razón del Islam), cuando ya la Umma se ha extendido y multiplicado enormemente por el mundo. Hacia el siglo XI (siglo V de la hégira o marcha a Medina), los doctores de la Ley cierran la puerta al ichtihad. El Islam carece de teólogos propiamente dichos, porque Allah es inasequible e inmarcesible para el Hombre. El enfoque metodológico islámico se altera. Y a partir de entonces, se imita, se repite, se abusa de los compendios.

Las necesidades de renovación, compromiso y acción del Islam.

Ante ese terrorismo propio, el mundo islámico se paraliza y no sabe qué decir o hacer. El Terrorismo se lleva a cabo mediante acciones de guerra contra objetivos generales, inocentes e indiscriminados. Y su finalidad es coaccionar a los colectivos humanos, propios o enemigos, buscando resultados políticos y sociales. Es decir, sus “actos electorales” son los ataques violentos. Y los votos contabilizados son el miedo y la parálisis social, que extienden como la pólvora entre los hombres. Afirman los portavoces e intelectuales musulmanes que el Islam es paz y tolerancia. Pero esto no es totalmente cierto, como vemos por los hechos y las omisiones en su condena y ostracismo. La inmensa mayoría de los musulmanes se distancian de los atentados por “oportunismo” pasivo, no como actuación proactiva. Para proteger al Islam, preocupados por el creciente rechazo que sufre en Occidente.

Y no se trata de que reaccionen los intelectuales laicos musulmanes. Éstos no son operativos de la manera que conocemos en Occidente, como nuestros “políticos profesionales”. Ya que para un buen musulmán la política, la sociedad y la religión forman una trinidad única, excluyente e inseparable, establecida por Allah. Además, el fracaso social y político de los intelectuales laicos árabes quedó refrendado con el de las élites nacionalistas, izquierdistas y europeizadas, que impulsaron la independencia de las distintas naciones árabes tras la II Guerra Mundial. Y que crearon regímenes laicos, “socialistas”, apoyados en el clientelismo y la represión interna y separados por su ideología e intereses de sus respectivas sociedades musulmanas.

Pero, ¿cuándo intervienen en el debate de este tema los ulemas o los muftíes, con mayor ascendencia y el respeto de todos? Casi nunca. No se ha dado en el Islam una reflexión profunda sobre la oportunidad política y religiosa de la violencia. ¿Alguien conoce a pacifistas islámicos activos? Algunas actuaciones de los jefes espirituales del Islam son asequibles y serían apreciadas por todos. Los ulemas podrían declarar que los intereses del Islam y de la Umma tienen a España y al resto de Europa como buenos amigos, como parte de Dar el-Ahd. Que son los países donde la Umma no domina políticamente, pero que está en paz con sus habitantes y puede realizar sus actuaciones y ritos. Los ulemas podrían utilizar la institución del takfir contra los más recalcitrantes, peligrosos y criminales terroristas. Los que actúen desviados perversamente (con malicia o tras ser reconvenidos por aquéllos sin resultados) en nombre del Islam. Y no lo han hecho históricamente por el miedo paralizante a caer en una espiral destructiva y disolvente de reconvenciones mutuas y múltiples dentro de la Umma. Recordemos que la unidad monolítica religiosa no existe en el Islam, en el que el pueblo, además, tiene acceso libre a su “sumisión a Allah”, con sólo recitar la Profesión de Fe. Que equivaldría, en cierta forma y medida, al bautismo cristiano.

MODERN WEAPONS: THE DRONE AND THE SUICIDAL MUJAIDIN II.

(continuation)

The explosive Taliban: from the Jihad to the Garden of the Houris, without scales.

The suicidal mujaidin is a personally advanced weapon (just look for who has nowadays the fearlessness of removing itself from life, defending some ideals and a prize at the Other Side), abundant, nearby and cheap. It possesses the highest «combat specific capacity», (according to the parameters established by colonel Trevor Dupuy, which refer to real values of the different armies, calculated in conflicts and wars): many military men, policemen and civil authorities of the enemy are definitive losses for each own loss. And speaking in terms of the universal good administration principle of the scanty available resources, his actions (as «investments») have also a high ROMI; or (military) return over this marginal investment. The suicidal jihadist optimizes this way his asymmetry with the weapon and the highly available enemies. This soldier of «one use» knows, takes advantage of his opportunity, decides and acts. Because he can be a hallucinated fanatic, but he is not an idiot. For his personal and ideological character, his effective action raises the moral, the conviction and the decision of his companions, collaborators and sympathizers. The islamist suicide «appreciates» this way his enemies. Because they are his infallible key to «going out under canopy from this Valley of Tears «.

The explosive fighter is a common weapon of the Talibans. If the explosive charge, her characteristics and the vector are suitable, the sophisticated enemy sensors and the protective jackets are of little use against he. And the armored vehicles and the buildings also do not serve to be protected from he. The “trigger carrying agent” can be man or woman and adult or child. And can cooperate in his suicide attack, a bushes, a goods stand, a donkey, a bicycle or an engine vehicle. A «suicidal fighter of one use», is not a select marksman: he is not necessary to train militarily (basic, technical and tactical knowledge). His other complementary, fearsome and almost unbeatable weapons are the surprise, the freedom of action and the initiative.

The aims preferred by the «explosives sworn-ins» are the enemy security forces, so much «unbelievers» as «traitors», and the Muslims belonging to the heterodox branch of the Islam (the Shiites and Alauites). To the enemy security forces they bring over disguised as recruits in formation, candidates for the enrollment, supplies personnel (outsourced services), companions, «collaborators» of the ISAF and civil innocent prominent figures. Their target is human always, because the property damages hurt less the regular enemy. And they are located in the policemen or the enemy armies agglomerations, in the barracks, recruitment centers and points of obliged and frequent passing and with motive of stops, farewells, ostentations and exhibitions, of those. To the Shiites they bring over taking advantage of their inevitable concentrations: the annual international peregrinations to his holy places, his stopping places in the different stages or the Fridays midday prayers, specially communities, in their mosques. Though the latter assaults take place rather in the bordering countries, Iraq (Shiite majority) and Pakistan (Sunni majority).

The great problem is that is very difficult to fight (to offset, stop or neutralize) against a few enemies, more or less isolated, determined to die and of another etnia and idiosyncrasy. And with the suicides this sharpens up to making it almost impossible to realize «a priori». Because they are combated with modern, technology and trained forces, prepared generally for wars of third generation. That would theoretically face similar forces or of the second generation. And their commands have almost as an unavoidable premise, preserve from physical (the principal thing), mental and moral hurts the men under their orders. The suicide must go unnoticed in the place chosen for the attack, by its age, genre, aspect and attitude. He has also to conceal perfectly his appliance and his equipment. To be able to approach his target and make exploit that one. His passport for the Garden of the Houris is to take with him the major number of dead and mutilated enemies.

The added human and material hurts to Muslims, caused around the explosion point, are “collateral damages”. The Sunnies jihadists looked for an overcomplicated, but sufficient «solution» in the practice, to ignore the Koranic rule «thou will not kill Muslims». On having lacked a clergy and an only religious doctrine, the interpretations of the Islam and, especially, his applications for the daily life, can be multiple. In effect, to calm the repugnances in producing them, an al-Qaeda «ideologist», Abu Yahya al-Libi, developed a «religious» theory about the «not looked hurt». According to her, is allowed to the militants jihadists to kill Muslims, when is inevitable. And, even, when it is useful. And the mujaidins express their desire that the collateral dead men, should also be considered by Allah as martyrs of his «holy war». And to believe this, comes very well to the fanatics who direct the groups and to the insanities fanatics that follow or support them.

The motivations of these “explosive sworn-ins” are simple. An effective material motivation is their chronic loss of the basic natural needs: sustenance, family, safety, refuge and cover, expectations and reasonable progress. It is an effective spur to induce the employment of the liberating violence by a part of the society, specially the idealistic young men. The «positive» motivation would be the economic prizes that Talibans give to the families of the martyrs. And these are so much the fallen in combat as the suicides. The religious motivation is the powerful mean of persuasion and conviction. The suicides of the Jihad are methodically and intensely catechized. The Koranic verses related with the Jihad, are known by heart by them. The other suicides «example» surrounds them in their daily life. In the way of photos, manuscripts, testimonial videos and destiny companions. Their preachers clarify their doubts and encourage them to prematurely reach the Paradise. That is destined specially to the martyrs of the Jihad. Everything is like to the initiation functioning of a toxic sect: that destroys the personality of the lowest members. The universal character of the Muslims’ community, facilitates the flow and the insertion of «internationalist voluntaries» suicidal fighters from other countries.

The operational key of the Taliban are their innumerable local chiefs, with their small bands of radical irregulars. They are the persons in charge of intimidating, teaching or catechizing, scaring, attacking and occupying more or less temporarily some of the numerous settlements and hamlets, on both sides of the border. The Taliban movement follows a constant elementary cycle of «teaching, training, supporting and delegating» between the small «sheiks» and his deputies. So that they obtain a certain rotation in the command and in its exercise. These local «maliks» are practically immune to the assault of the «drones» of the ISAF. That explore, attack the irregular enemy and execute his evident, it is supposed, out-standing commands.

The drones cannot follow and attack so many minuscule and evasive targets. From an enemy network that turns out to be profuse, diffuse and confused. They cannot substitute, as is claimed by extrapolation from a few first successes, the ground active and aggressive patrols of exploration or combat. That, together with the military units and the civic and political action groups, are destined to dispute and gain his “bases refuges” to the enemy and, later, the popular majority support. Like the «American saturation bombardments» could not cut the Route Ho Chi Minh, supplying the Vietcong and the regular North Vietnamese forces in the «zone demilitarized» and at the south of this. Going from North Vietnam across Eastern Laos to South Vietnam. And all was because their air attacks, were not accompanying a «ground action» over that Route. That was complementary, systematic and constant, not necessarily exhaustive, of the air action of pure attrition.

And waiting in peace death from sky does not scare, even not worry sufficiently the mentally normal people. This only happened to the imaginary chief of Asterix’s Gallic village. And is something like what Ramon Gómez de la Serna was saying to his acquaintances and less intimate friends in Buenos Aires: «Here I am, waiting for the cancer». The intimidating threat, which could change the conduct of an enemy chief, must be something real (that is tended to magnify), sufficient, felt and immediate or near. Like the sirens installed in the Stukas. In order that his precise diving bombardment terrifies in land all his possible human targets, which were not yet veterans. Or as the explosive mujaidins, whose behavior is for the enemy like a “gas”, without own volume or form and that can reach all the available sites.

MODERN WEAPONS: THE DRONE AND THE SUICIDAL MUJAIDIN

If Plutarch was living today, surely he would write one of his «Parallel Lives» (one of two collections of his works), dedicated to trying and comparing the not crewed planes («death from above») and the suicidal yihadists («Allahu Akbar»). In effect, both are annoying and asymmetrical weapon, directed against the personnel and the mental and volitional factors of the enemy. That are not tactically decisive. And whose military effects are limited, but accumulative.

The Not Crewed Planes of exploration (reconnaissance) and ground recognition and of bombardment.

They are technologically advanced weapons, which began to develop several decades ago, destined to eliminate a minimum of «designated enemies», so much real as «ideological or potential «. And to minimizing the own losses. Which does irrelevant his economic cost for their rich owners. They have a highest effective range and are of the category of «intelligent». Though are not yet authorized to decide the moment to throw their missiles, once acquired the target. Their operational strategic use might be named the «War of the Drones».

The specific tasks that were distinguishing the CIA and the Pentagon, were intermingling during the first decade of the 21st century. This was owed to the operational and strategic failure of the USA in the long asymmetric wars of IV th generation (be read of guerrilla warfares and, be added or not, as be the hostiles, of national liberation) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Actions that they carried out after their short «armed conflicts» after 11/09/2001 against the masses armies (of second generation) of their tyrannical regimes. And using in them their trained and very technologically equipped forces (of III rd generation). Closed in false the Iraqi front and initiated the retreat in Afghanistan, the White House is endowing the CIA of more military means to give hunt to the salafists terrorists. So she has increased his drones or planes without crew fleet. And is considering to authorize an increase of the Pentagon’s spies’ network, to exercise a bigger control on the refuges of al-Qaeda in the Arabic peninsula and in the east and north of Africa.

These changes in the strategic and operational aims of the CIA and the Pentagon and the suitable endowment of means, culminated during the Barack Obama’s first mandate. The CIA has taken more active part in the eradication of the international jihadism, and has expanded notably his program of assaults with missiles thrown by drones. In the summer of 2011, Obama nominated the former director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, chief of the Pentagon. And the commander of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and chief of the Central military Command, David Petraeus, was nominated director of the CIA. Petraeus, before resigning 9/11/2012, for that of the erotic (his biographer) of the Power, asked Obama for a reinforcement of the drones fleet of the Agency. To be able to effect assaults beyond the habitual aims in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. The Agency and the Pentagon have their looks put in Mali and Libya, in view of the increase of the activity in the zone of the franchise «al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, the Ansar Dine group and the Anzawad’s Islamic Republic, seated at the north of Timbuktu. The tuaregs have changed his former employer Gaddafi for the salafists terrorists. To whom Gadafi accused of being his armed opposition. And that are destroying the universal heritage of Timbuktu, under the pretext that its monumental representations rival with Allah. Sources of the North American intelligence say that the drones fleet of the CIA does not excel 35 at the end of 2012 and Petraeus requested ten more.

The CIA has a list of «threats» to the USA, of which he has authorization to kill. In September, 2011 he got a famous success on having killed in Yemen the imam Anuar al-Aulaki, an American well-known personage of al-Qaeda. The Pentagon also has his «ist of authorized targets». That are checked every week by approximately 100 security analysts of the Administration. Their function is to recommend to the president the changes of names in the list. The procedure is semi officially called the «Tuesday of the terror» in the White House. The CIA and Joint Command of Special Operations of the Pentagon cooperate in many of these attacks. Their targets are supposed leaders and even simple militants of al-Qaeda and associate groups of jihadists. And the tactic is to exterminate them before they act. This is one more step in the foundations of the military doctrine of the USA. Determined for decades by the contradictory parameter of «not suffering losses in any war or conflict «.

The Obama’s «war of the drones» has much of «preventive» character”-– before that crime has been committed–and the executions are summary, without judicial sentence. And ,for this reason, it supposes attributing the right to realize extra judicial executions in any part of the world. So, Obama’s right hand in this theme, John Brennan, a veteran of the CIA, is called the «Czar of the Assassins». The program «Death of the Sky» (Death from Above) is legitimized only » by the person of the president «. The executions are legal, because the president decides and arranges them. Obama has obtained with the drones a weapon to appear «hard and effective» in the fight against al-Qaeda, without turning out to be unpopular with the voters. But, according to Christopher Griffin, in an article published by «Rolling Stone», «Obama’s secret war supposes the major air offensive not driven by human beings, never realized in the military history». And paraphrasing Churchill, he adds «never so few had killed so many people by remote control».

The Administration does not admit explicitly the existence of the program of drones, for safety motives. Though the White House declares in her calculated filtrations, that the not searched victims are almost non-existent. Not all the analysts accept this “surgical precision” without authentic information, attributed to these assaults from well away the horizon. An important problem is that the drones terrify entire areas, with some of them flying a lot of time over the settlements. On the other hand, as is the case of Pakistan, the «basic information» for the creation of intelligence for the mission, is facilitated by the local paid people. That also offers false information. More important and controversial is the question of the euphemistically so called «collateral falls», as if they had less importance on having been caused by the imprecisions and the operational mistakes. Some assaults with drones have caused tens of civilians deaths, including women and children, as is the case of Saleh Mohammed al-Anbouri in Yemen in December, 2009. And only in Pakistan, according to The Guardian, the drones would have killed around 3000 persons, of which a third were clearly civil, between 2008 and 2011.

The assaults against the human aims are realized by missiles thrown from drones. Since 2002, the USA has realized almost 450 missions of this kind in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. President Obama authorizes the assaults in Somalia and Yemen. But he is consulted only about a third of the missions in Pakistan. Where the «operational at charge» decide on the basis of “general received orders”. The Pentagon also uses the drones in his operations of exploration and of assault in Afghanistan. The CIA has his principal role in Pakistan. Where exists internally an ambiguity calculated of the FFAA, the intelligence services (the ISI is the most important, with much) and the Government in the relations and preferences towards: his foreign ally, the USA, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban and the pashtunes tribes of the frontier zones, near the former Durand line, and the southern baluchis (the Baluchistan). A strategic national aim for Pakistan is to support an important, preferably decisive influence, in the internal Afghan matters. And a strategic military aim at the east of the country is to have monitored, controlled and neutralized his own Taliban and other hostile minor groups, at the east of Peshawar’s meridian, and without they act at the east of the Indus river.

George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established, but without being due explained, not accepted tacitly by both Parties, that «asymmetrical wars» (irregular and with low level of military means) were carried on and were necessary, to keep away from the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the “foreign fundamentalist terrorism” of any origin, religion or ideology. This justified the post war occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with an exploded fiscal and exterior deficits and with a democrat Administration, is necessary for the USA to save more in military resources. To dedicate them «to constructing a nation here, at home». This way, the USA qualitatively lowers the bar of the exterior terror, putting al-Qaeda as almost the only not national violent enemy. This terrorist salafist internationalist «network», without own territory, with his operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable aim for the American forces and means of «rapid punctual incursion».

This justifies the increase of the use of the drones, spy satellites, own or local agents in the hostile area, attacks with limited aim by elite small units and small expeditionary forces and units of Marines amphibious assault, transported in «ships of control and transport» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of tens of thousands of military men and his luggage and equipment for several years in a theater of operations, are rejected indefinitely by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense». This way, the Pentagon has to operationally center on the counter terrorist tactics and technologies. And he seeks to reinforce his own espionage branch, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The reason is simple and clear: as the CIA has been effective giving hunt to terrorists abroad, the Pentagon wants to be more like it, and less as an army at use, to adapt to the new aims and national strategies. In November, 2012, Panetta asked Obama to allows him to recruit 1600 new spies. It would double the size of the DIA. At the end of this month, the secretary of Defense declared that: «The campaign against al-Qaeda will take place out of “declared combat zones”. And using tactics that leave little track, with precision operations».

The principal not crewed planes are the Predator and the Reaper. And cost more than $13 millions of dollars per unit. The Pentagon possesses approximately 19000 for the tasks of espionage and combat. The CIA has his own fleet, with reserved information. The General Atomics makes the drones. Their weapon more devastating are the missiles AGM-114 Hellfire II, the Lockheed Martin. In October, 2012, the USA entrusted 24000 missiles for his use and that of allied authorized countries. There exist the variants of antitank hollow load (HEAT), antipersonnel (with diverse types of explosion and fragmentation, reinforced or not) and with self guided (fire and forget). Each one weighs 47 Kg., with 20 % of useful load (warhead), it is guided by laser with diverse technologies and has a range of 8 Km. The effect of a volley of several of them on a block of houses of adobe or masonry is devastating. But it guarantees the elimination of the human selected target.

The equipment of the base is very simple and highly elaborated: the remote control of the drones, several screens and a pedal, in front to the ergonomic chairs of the pilots. The drones have cameras that transmit their views to the pilots in land. A deliberate observation precedes an assault. The pilot of the drone and the controller of the camera, which form one «killer team», observe to his «designated aim» during the whole day, checking his activities. The assault would be realized when, for example, his family has gone shopping. In fact, all the «teams» talk about an «established intimacy» with the Afghan families, observed during up to weeks. Thing that, for example, the foreign soldiers of the ISAF on the area would not know. Neither it seems, according to the medical statistical studies realized, that the pilots and observers were affected by the enemies dead in an important way. Also they reject that their work is like a video game. Though some of them argue that they do not know any video game that is required to observe the aim for hours.

The US Air Force of the Pentagon possesses more than 1300 drones pilots, being employed at 13 bases in the USA. And he would need at once approximately 300 more, at least. The majority of the military missions are in Afghanistan. The Pentagon calculates that for 2015, the Air Force will have to count with 2000. Already he trains more pilots for drones that for the conventional flights: 350 in 2011. And from 2012 the formation is specific for them: the pilots only pass 40 hours on board of a Cessna, without flying in fighters or bombers, learning to direct a drone. The chief of the Air Force HHQQ, general Norton A. Schwartz, recognized that the pilots of drones might overcome the classic ones in the next years. The halo and the combat pilot’s profession change for that of “armchair screen viewer civil servant”. And air bases in the USA increasingly stop dealing with traditional flights «to «direct» drones.

In November, 2011, after an assault with drones in the border with Afghanistan, where died at least 24 Pakistanis soldiers of a control fort, Pakistan blocked the way of the logistic convoys of the NATO following the routes of Khyber and Shaman to Afghanistan, from Peshawar. They are two crucial routes in order that the soldiers of the ISAF, that have used them during the last 10 years of asymmetric combats, receive fuels, equipments, provisions and military material. The Pakistani Defense minister, Ahmad Mukhtar, indicated at the end of 2011, that they might reopen them to the ISAF, if they pay for it. And, according to sources of the Pentagon, Pakistan forced them to dismantle also a platform of drones installed in a base in the southwest of the country, principally manned by the CIA. Washington lost temporarily one of his more powerful weapon: the permission to throw missiles from the not driven planes against the insurgents in the provinces of the northwest of Pakistan, tactics that generalized there from 2008. In turn, Panetta, also indicated then that the USA is «coming to the limit of his patience» with Pakistan,»for his disability to act against the armed groups in the tribal zones». At the beginning of 2013 the drones pulverized the so called mullah Nazir in the province Pakistani of Southern Waziristan (in the tribal zones). The volley of rockets thrown to reach him, also killed two of his more nearby collaborators, Rafey Khan and Atta Ullah, who were accompanying him in the vehicle. Already the USA had previously realized several assaults to finish with his life. This guy belonged to the «neutral» Taliban in Pakistan. And, at least, it was giving cover, helps and logistic support to the members of al-Qaeda and to the Afghan Taliban, who operated at the other side of the border. And probably he was a collaborator of Pakistani «authorities» during some long periods. It is confirmed by the fact that in November, 2012 Nazir was object of an unsuccessful suicide attack at Wana’s market, the provincial capital.

In a declassified report of the Central Command of the Pentagon, published in December, 2011, is assured that «the catalyst of the assault was the opening fire by the PAKMIL (the Pakistani Army)”. But are added that «the cooperation and collaboration in the border were disabled by a mutual distrust climate»; that the orders given by the NATO «were lacking clarity and precision», and that the goal of the mission was «inadequate». The final result was that the Marines’ James Mattis, in charge of the Central Command, ordered a series of changes in the protocols for the frontier operations. And, would not it be that for routine and lack of commitment with the missions, those which existed were not fulfilled well? Finally, bureaucracy will kill the initiative and the inventiveness. And it will turn out that, as with the black greyhound of the Han Chinese, when, being tied, he was asked to catch unattainable hares…

The mutual distrust exists in all the cooperation areas between the USA and Pakistan. Since both countries were sealing an alliance after 11-S, to fight al-Qaeda, the Congress of the USA has sent $ 20000 millions as «economic aid» to Islamabad. The real and practical results of this «alliance» are lean and scanty and the loyalty of Pakistan to the interests of the USA, for which this collaboration is paid, is questionable. Because Pakistan keeps his firm loyalty to the aims of his great or national strategy. Several members of the USA Congress asked for a change of approach in his relations in this geostrategic region. The representative to the Chamber, Duncan Hunter, declared that «Afghanistan needs economic and political stability, to guarantee that the victory of the USA is lasting. And the relation between the USA and Afghanistan must be also a point of interest, not only for the future of Afghanistan, but for the whole region». And Frank Wolf indicated: «It is clear that to manage to triumph in Afghanistan, we must solve first a series of problems in Pakistan. To obtain a military victory in Afghanistan is a thing, but our general success depends on more factors».

The authorities of Pakistan and Yemen, allied of the United States against al-Qaeda, have protested several times, so much for the violation of theirs sovereignties with war actions, as for the death of people who did not have any relation with the conflict. And they warn that this war carried out secretly, destabilizes them and gives arguments to the jihadists.

(to be continued)

The Taliban’ Military Operations in Afghanistan II.

(CONTINUATION)

or The Expert Taliban Military Field Manual

The suicidal Taliban.

The suicidal fighter is a common weapon of the Taliban. The suicidal militant is for the Taliban a cheap, abundant, effective and highly asymmetric weapon. If the explosive charge, its characteristics and the vector are the suitable ones: the sophisticated enemy sensors and the protective jackets use as little against her. Nor the armored vehicles and the buildings serve to be protected from her. The trigger carrying agent can be man or woman and adult or child. It can cooperate in his suicide attack a bushes, a goods selling street place, a donkey, a bicycle or an engine vehicle. A suicidal fighter of one alone use is not a select shooter: it is not necessary to form him militarily (basic, technical and tactical knowledge). Complementary to the explosive belt or jacket, his other fearsome weapons are the surprise, the freedom of action and the initiative.

The suicidal soldier must go unnoticed in the place chosen for the attack: by his age, genre, aspect, movements and attitude. To be able to approach his target and make exploit the load, producing the major possible number of enemies dead and mutilated. The added human and physical hurts that are caused around the explosion point are only «collateral damages”. To calm the repugnances in producing them, an Al-Qaeda «ideologist», Abu Yahya al-Libi, developed a «religious» theory about the not looked for hurts. According to her, it is allowed to the Yihad’s militants to kill Muslims, when it is inevitable. Even, when it is useful to the cause. So, the suicidal soldiers express their desire that the not looked for dead, should be considered also by Allah as martyrs of His «Holy War».

The suicidal Taliban is an essentially inhuman weapon. We do not know any case in which it has used in only destroying a military physical target: a bridge, a store. Sometimes the suicide is used as part of a command, for blow opening the entry to a complex or for promoting with his immolation the surprise of the enemy and attracting his attention. Here the suicide’s «merit», who already must has certain instruction, is that of the whole assailant group in his action.

The motivations of these «sworn-in» are simple. Not to be able to chronically cover his basic natural needs of: sustenance, family, security, refuge and cover, and the reasonable progress expectations is a spur for his enrollment. The economic prizes that the Taliban give to the «martyrs» families are covering this line. The religious motivation is the powerful way of conviction. The suicides of the Yihad are methodically and intensely catechized. And live in an involving «environment» where they get clarify his doubts and that breathe them to prematurely reach the Paradise. The universal character of the Umma or Muslims’ community, facilitates the flow and the insertion of suicidal soldiers from other countries. In the last years, the followers of the Sunna are those who are using the suicide in his «Holy War». They are used by al-Qaeda, the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the members of Hamas.

The Military Contradictions in Afghanistan.

The foreign military men are tied by their own contradictions. On one hand, for socially correct or electoral reasons, is avoided to define this conflict, not already as a war, but as what it is: an “irregular Islamic popular liberation war”. That is directed against «a corrupt, impious and unpopular government, puppet of the exterior Allied powers». This way, the Allied armies establish strict “clashing procedures”, which they say that are to protect the Afghan people. But in all when they meet threatened or want to undertake some advances in the Taliban “loose controlled territory”, they only firstly and principally trust in their devastating and/or indiscriminate heavy fire capacity.

The Americans and their allies do not have a permanent and indefinite commitment, the hallmark of the good ally, with the Afghan political regime. That is an incoherent puzzle of tribal and personal interests. Agglutinated by the social and political power that today they hold, use and distribute. Neither is possible to «impregnate» in its entirety and per se, an inorganic western democracy in a Moslem’s country with an ancient, enduring and little evolved social structure. Without liberal principles and forms in her idiosyncrasy, the Afghan leaders and sheiks will use the new political power mechanisms to increase their influence and benefit, in a supposedly modern and free, but inarticulate society. An Islamic democracy, in use and customs guided by the Islam and the Sunna, is not equal to a liberal democracy.

Also exists a complete lack of nearness and commitment with the Afghan people. That perceives the «unfaithful armed foreigners» in his territory, as something temporary, relative, foreign and superposed to his interests and the personal, familiar, tribal, cultural and religious needs, in this order. Only some British managed to be accepted, respected and estimated, in a personal title, by the pashtunes and baluchis. It was the epoch of the British Empire of India and the famous Northwest Border (the Durand Line and the Tribal zones) with Afghanistan. It was a historical distant stage, with events that were going up with a minor pace that nowadays. Where the overseas «service shifts» (» military tours of duty”) lasted several years.

At beginning the summer of 2010, a powerful offensive of the ISAF took place in the province of Kandahar, at east of Helmand, to defeat and remove the Afghan Taliban of their habitual and original social support base. There were used ground and air multinational forces, as in Marjah’s battle in February, and selective commands assaults type «bites and flees». Nevertheless, the offensive was paralyzed without achieving her goals and it is not known of her resumption. Marjah was an important culture and processed center of the opium in Helmand’s province. After the battle and occupation, there was try to establish a local government, dependent on Kabul, which sank immediately and came to nothing. Soon there started appearing in other nearby populations the «green buds» of the Taliban. Who advanced without been disturbed after the military ebb tide.

The operational strategy of the ISAF is unsuccessful. The results of his military actions or are lean or lack continuity and go away vanishing. As would say an illuminated defeated politician: «they only belong to the wind». And precisely, because the Afghan «authorities» would have to consolidate, develop and keep those successes. Here it is easier to militarily win than occupy. And to temporarily occupy is easier that to convince and appease. And to assure and develop a civil native zone got from the Taliban.

The Taliban’ Military Operations in Afghanistan.

or The Expert Taliban Military Field Manual

In this epoch of scanty dissimulation, of powerful electronic sensors, even installed in the space, of spreads of the «intelligence», the enemy movements and hostile intentions are difficult to conceal to a military modern army. The means to achieve it are the dispersion, the geography (fogs, rainfalls, forests, orography, nights), the disguise (spoiling the reality) and the camouflage, concealing or adjusting reality. To avoid the detection and the heavy fire, to the enemy improved vision, is necessary to oppose the fleetingness, the smallness and imprecision of the images (few people, neutral clothes, conceal and dismantled weapons) and the insecurity in the apprehended «reality» (civil or armed and friends or enemies?). The enemy are difficult to be seen In the modern «empty» combat fields in combat availability at the nearby distances. Where the movements of the afoot infantry are not enfilade or by short and rapid jumps from concealment to concealment, preferably protected. And the «drones» or planes without crew of exploration and/or ground attack always will be able to lead to the murder of a few innocent smugglers or countrymen. By confusing them with enemy activists. Everything to do for losing the war to «gaining the hearts and minds of the enemy»!

The Taliban operational ways.

But, during a lot of time yet, the air and spatial means of the USA, as spy satellites, drones and planes of the system Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), will have great limitations in the detection and check of small ground, even regular, forces in the areas of difficult transitability and with concealment possibilities: as mountains, jungles and forests, marshes and urbanized areas (industrial, warehousing and distribution, and housing). Those not only offer concealment, but also covered from enemy fire, up to the near combat distances. A slightly valued phenomenon here is the plethora of the «relative concealment heights», as determinant factor of the «transitability» («the good or bad ongoing» does not completely value and express it) of the units in this type of so abundant areas.

The operational key of the Taliban resides in their innumerable local chiefs, with their small guerrillas bands, at full or part time availability. They are in charge of intimidating, teaching, scaring, attacking and more or less temporarily occupying some of the numerous peasants settlements and hamlets. According to the pressure degree that they should exercise on the villagers in order that they inform, hide and support them. Evidently its elementary degree of operational development keeps the movement at the defensive. Without being able to dispute to any of the present ISAF’s Armies in these areas, any territory or village. Without being able to realize other attack actions beyond ambushes; assaults to very small enemy isolated units, preferably natives, demoralized and/or tired; medium range fire harassment; kidnapping; short duration isolated incursions, helped or not by other nearby bands; and the mining of paths and ways (the fearful IED), usually travel by the enemy with their frequent, unimaginative and “showing” patrols. The sheiks or commands chiefs are ideologically concentrated in the conversion to their movement, to their semi nomadic cells, of the most related or nearby Pashtuns. In a minor and less extensive degree, operate the cells of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Taliban «action units» type platoon must be unfolded in sections and even in «teams», for their large movements or with the possibility of the enemy presence. The extended march security helps to this secure deployment. The result is a network structure. Which nodes are the unfolded subunits and which “threads” indicate their horizontal and vertical relations, supports, communications and superposed protective shooting sectors. Even this network can be camouflaged, mixing or intermingling the “nodes” with pacific native groups. In this more yet empty battlefield, without permanent or consolidated lines, is necessary to accept the sporadic incursion in our own rear of military patrols of exploration and/or of combat. Their air abundant means facilitate them to realize surprising, rapid and powerful deep insertions, in charge of elite units. For it, in the haltings, rests and locations we have to keep the security, even in our rear and always deploying a tactical exploration.

This imposes a tremendous effort on the men and on the commands. Whose training, formation and discipline, motivation and religiousness and commitment with each mission must be complete. In this type of fighting, apart from the self-defence units, which dominate and monitor our own settlements and enclaves, the number of «select» soldiers, destined for the action units, it should be subordinated to their quality. These select fighters, as any other military mean of interest, always will skimp on. So, it is absurd to get involved in a clash, in which the Taliban’ combat capacity, is clearly lower than that of the enemy. Against the on board cannons and machine guns (both in ICV and airships), with their detection and fire control equipments, the ambushing Taliban, even protected in reinforced and/or covered positions, but in the forward slope to use their tense fire weapons, cannot support a duel.

The Taliban harassment operations on the military forces.

For the fire harassment to the patrols they don’t need to mobilize many fighters. The enemy will always call his tactical aviation or the helicopter gunships, which come fast, if he see a shooters spot or lunette in front of him. Even they sometimes overfly the marches of their columns and patrols, looking for opportunity targets. A small «selected» rebel unit can stop them. So forcing them to deploy, spend their ammunition as much as they follow their «engagement rules». And to regroup and, even, reequip, to continue their march. After the harassment the Taliban combatants, without being committed, will be scattered to gather on a main or alternative meeting point. And this can be repeated later by another «action unity». Fixed as they are to the tracks, the occasions for the Taliban will be numerous. And the results, enervating and frustrating, because they force the military men to the passiveness and to the moral wear.

Afghanistan almost lacks asphalt roads: there are only two. The most important gives itself a round turn all over the country, joining the principal populations, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, etc. So they called it Ring Road. Then there is the North-South Road, which follows this tour, at the east of the country. They are not great thing. The asphalt have between half and one inch of thickness; the heats soften it and potholes and bubbles are easily formed. But, under a protuberance can hide an explosive device. It is necessary to cross slow the roads and looking at the soil. The Taliban have not now the habit of recording on video the ambushes, to hang them on Internet. This does that the carelessness observers in horizon, highly vulnerable as acquaintances, are almost away from the limits of the landscape of the ambushes. And that do not use as alert sign of them. But, the explosive devices are constantly developing and perfecting. These give a certain anonymity, distance and impunity to his «placers». The devices detonated by cable cannot be neutralized by the inhibitors. They are not frequently using cables activators. These are expensive and weigh, and the rebels are in isolated zones and the logistics is weak, vulnerable and complicated. Some devices are activated by a frequency transmitter with a given range; even serves an electronic opening door device. With the frequency inhibitors, the soldiers try to offset the radio waves of the probable frequencies used in the zone. Being the most expensive and complicated transmitters, that with more range, power and frequencies range. It is the game of the cat and the mouse. The problem is that the guerrillas of an area receive a radio activator that uses an unforeseen frequency. The activated by pressure and wrapped in plastic, can be very effective if their hollow conical explosive charge covered with the fatal metal, is well enough. The multiple and complicated are increasingly used. For example, it is possible to place one of average credible load, which alerts the designated land observers in the vehicles. On having brought over or descend from these, some of them can be activated by cable. And even «throw» from the path flanks some hollow charge missile placed in fixed unexpected camouflaged launchers. If the soldiers dismount from the vehicles, also some mortar bombs can be thrown on the ambush area, having it registered from the deployment positions of the tubes.

The obligatory passing zones of the enemy (gorges, mountainous passes, ways bordered of rocky outcrops or with cut gutters and direct accesses to the hamlets) are adapted for their employment. It must be also used a certain number or percentage of trick «placements», keeping the scene and decoration, but without live charges or cable wastes, destined to harass, tease and tire the foreign enemy stroller. In the variety are the taste and the initiative. The effect on the enemy of the “explosive, real and fictitious, simple or multiple ambushes”, is not simply added. But is a potential function of those deployed.

A permanent harassment of the barracks is not normal, for unproductive and costly. Also, they are tremendously defended (sensors, pits, wire fences, patrols and fortifications) against the suicides bombs. But happens that the suicides, who are illuminated but not silly fanatics, usually attack “not sufficiently protected enemies groups”.

In order to remove the indirect fire origins, the military men can realize limited aim assaults, expelling the Taliban irregular mortars. With an active habitual patrolling, they can in these moments scare or beat and remove the hostile marauders. The Taliban usually explore, at least initially and also in fluid fighting conditions, by observation. It is important to locate and eliminate these reconnaissance positions. The patient observation is the way. Bearing in mind that if the exigency is intense, every 30 minutes the observer must be replaced. Because he looks, but already not sees.

The Taliban usual procedure to assault a weak defended and/or without spirit position, preferable of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is this: at dawn they bomb with heavy fire from fixed missile launchers, then they approach to use mortars and finally, the assault is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance, shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL grenade-launchers. To avoid friendly fires, they would fire only to verified targets and from bottom to up or above to below.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The Latest British Misfortunes in Afghanistan II.

On how a passive defense is inoperative and shameful in the counter insurgency war!!

(continuation)

The Taliban assault at Friday, 14, September, 2012 against Camp Bastion.

The British base has been attacked in diverse occasions during his years of existence. The most “media” occasion has been this that we treat. In the assault were dead two Marines (of the attached Camp Leatherneck). And other nine persons – eight military men and a civil contractor – were hurt. 6 airplanes McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II of the Marines Corps were destroyed and other two were very damaged. As for the logistic facilities, were destroyed three stations of fuels supply and damaged 6 hangars of aviation not structurally reinforced.

The effective defense of the military barracks, redoubts and camps against the assault and the harassment of irregular armed rebels is founded on three operational qualities: the initiative, the mobility and the offensive action. These, in turn, are directly determined by the mentality and the combative disposition of the military men (which depend fundamentally on them) and by the military available means in the operations zone (that depend fundamentally on the politicians and the public managers). The gravity center of the active defense of the military fixed positions resides in the observation and the control of the approximation routes. That in rural zone can be a semi flooded rice field; in mountainous area, a heights line a little below the military crest; in urban zone, the streets orientated towards them, from certain distance, and in a road, a verge. All this compounded by the climate and the day hour. The observation and fighting military positions can consist from the couple of snipers up to a reinforced platoon, according to the characteristics of the area and the intentions and capacities of the enemy. Those are apart of the perimeter defense and of the patrols who cross it randomly, that constitute a part of the camp static defense. The enemy is in the habit of exploring, at least initially and also in fluid fighting conditions, by observation. It is important to locate and eliminate these reconnaissance positions. The patient observation is the way. Bearing in mind that if the exigency is intense, every 30 minutes the observer must be replaced, because he looks, but already not sees. If additional means exist for it and as complement, it is necessary to use the energetic patrolling against the enemy, moving away the Complex much more, using armed reconnaissances and attacks with limited aims.

A passive defense, limited to rejecting the assaults, with the initiative and the election of the moments in hands of the enemy, is almost the most solvent of the combat morale that can experience a force, leaving apart a defeat. Ask about it to the Frenchmen who were defending multitude of redoubts and positions in Indochina before Dien Bien Fu in 1954 and to the nationalistic Chinese until 1949.

The operational offensive key is the energetic, constant, unpredictable patrolling, eager for the combat with the insurgents or of obtaining information. That constitute a more professional, more active and more lethal «swarm» than the insurgents bands. Integrated by units not usually bigger than a platoon. Whose weapons are the seal, the discretion, the mobility, with the night as collaborator and refuge. The initiative, demonstrated in the irregular war in multitude of small actions, is always habitual and consistently of the winning final side. It is not acceptable to allow that the enemy takes her, uses her or retains her. The initiative is joined to the creative imagination, framed and illuminated by the professional knowledge and the field experience . Together, reinforcing an enterprising character, they can be military decisive and efficient here

The Taliban usual procedure to assault a weak defended or without spirit position enemy is this: at dawn they bombard with the fixed rocket launchers heavy fire, then they approach to use mortars, finally, the assault it is realized by several independent squads, that converging advance shooting AK and RPD or PK machine gun bursts and their RPG and RL hollow charge grenade-launchers. They only fire on verified targets or from above and from below. When they try to keep the surprise, the initiative and the confusion, to lengthen the military reaction time and to obtain a very local and temporary superiority, they act without their meager heavy fire support. A typical characteristic of the Taliban is that they do not get involved in the defense of their positions. Once obtained the harassment of the enemy and extended the hurt, the mutilation and the stupor on the military men, they will move back. They are not so silly to wait intrepid for the heavy, precise and devastate military fire. Nor to presume of courage, in front of enemies with weapons of superior range and characteristics and capable of turning a surface target into a destruction zone. Also there are the time and its corollary, the opportunity. The Taliban handle very well the tactical and operational times. They are masters of the patience, the waiting, the repetition of trainings, simple and easy. For the important attacks they manage to use scale models of the goal. And, to penetrate in a base and attack the heavy and evident war aircrafts, only need to represent part of the perimeter, the directional location of the target and its identification, as well as the rejection fighting positions of the irruption point.

None of the laws of the war defined in the Geneva and The Hague conventions favor the Taliban fighting. The condition of right belligerent is granted by the fulfillment of them. For it, the bands should go uniformed, exhibiting the weapons, commanded by a chief and acting in name of a state that was retaining the sovereignty of, at least, a part of his territory. In the other cases, the national legislations are applied. They are specially hard in the cases of armed sedition. And qualifying of assassins, terrorists or bandits without entrails, to the rebels. Though, it is true that, in general, is suitable to smooth the “manual” treatment given to the partisans, to not irritate the positions and to no re-grow the excesses and the losses.

Enough hours before 12 pm of Thursday, the 13th of September, the Taliban forces began to approach from several directions to the air zone of the Complex. To keep a low tactical trace, they followed dragging techniques in their advance to the security zone of the area. And up to there got, without being detected, 45 to 50 insurgents that, in three convergent spears of advance attacked by midnight, supported by their squad organic weapons. Not to being detected up to the beginning of the assault, also helped them the scanty combative availability of the men. And the tedious and unproductive routine of the guards and patrols, which creates the passive defense of a great protective barrack. Approximately 15 Taliban from two of the groups, managed to get through Camp Bastion’s perimeter and to attack effectively the air zone. Finally the attacking group was wiped out (dead and injured men and prisoners).

It was a «significant» assault, the British Defense Department declared, as the insurgents should never have come so far away. It was, admitted the ISAF, a «good coordinated» attack. Organized in three assault groups, the Taliban managed to get through the defense perimeter of the base. «They were well equipped and trained, dressing USA Army uniforms and armed with automatic rifles, grenade-launcher and explosive jackets», continued the ISAF in his communique. This mission assured that during the assault, the international troops killed 14 insurgents and hurt other one, who is arrested.

The British correspondents in Afghanistan assured that Camp Bastion has an excellent visibility from all parts and is extremely strengthened. The defense correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, who has been for more than twelve times in Camp Bastion, wrote on Sunday, the 14th: «In spite of being in the center of the most dangerous province of Afghanistan, I always felt completely sure, undoubtedly, of an assault of the Taliban. And honestly I believed that there were more possibilities of dying knocked down by a military vehicle that murdered by insurgents». The forces of the coalition, make clear the correspondents, ask themselves how the Taliban were capable of giving this surprise attack a strengthened and isolated complex barrack. And a spokesperson, Adam Wojack, said that the Friday assault «was a sign for the coalition that it is necessary to give many attention to the popular, local and international state of mind about Afghanistan».

On Monday, the 10th of September Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman insurgent, declared to Reuters that the Taliban were trying to use all his resources to kill the prince Henry (also called «Harry the Nude»), third in the succession line to the British throne. After the facts, another Taliban spokesman underlined that they attacked in «revenge» for the American amateur movie which offends Mohammed. And that they choose to commit an attack against Camp Bastion, because the prince Harry was there, acting as co-pilot gunner in the Joint Air Group.

The Latest British Misfortunes in Afghanistan

On how a passive defense is inoperative and shameful in the counter insurgency war!!

Let’s see the «vital path» of the British in the current conflict. Of the “warlike fervor” of these «European technologically modern soldiers», give faith the operations carried out for years in Helmand province. After the war of 2001, which ended with the medieval theocratic radical intransigent regime of the Taliban, close to Lashkar Gal city, Helmand’s capital, up to 8 thousand British soldiers established themselves. That were successively relieved by their replacements in «tours of duty». This powerful contingent of professional experienced soldiers was unable in almost 7 years to fight, replacing the culture of opium in Helmand and appeasing the province, for the effective implantation in her of the Government of Kabul. To solve this operational Gordian knot of the ISAF, cutting it with a slit, it was decided…

The last great Offensive against the Taliban in Helmand: Marjah’s battle.

The “Operation Moshtarak” («Together», in dari, one of the afghan languages) began at Friday, February 12, 2010. For the operation approximately 15 thousand allied soldiers have met, from the ISAF and Afghanis. The USA contingent had around 4 thousand marines and 800 soldiers from the US Army. The Afghans were 2 thousand men and they accompanied the Americans in the attacks and occupations. The British were 4 thousand men and there were groups from Canada, Denmark and Estonia.

There were several operational aims in the “Operation Together”. The first was to aim a rapid and forceful blow to the Taliban, going forward to their usual spring operations. And showing them who have taken now the initiative. And as corollary, to try again to appeasing Helmand, for the effective and final implantation of the Government of Kabul in it. In the strategy of counterinsurgency is sought to clean the zone of the Taliban and to protect the inhabitants of their influence. It is supposed that the transcendence of the operations success will be indefinite. As the Government cannot request the loyalty of the people, if this is not defended effectively and permanently of the reprisals of the Taliban.

Also, it was the goal of eradicating the drug production in Marjah’s district. According with the UNO Agency for the Fighting against the Drug and the Organized Crime, 42% of the world opium is produced in Helmand’s province. And Marjah is one of the principal centers of the culture of the poppy and its chemical processing. The British were previously in charge of attacking its culture in the zone. But their efforts, up to the last summer, were insufficient and ineffective to achieve these two principal aims. In spite of the presence, at 40 Km from Marjah’s ville, of more than eight thousand British soldiers.

Another operational aim was giving field to the soldiers of the Afghan Army. Increasing their auto esteem and their military experience, trying his operational and organizational capacities and confirming his loyalties with the Government. Finally, it was wished that Marjah would be a «testing and checking center» for the different skills and techniques of pacification and civil development, of immediate and future application in the rest of the country. In a war against “national armed rebels”, these civil operations are the “other arm», complementary and necessary, of the successfully military actions over they.

The battle was carried out more in advancing and bombarding or shelling the suspicious positions. The allied troops were occupying and consolidating the successful advances. The external siege and the control of the possible escape routes of the guerrillas were in charge of the British and the auxiliary forces of Canada, Denmark and Estonia. That also defended the allied road links. The operation was completed in a month.

The Taliban, a light irregular infantry, without artillery or aviation, with a pedestrian and insufficient logistics, were beaten and removed from their combat positions in Marjah, dispersing finally, largely to the bordering provinces. And Marjah remained occupied by the Marines and the forces of the Afghan Army. A whole labor staid ahead now to earn the respect, the confidence and the loyalty of the villagers. And that they begin to accept the central Afghan government. Also it is necessary to offer them a future of peace, safety and prosperity. Replacing their current means of life, based on the opium poppy culture and the drug transport, by others that turn out to be reasonably profitable. And that do not move them simply to a subsistence agriculture without hope. Marines are excellent elite action forces. But in the vulgar and patient tasks of occupation and civilization of a more or less hostile and strange territory, they are mediocre, distant with people and no motivated.

In the province of Kandahar, the fief of the mulah Omar and the first national quarry of the Taliban, there were then almost 3000 Canadian troops, with the American and British forces. It was one of the first fighting «fronts» against the insurgency in the country, together with Helmand and the frontier Eastern provinces. As continuation of the cleaning in Marjah and at “load snort” of its military success, the allies decided to launch during the spring and the summer of 2010, the «Operation Kandahar», with almost the same operational aims that the first one. It was trying to make an intensive use of the operations of search and destruction of the enemy, to divide and disperse him. That would go at charge the elite units of of the armies, forming patrols of exploration, of combat and mixed, backed by Afghan soldiers and using the tactical aviation and artillery supports and the exploratory and precise fire capacities of the «drones». It was talked about the Battle of Kandahar. But, within a few weeks of initiated, his momentum was languishing. And losing initiative, creativity, will and applied force. And it was stopped speaking about her. In this epoch, the journalists detached in military units and populations in Afghanistan warned us that the «green outbreaks» of the insurgency were appearing, as vigorous and firm renews, within Marjah and Nad Ali…

In Afghanistan are present military forces from approximately 46 countries. Some of them are dedicated to support, garrison and rear tasks. As being a great coalition, without subordinating to it any of the interests that to each country dictate his needs and his political commitments, the coincidences between the allies are partial, have continuity solutions and are unstable through time. This intrinsic fragility of the coalition, is born in that almost all the allies do not practice State policies, but temporal or, worst enough, electoral. It is necessary to indicate that this owes largely to that there is not a clear perception of the Afghan problem. Not of his direct or indirect, immediate or distant nearness, to the national respective defense interests.

The great British military Complex Bastion in Helmand’s province.

Helmand is one of 32 provinces of Afghanistan. It spreads over 58.583 km ² at the southwest of the country and has a population around the million and half of inhabitants, of the pashtun and baluchi ethnias. The capital is Laskar Gah. In his Washer’s district, at the northwest of the capital, the Camp Bastion is installed. It is the principal military British base in Afghanistan. It can house between 20 and 30 thousand persons in all its facilities, British and American principally, depending on the Branch to which they belong and their missions, equipments and supplies. It occupies a total extension of 52 Km2, approximately 10 km per 5 km. It was designed to be the center of the logistic operations of the ISAF in Helmand. In addition, it is the major military British camp constructed outside their country after the II World War. Built by the British Engineers since the beginning of 2006, the Complex is placed in a desert zone and away from the populations and provided with long clear sights in all dirThe Latest British Misfortunes in Afghanistanections.

The Camp is divided structurally in different «sections». Bastion 1 and 2 are first erected. Bastion 2 contains also the Camp Barber (USA) and the Camp Viking (Danish). Bastion 0 was added about 2010 and it houses the facilities of the external contractors. The Bastion 3 is used for the specific training of counterinsurgency. The Complex also includes Camp Leatherneck (of the USMC) and Camp Shorabak, of the National Afghan Army. Camp Bastion’s airport, which possesses two landing strips, attends approximately 600 aircraft flights every day, in operations of combat, logistic and medicals. In the attached heliport are deployed the Westland WAH-6 Apache of multiple attack and the Boeing CH-47 Chinook of mixed transport. In these moments the Complex can handle and attend almost all the military and civil aircraft in use. The Complex also houses a great military campaign hospital. And large areas of this great base are protected by a nine meters high concrete wall, which spreads over a perimeter of more of 40km, inserted with special vigilance towers, with soldiers and high technology instruments.

(to be continued)

¿Hay Tiroteos en Afganistán?

Los talibán matan por primera vez a un militar español en combate”. “El chaleco antibalas no salvó al sargento en la guerra afgana”. Eran algunos de los titulares de los periódicos españoles, a su desarrollo de la noticia de la muerte del sargento Joaquín Moya en un tiroteo con el enemigo el lunes 7 de noviembre. Los hechos ocurrieron al noreste de Ludina, en uno de los tramos más peligrosos de la ruta Lithium. Ésta une Qala-i-Naw con Bala Murghab, en la provincia de Badghis, siguiendo un trazado orientado al noreste por el interior de ella. Y cerrando un rectángulo con la vieja Carretera Circular, que une por el sur ambas poblaciones.

¿Qué pasó? ¿Qué está pasando? ¿Cómo reacciona nuestra “retaguardia de apoyo”?¿Apoyamos y apreciamos de verdad a nuestros militares?

Ante la muerte del sargento, también se habló de que la familia ha pedido al presidente Rodríguez Zapatero, que dé «explicaciones» por la muerte del único soldado que matan en un tiroteo en Afganistán. Así, “María Dolores, una cuñada de Joaquín Moya, se ha mostrado enormemente «dolida». Y en declaraciones a ELMUNDO.es de Andalucía ha lamentado que el jefe del Ejecutivo apruebe que soldados españoles acudan a países como éste «a ayudar», porque entiende que los llevan a «que los maten». De ahí que haya exigido que el presidente del Gobierno ofrezca las «explicaciones» que entienda que ha de dar a una familia destrozada”.

Y estos casos variados y cambiantes en características, lugares y tiempos ocurren a diario. A mediados de diciembre pasado, una columna del Ejército Nacional Afgano, reforzada por fuerzas españolas, en marcha por la ruta Lithium, fue atacada por los talibanes cerca del desfiladero de Sang Atesh, al norte de la provincia de Badghis. Unos 40 tiradores talibanes les atacaron hacia 6 de la madrugada, desde posiciones fijas ligeramente reforzadas, en un punto situado a unos 60 Km. de la base española de Qala-i-Nao y a unos 110 de Herat. La sección española reforzada con ingenieros, fuerte en unos 50 hombres, que forma parte del llamado Equipo de Reconstrucción Provincial, tuvo que responder al enemigo con el fuego de sus vehículos ligeros blindados. La escaramuza duró una hora y terminó con la llegada de los helicópteros artillados Mangosta italianos, que hicieron romper el contacto al enemigo. Era cuestión de detener la misión y volver a la base. Y tras la retirada de los helicópteros, un grupo de media docena de insurrectos volvía tirotear a la columna en marcha retrógrada. Todos recordamos también el vídeo colgado de Internet y las fotos publicadas en Interviú, donde una patrulla de caballeros paracaidistas legionarios mandada por un sargento, fuerte en total en una sección, se atrincheraba y era hostigada a distancia por los talibanes, en un sector de esta carretera secundaria.

La propaganda constituye un objetivo estratégico básico de los insurrectos, al que colaboran entusiasmados las agencias y los medios occidentales. Cualquier ataque rebelde con éxito o llamativo es inmediatamente retransmitido al mundo. Esto debilita siempre la voluntad de permanencia de las fuerzas de la ISAF, los EEUU y sus aliados. Sus legiones, llamadas por sus casas, quieren regresar, para gozar del consumo variado y superfluo del mercado global y las vacaciones exóticas. Las madres espartanas, algo impensable hoy en día, les decían a sus hijos cuando salían de campaña, al llegar la estación benigna y abandonar los cuarteles de invierno: “vuelve con el escudo o sobre el escudo”. El escudo era suficientemente extenso y recio como para servir de camilla a un herido o a un muerto. Y cuando huían, el escudo grande y pesado de los hoplitas griegos, capaz de resistir las acometidas tremendas de las sarisas o largas picas de 5 m., armas principales de sus falanges, era un estorbo y lo desechaban.

Aquí tenemos muchas decenas de miles de militares de todas las Armas, incluyendo la Guardia Civil. Pero, salvo con ésta, por su relación de cercanía y función de seguridad pública, parece que la sociedad española no sabe bien qué hacer o qué decir de sus militares. Los cuarteles están a mucha distancia anímica de nuestras casas. A los militares los admiramos por su gallardía, seriedad y disciplina, que solamente nos exhiben en los pocos desfiles que les permitimos. A sus muertos los despedimos rápida y oportunamente en dirección a su sepelio íntimo y la tumba familiar.

Esta disfunción social que rompe el verdadero tejido nacional, forma parte de la ideología decimonónica de la izquierdona más rancia, sectaria y rencorosa que aún se arrastra por la Europa, ya libre de doctrinas totalitarias inhumanas. Su “ideal” sigue siendo el Ejército Rojo de Obreros y Campesinos (en ruso RKKA, Raboche-Krestiánskaya Krásnaya Ármiya), controlado por los comisarios políticos, no por sus mandos naturales. Esto choca de frente con el principio del mando único y capacitado. Que es el que vertebra y ensambla toda la capacidad e idoneidad de las unidades, desde sus suboficiales a sus jefes y altos mandos. Aunque muy pocos europeos, salvo los del Komintern y de algunos países ocupados, se alistaron voluntariamente en sus filas durante la Gran Guerra de la Patria.

¿Cómo actúa el enemigo?

Las operaciones de combate de las guerrillas y bandas relativamente experimentadas tienen ciertas características distintivas. Una es la planificación detallada y cuidadosa de los combates decididos. En el plan se dan las instrucciones más o menos elaboradas y extensas para el ataque a los objetivos designados. También se suelen designar objetivos alternativos. Su función es permitir la flexibilidad de las subunidades irregulares, para adaptarse y aprovechar los cambios posibles, pero no previstos, en el desarrollo de la situación táctica. Incluso, a veces, se prevén otras operaciones destinadas a explotar y ampliar la ventaja adquirida. La inteligencia, que es la información detectada, elaborada y transmitida, iluminará y facilitará la planificación. En cada operación hacen un esfuerzo especial de exploración, para actualizar y precisar las condiciones tácticas objetivas. Que complemente y verifique el flujo normal de información que reciben de los observadores y los colaboradores “part time” o los civiles afines.

Esta planificación centralizada de los mandos regionales se plasma y concreta en una ejecución descentralizada todo lo posible. Las subunidades a cargo del mando táctico pueden ir desde un “arma automática de pelotón o SAW y su defensa de tiradores”, hasta una “sección reforzada” de éstos. Aquéllas “atacarán” el objetivo convergiendo desde sectores o fajas diferentes, enjambrándose en torno a él. Pero no todo son acciones “violentas”: en lontananza puede moverse un grupo más o menos sospechoso, mientras que un equipo ametrallador completo toma posiciones, enfilando los movimientos amplios y evidentes de la plétora de tropas regulares de patrulla o en “ejercicios” de entrenamiento de afganos o en prácticas propias.

La sorpresa, que es un multiplicador eficaz de la “capacidad de combate” específica de una unidad dada, es empleada continua y sistemáticamente por los combatientes irregulares. Así, ocurre que, “por este valle amplio, ocre y árido nunca nos han atacado”, porque las montañas que lo enmarcan están a 300 o 400 m. en el horizonte. Bueno, pues hoy te van a atacar con ráfagas cortas (2 o3 disparos) de ametralladora con bípode, cuando avances desparramado por aquél, ofreciendo múltiples blancos al enemigo tenaz, curtido y venenoso.

Otra característica típica de las guerras afganas es que los rebeldes irregulares no se empeñan en la defensa de sus posiciones detectadas. Una vez conseguido el hostigamiento del enemigo y extendidos el daño, la mutilación y el estupor sobre los militares, aquéllos se retirarán. No son tan tontos como para esperar impávidos el fuego pesado, preciso y arrasador regular. Ni para presumir de “bravos”, “corajudos” u otras “etiquetas consoladoras”, frente a enemigos con armas de alcance y características superiores y capaces de convertir un blanco de superficie en zona de destrucción. Estos gestos de valor (?) se los dejan para los soldados regulares.

Por último, están el tiempo y su corolario, la oportunidad. Los talibanes manejan muy bien los tiempos tácticos y operativos. Son maestros de la paciencia, la espera, la repetición de los ensayos, simples y sencillos. El tiempo, como variable universal independiente, tiene su complemento y realización práctica en la oportunidad. Sólo cuando las condiciones de una “correlación de fuerzas” muy elemental les son favorables, actúan tácticamente. Incluso se permiten realizar acciones sucesivas o simultáneas en un área dada, para saturarla con sus efectos. Del suicida no hablamos, porque es de un solo uso y casi siempre optimiza bien su tarea prevista.

El tiempo sicológico lo tienen ganado los rebeldes afganos. Los occidentales buscamos que los resultados sean fáciles y rápidos de conseguir. Para aquéllos, el tiempo como condicionante no existe. Viven en el aquí y el ahora, en unos momentos que se concretan en esperar, en andar, en pelear, en comer, en dormir. El tiempo estratégico también lo tienen ganado los afganos irregulares. Porque su enemigo principal y poderoso tiene fecha de caducidad: el 2014. Y el tiempo sicológico les hace más llevadera la espera, como resultante de infinidad de momentos vividos.

En cuanto al combate por el fuego de armas ligeras y medias, los guerrilleros no se acercan demasiado. Son gentes menos entrenadas y equipadas que los militares profesionales. Actúan hostigando al bulto. Sus armas personales más frecuentes, los AK en sus variantes 47 y M no son precisas más allá de los 150-175 m., en tiro filante. El fuego de morteros resulta impreciso y esquivable contra una patrulla montada. Sin embargo, para los civiles y para el tránsito de vehículos y mercancías estas técnicas de ataque son suficientes y eficaces. El arma más temida de los talibanes es el iluminado fanático suicida. Que busca como credencial para el Jardín de las Huríes, el llevarse consigo el mayor número de enemigos muertos y mutilados. El atacante podrá ser un loco religioso, pero no es un tonto. Los suicidas no atacan las posiciones militares preparadas. Dotadas en su perímetro defensivo de complicadas alambradas, fosos, paredes, espacios entre obstáculos, alarmas, deflectores de explosiones, patrullas fijas y móviles. Porque saben que la explosión se disipará en el aire y que no le dejarán acercarse a las garitas o a las torres de vigilancia, porque ya están esperándole. Las armas principales del suicida no son su cinturón o chaleco explosivo, son la sorpresa, la libertad de acción, la iniciativa y su desprecio de la vida por la causa.

El procedimiento para atacar una posición débilmente defendida o sin ánimos de lucha suele ser éste: Bombardean de madrugada con fuego pesado de lanzacohetes fijos, luego se acercan para emplear los morteros. Por fin, el asalto lo realizan varias escuadras independientes que convergen, avanzando y disparando ráfagas de AK y ametralladora RPD o PK y, desde algo más atrás, los lanzagranadas RPG y RL. Sólo disparan sobre blancos comprobados o desde arriba y desde abajo. Con ello evitan todo lo posible los daños del fuego amigo.

La Lucha contra los talibanes y las bandas no ideológicas.

El único modo de defenderse de estas partidas insurrectas es privándoles de la iniciativa, dislocando sus movimientos entre posiciones y hacia objetivos, esquilmando su retaguardia operativa, quitándoles la libertad de acción y demostrando al pueblo quiénes tienen los medios y la determinación para ganar la guerra, apoyando a su gobierno y autoridades. Defenderse no es dejarse reducir o arrinconar en las guarniciones, por la actuación y la extensión de las bandas. Guarniciones que se convierten en enormes y costosos “depósitos protegidos” de materiales y hombres sin utilizar. Esto es dejarse oxidar, desmoralizar y enervar por el enemigo móvil, activo y muy asimétrico.

En estos momentos, en Afganistán se están usando modernos sistemas de combate de infantería, no los mejores y más caros en todos los casos, en misiones de patrullaje rutinario y/o demostrativo, de enlace entre puestos y posiciones y de escolta o apoyo a las columnas de marcha del ejército afgano. Gran parte de las características de estos vehículos, sobran para estos usos. Ya que no son empleados siquiera para la exploración y el reconocimiento de las vías por delante de aquéllas. O como vanguardias de combate, para asegurar pasos y parajes comprometedores. Los VCI son buscados como habitáculos protegidos para escuadra o pelotón, dotados de suelos altos construidos como poliedros convexos, destinados a reflejar las explosiones de los artificios explosivos improvisados, y como plataformas de tiro rápido para rechazar a los irregulares hostiles.

Las sucesivas noticias que vamos recibiendo desde las zonas de operaciones de guerra en Afganistán, procedentes de periodistas insertados en las fuerzas combatientes, de los corresponsales destacados en Kabul y otras poblaciones y las que emiten los ejércitos en presencia, van destilando una serie de características que son comunes a las fuerzas de los distintos ejércitos. Todos van cayendo en la tendencia iniciada por los estadounidenses de tener al enemigo menos cerca, más visto y observado y más batido por el fuego pesado aéreo y artillero.

No se busca con éste, en orden creciente de efectos, perturbar, cegar o neutralizar, sino destruir. Que es el más costoso (bueno para el complejo industrial correspondiente) e improbable de sus efectos (al 100%), lo que exige un gasto incrementado deficiente de recursos. Y no existe siempre su conexión directa con las maniobras ofensivas de las fuerzas terrestres. Que muchas veces no acuden a batir al enemigo quebrado tras el golpe múltiple de fuegos. El fuego pesado se ha convertido en un sustituto económico (el esfuerzo militar se cambia por dólares) e industrial de las maniobras y los ataques de las fuerzas terrestres.

Y la razón de todo esto la saben los talibanes: el horror al riesgo y a asumir bajas.

A THEORY OF THE CONTEMPORARY WARS II.

(continuación)

The Last Operational Projections opposite to the Most recent Threats.

The balance of the nuclear weapons between both great atomic hegemonic powers («guides and leaders» of their partners), is defined by the new START Treaty. This has been ratified on December 22, 2010 by the American Senate. And is hoped that the Russian Duma ratifies it, after her established by protocol study, in an only voting at the beginning of 2011. This new agreement replaces the START of 1991, which expired on Saturday, the 5th of December, 2009.

The START 2 supposes a qualitative and substantial limitation of the number of heads and nuclear strategic vectors of the USA and Russia. Far are the times in which the number of operational, stored and dismantled by pieces nuclear devices were reaching 50000 between both. By 2013, each country will deploy only 1550 strategic nuclear warheads and will have 800 carrying and multicarrying vectors for them: submarines, free flight rockets, ballistic rockets and planes. Also is established a new system of inspection of the arsenals and nuclear means.

Several are the deficiencies or topics not solved by the Treaty. One is the not limitation to developing the defense systems against the vectors. Also is kept the storage freedom of not operational warheads and of deployment of the atomic tactical weapons. Between both «models», each signatory power can have nowadays near 6000 warheads. The tactical nuclear weapon, destined to the battlefield, can be an intermediate step in a direct warlike confrontation between nuclear powers. Before using the nuclear strategic volleys against the operational or deep enemy rears. The USA claims that, at least, the last two topics been an object of a later treaty.

The rigorous limitations of the nuclear weapons do not eliminate them. No weapon has never been abolished, once acquired and extended the technology for his manufacture and use. It is necessary to learn to coexist indefinitely with them. An excessive control (very few explosive heads and vectors) does that they all are directed to attack the enemies population and industrial centers. This paradoxically goes in opposition with the pacifists aspirations. When the number of weapon systems overcomes a survival or practical threshold, it allows to follow an atomic flexible, variable and staggered strategy. In her, many of the vectors are pointed to destroy the enemy vectors in the diverse phases of his path to the goals: in and over the hostile territory or platform; in ballistic or autonomous flight towards the goal and over the own territory, both at high and very low level. This keeps limited the number of heads destined against populations and industries. Even it allows their tactical employment against profitable goals of military enemy concentrations, specially before reaching in force the forward limit of a principal defense position.

The modern communications have rushed, marking character, into the contemporary wars: the wireless or waves of wide spectrum; the road networks and the diverse engine vehicles. A special challenge, which appears in all the coercive conflicts, not necessarily armed in all his phases, is the so called cybernetic war. Made concrete in the attacks to the «enemy» across the universal wireless communications network. These aggressions are capable of penetrating the first and second levels of security lines, most known or common. And to commit an outrage against the databases and the processes of the normal computers of companies, individuals and institutions. Until a few years ago, only the developed states had access to this vanguard technology. And this also connects the 3th and 4th generations wars: the employment of the cyberattacks is not already only in hands of the big powers. As example, driving mad the computers of the hostile plants of enrichment of the uranium 235. Today, small nations and groups of fanned rebels or of conceited little rascals, with certain knowledge and lean resources, can realize successfully cybernetic assaults at certain level.

In the last decades, the wars are showing in very asymmetric levels of means and efforts confronted. So much is so, the Americans are called them wars of 4th generation or asymmetric wars. But they are nothing more than the old guerrilla wars of the History. And, often also, of national liberation. Let’s not forget that always the rebellious and insolent enemy is despised. He is judged by the laws of armed sedition and attack against the National Security. From May, 1808 Napoleon so had in consideration the Spanish. Or the European powers to the nascent nations in Africa and Asia, after the World War II, from Algeria up to Indonesia, passing to Angola (the Portuguese were saying that she was a national province) and Vietnam.

In these irregular wars many of the parameters of the previous wars are absent. There is no declaration of war by the Legislative Power of the strong or military contender. The victory is not obtained occupying the enemy territory. The military means lose a part of his leading role, in favor of the social, economic and political means, necessary to gain the will and the fervor of the societies at the stack. The treatment and the care given by the contenders to the civil population of the guerrilla infected territory is fundamental in the development and the result of the conflict. The duration of these wars is major than that of the conventional wars. The time, necessary in order that the rebels make and develop their total war effort, works, in general, in favor of the weak or irregular contender. The military means are not adapted, at first, to the type of fighting that is asked to them. Neither exist clear goals, nor territories at stake, nor front lines or enemies deployments, nor strengthened positions. If the guerrilla are it sufficient skillful and steady, to not directly and unnecessarily confront her chronic weakness to the enemy strength.

The Great Operational Lines of the Counter Guerrillas Forces.

Nowadays, in West, in Europe, the exterior leading role of the conventional armed forces seems to center in them, throughout the time and in varied theaters. The military western action opposite to their exterior irregular global threats demands an effective, light and mobile counterinsurgency forces, specialized in not orthodox tactics and technologies, as part of the conventional troops. That must always operate in conjunction with the national forces of the countries infected by irregular hostiles and supported with decision by the own economy and the diplomacy. This will strengthen their missions and compounded role, The counterguerrillas forces must not be enslaved to the strategies and tactics of the conflicts of the second and third generation or classic contemporary ones. Though these could arise punctually in the armed conflicts with the «urchin States» of each time (for example, Iran, North Korea or Venezuela).

Some of the operational characteristics of this different type of war, but not new, are:

To always avoid a protracted war. With her the enemy organizes, spreads and strengths, sometimes irreversibly. While the military men lose way, get angry and weaken. The war of Afghanistan is squarely in this long critical period.

To always attack the concentrations and the rebel bases. These are the hard and conventional goals that they offer to the military forces. To always defend and support the own communications and to attack those of the enemy. To take advantage for it of the light armored vehicles mobility and of the aircraft, which neutralize the information of the different enemy observers.

To keep the passive defenses of the war to the possible minimum. The big «protective» and costly barracks in relatively calm zones, only serve to socially and military isolate the regular forces, from the fluid and active environment of the irregular fight. If the military forces were initially not enough, is necessary to concentrate them temporarily in fewer zones and to promote between the population the self defense forces. To always use a constant, creative and energetic patrolling. So much for the exploration and the attack, as to hinder and isolate the guerrillas from the friends or neutral populations and to cut their communications. In both cases, is necessary to keep mobile, even airborne forces, to give them supports. To use the concentrations of regular military forces only to attack the guerrilla bases or to surround and chase his operational concentrations.

This will keep the initiative and the surprise, created by the regional network of small light “action units”, in hands of the military men. That by formation, training, means and vocation should clearly overcome the hostiles in the military operations. The principal goal is not to keep a “front line” or a «cultivated field» of barracks, redoubts and forts through a whole country or strategic region. But to active destroy the combat capacity and the operational movement capacity of the armed rebels.

And only the military «initial» and continued successes, will lay the foundations for a firm, irreversible and progressive pacification of the different regions of the country.

Let’s see now succinctly the possible distribution of the military bases depending on the enemy activity. In the enemy most favorable zones, the military positions must be solid and resistant, few and with a bigger garrison. In these areas must predominate the exploration of the bands and the major offensive operations against them, over their bases, concentrations, refuges and passages.

In the zones where the rebels try to settle, progress and manage to dominate the civilians, the military positions will be more numerous and with fewer troops. These are the more changing zones, of more irregular war, of combat meetings (the ambush is it) more frequent. Here is decided, first, the advance and the progress and, finally, the victory of one of both contenders. The enemy communications and the rebellious centers in these areas are the operative goals of the loyal forces, together with the defense of the populations. Resting, partly, on local self-defense forces, reinforced by highly mobile military patrols, even transported by helicopters. Assured the defense of an area in these zones, is possible to demand loyalty to the protected population. And to begin the labors of national economic support and civic rearmament.

In the most loyal or neutral and pacific areas is necessary to test the technologies and the methods of sincere and effective approximation to the population. The self-defense native forces, supported by military mobile patrols, in charge a manageable zone, must support here the weight of keeping their own security. In this zone can be located the helitransported and the mechanized sufficient reserves. To be sent to other 2 kinds of operational zones in support or assault operations. Also the brigades of economic support and of civic rearmament, can have here his stores and central big barracks.

When scanty military means are available and the enemy sustain an all-out war, is it possible to fight against armed and motivated rebels?

Let’s see a historical example of the action of military forces against insurgents, in unfavorable conditions for them. The German antipartisans forces in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In heir manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that » the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be replied».

The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, by the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His anti partisans troops were consisting of an always variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German security troops and policemen; security troops of his allies in the East Front, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of «Russian» allied forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes insecure. The hard core of the units were the Germans. In the positions usually were not homogeneous troops. In them the qualities were intermingled, in order that the more mope or novice was encouraging by the presence of the forte. And it remove from him the thoughts of weakness or desertion. Before the inability to garrison her rear in the whole territory conquered from the USSR, at west of an imaginary line between Leningrad and Stalingrad, the Germans had to select very well the points to garrison. These rarely were possessing more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the position could be defended for a time. While, the rest, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor their vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of anti partisans forces, they were formed exploration and combat patrols. Something like a reconnaissance in force forces, to locate and to scourge the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, before a guerrilla threat or the location of an important concentration, even were temporarily brought troops from the first line (of the operational zone) for the assault and destruction of those, generally looking for his encircle and annihilation. I

It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational goal of his anti partisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies from Germany, Poland and Romania were kept reasonably opened up to the rears of the German forces and their allies in the East Front. And the men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods flows that they received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Million Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and to there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch.

TEORÍA DE LAS GUERRAS CONTEMPORÁNEAS II.

(continuación)

Las Últimas Proyecciones Operativas frente a las Amenazas más Recientes.

El equilibrio de las armas nucleares entre las dos grandes potencias atómicas hegemónicas (“guías y conductoras” de sus asociados), lo define el nuevo tratado START. Éste ha sido ratificado el 22 de diciembre de 2010 por el Senado estadounidense. Y se espera que la Duma rusa lo ratifique, tras su estudio protocolario, en una única votación a primeros de 2011. Este nuevo acuerdo reemplaza al START de 1991, que expiró el sábado 5 de diciembre de 2009.

El START 2 supone una limitación cualitativa y sustancial del número de ojivas y vectores nucleares estratégicos de los EEUU y Rusia. Lejos están los tiempos en los que el número de artefactos atómicos operativos y almacenados y despiezados alcanzaban los 50000 ingenios entre ambos. Para 2013, cada país desplegará sólo 1550 cabezas nucleares estratégicas y tendrá 800 vectores portadores y multiportadores para ellos: submarinos, cohetes de vuelo libre, cohetes balísticos y aviones. También se establece un nuevo sistema de inspección de los arsenales y medios nucleares.

Varias son las deficiencias o temas no resueltos del tratado. Una es la no limitación a desarrollar los sistemas de defensa contra los vectores. También se mantiene la libertad de almacenamiento de cabezas no operativas y de despliegue de las armas atómicas tácticas. Entre ambos “modelos”, cada potencia firmante puede tener actualmente cerca de 6000 ojivas. Las armas tácticas nucleares, destinadas al campo de batalla, pueden ser un paso intermedio en una confrontación bélica directa entre potencias nucleares. Antes de emplear las salvas nucleares estratégicas contra las retaguardias operativas o profundas enemigas. Los EEUU pretenden que, al menos, los dos últimos temas sean objeto de un posterior acuerdo.

Las limitaciones rigurosas de las armas nucleares no las eliminan. Ningún arma ha sido abolida nunca, una vez adquirida y extendida la tecnología para su fabricación y uso. Es necesario aprender a convivir indefinidamente con ellas. Un control excesivo (muy pocas cabezas y vectores) hace que todas sean dirigidas a atacar los centros de población e industriales enemigos. Esto va paradójicamente en contra de las aspiraciones pacifistas. Cuando el número de sistemas de armas supera un umbral de supervivencia o práctico, permite seguir una estrategia atómica flexible, variable y escalonada. En ella muchos de los vectores son apuntados a destruir los vectores enemigos en las diversas fases de su trayectoria al blanco: en y sobre territorio o plataforma hostil, en vuelo balístico o autónomo hacia el objetivo y sobre el territorio propio, tanto a alta como a muy baja cota. Esto mantiene limitado el número de cabezas destinadas contra poblaciones e industrias. Incluso permite su empleo táctico contra blancos rentables de concentraciones militares enemigas, especialmente antes de alcanzar en fuerza el límite anterior de una posición de defensa.

En las guerras contemporáneas han irrumpido, marcando carácter, las comunicaciones modernas: las inalámbricas u ondas de amplio espectro, las redes viarias y los vehículos diversos a motor. Un desafío especial, que se plantea en todos los conflictos coactivos, no necesariamente armados en todas sus fases, es la llamada guerra cibernética. Concretada en los ataques al “enemigo” a través de la red universal de comunicaciones inalámbricas. Estas agresiones son capaces de penetrar las líneas de seguridad de primer y segundo niveles, las más conocidas o comunes. Y atentar contra las bases de datos y los procesos de los ordenadores normales de empresas, particulares e instituciones. Hasta hace unos pocos años, sólo los estados desarrollados tenían acceso a su tecnología de vanguardia. Y esto enlaza también las guerras de 3ª y 4ª generaciones: el empleo de los ciberataques no está ya en manos de las grandes potencias. Por ejemplo, alocando los ordenadores de las plantas de hostiles o golfos de enriquecimiento del uranio 235. Hoy en día, pequeñas naciones y grupos de aventados rebeldes o de pilluelos vanidosos, con ciertos conocimientos y magros recursos, pueden realizar con éxito ataques cibernéticos a cierto nivel.

En las últimas décadas, las guerras se están manifestando en unos niveles muy asimétricos de medios y esfuerzos enfrentados. Tanto es así que los estadounidenses les llaman guerras de 4ª generación o asymmetric wars. Pero que no son más que las viejas guerras de guerrillas de la Historia. Y, muchas veces también, de liberación nacional. No olvidemos que siempre se ha vilipendiado al enemigo rebelde y respondón. Al que se le juzga por las leyes de sedición armada y ataques contra la seguridad del estado. Napoleón así tenía en consideración a los españoles a partir de mayo de 1808. O las potencias europeas a las naciones nacientes en África y Asia, tras la II guerra mundial, desde Argelia hasta Indonesia, pasando por Angola (que los portugueses decían que era una provincia nacional) y Vietnam.

En estas guerras irregulares faltan muchos de los parámetros de las guerras anteriores. No hay declaración de guerra por parte del poder legislativo del contendiente fuerte o militar. La victoria no se obtiene ocupando el territorio enemigo. Los medios militares pierden una parte de su protagonismo, a favor de los medios sociales, económicos y políticos, necesarios para ganar la voluntad y el fervor de las sociedades en juego. El trato y el cuidado dados por los contendientes a la población civil del territorio infestado de guerrillas es fundamental en el desarrollo y el resultado del conflicto. La duración de estas guerras es mayor que la de las guerras convencionales. El tiempo, necesario para que los rebeldes creen y desarrollen su esfuerzo de guerra total, actúa, en general, en favor del contendiente débil o irregular. Los medios militares no suelen estar adaptados, en principio, al tipo de lucha que se les pide. No existen objetivos claros, ni territorios en litigio, ni líneas o despliegues, ni posiciones fortificadas, si las guerrillas son lo suficientemente hábiles y sentadas, como para no oponer directa e innecesariamente su debilidad crónica a la fortaleza enemiga.

Las Grandes Líneas Operativas de las Fuerzas Contra Guerrilleras.

Hoy en día, en Occidente, en Europa, el protagonismo exterior de las fuerzas armadas convencionales parece concentrarse en ellas, a lo largo del tiempo y en variados teatros. La actuación militar occidental frente a sus amenazas exteriores irregulares globales exigen unas fuerzas de contra insurgencia eficaces, ligeras y móviles y especializadas en tácticas y técnicas no ortodoxas, como parte de las tropas convencionales. Que deben operar siempre en conjunción con las fuerzas nacionales de los países infestados de hostiles y apoyadas con decisión por la economía y la diplomacia propias. Las fuerzas contra guerrilleras no deben esclavizarse a las estrategias y tácticas de los conflictos de segunda y tercera generación o clásicos contemporáneos. Aunque éstos puedan surgir puntualmente en los conflictos armados con los “estados golfos” de cada momento (por ejemplo, Irán, Corea del Norte o Venezuela).

Algunas de las características operativas de este tipo de guerra diferente, pero no nuevo, son:

Evitar siempre una guerra prolongada. Con ella el enemigo se organiza, se extiende y se fortalece, a veces irreversiblemente. Mientras los militares se desorientan, se irritan y se debilitan. La guerra de Afganistán está de lleno en este período prolongado crítico.

Atacar siempre las concentraciones y las bases rebeldes. Éstos son los objetivos duros y convencionales que ofrecen a las fuerzas militares. Defender y mantener siempre las comunicaciones propias y atacar las del enemigo. Aprovechar para ello la movilidad de los vehículos ligeros blindados y las aeronaves, que neutralizan la información de los observadores varios del enemigo.

Mantener las defensas pasivas de la guerra al mínimo posible. Los grandes cuarteles “protectores” y costosos en zonas relativamente tranquilas, sólo sirven para aislarlos militar y socialmente del medio fluido y activo de la lucha irregular. Si faltaran fuerzas propias inicialmente, es necesario concentrarlas temporalmente en menos zonas y fomentar entre la población las fuerzas de auto defensa. Emplear siempre un patrullaje continuo, creativo y enérgico. Tanto para la exploración y el ataque, como para estorbar y aislar a las guerrillas de las poblaciones amigas o neutrales y cortar sus comunicaciones. En ambos casos, es necesario mantener fuerzas móviles, incluso aerotransportadas, para prestarles apoyos. Utilizar las concentraciones de fuerzas militares sólo para atacar las bases guerrilleras o cercar y perseguir sus concentraciones operativas.

Esto mantendrá la iniciativa y la sorpresa, que crean la red regional de pequeñas unidades ligeras de acción, en manos de los militares. Que por formación, entrenamiento, medios y vocación deberían superar claramente a los hostiles en las operaciones militares. El objetivo principal no es mantener una línea o un “sembrado” de cuarteles y fortines por todo un país o región estratégica. Sino destruir la capacidad de combate y de movimiento operativo de los rebeldes armados.

Y sólo los éxitos militares “iniciales” y continuados, sentarán las bases para una pacificación firme, irreversible y progresiva de las distintas regiones del país.

Veamos sucintamente la posible distribución de las bases militares en función de la actividad enemiga. En las zonas más favorables a los rebeldes, los puestos militares deben ser sólidos y resistentes, pocos y con mayor guarnición. En estas áreas deben predominar la exploración de las bandas y las mayores operaciones ofensivas contra ellos, sobre sus bases, concentraciones, refugios y pasos.

En las zonas donde los rebeldes intentan asentarse, progresar y llegar a dominar a los civiles, los puestos serán más numerosos y con menos tropas. Éstas son las zonas más lábiles, de guerra más irregular, de encuentros (la emboscada lo es) más frecuentes. Aquí se decide, primero, el avance y el progreso y, finalmente, el triunfo de uno de los dos contendientes. Las comunicaciones enemigas y los núcleos rebeldes en estas áreas son los objetivos operativos de las fuerzas leales, junto con la defensa de las poblaciones. Apoyándose, en parte, en fuerzas de autodefensa locales, reforzadas por patrullas militares muy móviles, incluso helitransportadas. Asegurada la defensa de un área en estas zonas, es posible exigir lealtad a la población protegida, y comenzar las labores de apoyo económico y de rearme cívico nacionales.

En las áreas más leales o neutrales y pacíficas es necesario ensayar las técnicas y los métodos de acercamiento sincero y efectivo a la población civil. Las fuerzas nativas de autodefensa, apoyadas por patrullas militares móviles, a cargo de una zona manejable, deben soportar aquí el peso de mantener su propia seguridad. En esta zona pueden localizarse las reservas helitransportadas y mecanizadas suficientes. Para ser enviadas en operaciones de apoyo o de ataque a las otras 2 clases de zonas operativas. También las brigadas de apoyo económico y de rearme cívico, pueden tener aquí sus almacenes y barracones centrales.

Cuando los medios militares disponibles son escasos y el enemigo sostiene una guerra total, ¿es posible combatir contra rebeldes armados y motivados?

Veamos un ejemplo histórico de la actuación de fuerzas contrainsurgentes, en condiciones desfavorables para ellas. Las fuerzas antipartisanas alemanas en la URSS intentaron siempre no ser forzadas por los guerrilleros a la pasividad de la guarnición o la escolta. En su manual de “Guerra contra las Bandas” establecían que “la iniciativa debe ser siempre nuestra. Incluso si el comandante solamente tiene una pequeña fuerza a su disposición, no debe mostrar fallos en su resolución. Si es posible, cada acción de las bandas debe ser contestada”.

Los alemanes no sólo estaban obstaculizados en sus operaciones contra guerrilleras por una habitual inferioridad de hombres. Sino, también, por la heterogénea calidad de las que disponían. Sus tropas antipartisanas consistían en una siempre variable combinación de fuerzas de diversos orígenes y calidades: tropas de fronteras y tropas de seguridad y policía alemanas; tropas de seguridad de sus aliados en el frente del Este, especialmente italianos y rumanos; y una mezcla variopinta de fuerzas “rusas” aliadas de seguridad y de autodefensa, a veces, inseguras. El núcleo duro de las unidades eran los alemanes. En los puestos no se solían poner tropas homogéneas. En ellos las calidades se entreveraban, para que la presencia del fuerte animase al más flojo o novato, y le alejase los pensamientos de debilidad o deserción.

Ante la imposibilidad de guarnecer su retaguardia en todo el territorio conquistado a la URSS, al oeste de una línea imaginaria trazada entre Leningrado y Stalingrado, los alemanes tenían que seleccionar muy bien los puntos de guarnición. Éstos pocas veces contaban con más de una sección de fuerzas contraguerrilleras. Además, se consideraba que con 4 o 5 hombres, el puesto podía ser defendido por un tiempo. Mientras, los otros, en 1 o 2 patrullas, salían a perseguir a los partisanos en las aldeas cercanas, a vigilar la vital línea de comunicaciones o a apoyar a otros puestos. Cuando se creaban nuevas unidades o si había un “sobrante” temporal de fuerzas antipartisanas, se formaban patrullas de exploración y combate, algo así como unas fuerzas de reconocimiento en fuerza, para localizar y hostigar a los guerrilleros. Cuando era necesario realizar una acción ofensiva mayor, ante una amenaza guerrillera o la localización de una concentración importante, incluso se traían temporalmente tropas de primera línea (de la zona operativa) para el ataque y destrucción de aquélla, generalmente buscando su cerco y aniquilamiento.

Es cierto que los resultados alemanes fueron limitados. Y también es cierto que el principal objetivo operativo de sus fuerzas antipartisanas se cumplió. Se mantuvieron razonablemente abiertas las líneas de abastecimientos desde Alemania, Polonia y Rumania hasta las retaguardias de las fuerzas alemanas y de sus aliados en el Este. Y el flujo de hombres, armamentos, equipos, repuestos y mercancías que recibieron fue constante, para permitir el gigantesco esfuerzo de guerra contra los casi inagotables recursos de la URSS. Millones de prisioneros soviéticos fueron enviados al Reich y hacia allí retornaron incontables unidades y hombres de la Wehrmatch.