GEOGRAPHY AND OPERATIONS – Página 2

Modern Allied Urban Warfare against the Insurgency.

Introduction.

The American and European troops are prepared to fight against a regular military enemy provided with a masses army. Or even more modern, of the IIIrd generation, with more elaborated technologically means and better trained men, to support the lonelinesses and tensions of the awaited current battlefields. Definitively, his «way», his action space, is the direct and opened clash in presence of a great profusion of probable enemy targets. His instrument is the attrition, the destruction of the aims that the enemy presents and could be detected and acquired in all the depth of his march or assault deployment. The last two enemy echelons, nowadays increasingly remote or deep, are reached by the longe range support aviation or with the ballistic or autonomous missiles of medium range.

Resultado de imagen de Russian Ordnance fire in Middle East

Which is here the role of the man? To detect and confirm the enemy targets, to try to fix them, if it is about a patrol or a small combat unit and to call his «ordnance» in order that it devastates them. Only his elite units, always scanty and, therefore, exceptional and precious, are formed in the nearby infantry fight using only his organic means.

In Iraq and in Syria the islamist bases are always in the cities and populations more favorable for the activity of his different bands. And they are surrounded or permeated by military local and foreign forces. Already initiated the war, the North American intelligence intercepted a memorandum of 17 pages written by Abu Musad al-Zarqawi, former chief of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, to Osama bin Laden. In it he was expressing his worry for his survival: «In Iraq there are not mountains where we could shelter, nor forests in whose thickness we could hide. There are spies eyes everywhere. Our backs are exposed and our movements are realized in view of all». And this geographical military space is similar in Syria.

The Action of the military Forces against the current Insurgency.

In the books on the guerrilla warfare, it is discused of the tactics of the siege to the military fixed or semipermanent positions. The guerrillas, deprived in the first phases of an ideological armed revolution (communists, of fight against the foreign occupant) of enough military capacity, have their guidelines to attack the mentioned military positions.

Resultado de imagen de Russian Ordnance fire in Middle East RUSSIAN REACTIVE ARTILLERY IN SYRIA

In the zones not dominated by the guerrillas, but bordering the areas under his control, it is where develops the fight of those for removing the military enemy. Seeking to also control these areas and to realize in them his ideological indoctrination of the populations. The guerrilla bases only can grow in space or increase his number, when the military enemy moves back. Or when his positions (advanced positions, barracks) are submitted to a more or less nearby and ferreous siege. That must be continuous in his effects: that is to say, controlling the approximation and exit routes of those. To threaten, harass, check and to attack in its moment the surrounded forces. And the reinforcement and supply columns of that come to help. Using limited attacks, ambushes and traps and registered fire bags.

In the regions infected by the guerrillas, not necessarily occupied by them, the military positions are protective, extensive and few fortress. His garrison is high. The military set evokes there a blind, awkward and low mobile bunker. The military men realize from them special forces operations of reconaissance and against guerrilla positions and of march to the combat on targets of zone, at charge of strong columns. To occupy and then defend them, according to the capacities of the military forces. In this, the commitment and moral of them is decisive.

Resultado de imagen de Bombing in Middle East GOVERNMENT CARPET BOMBING IN SYRIA.

In the irregular war against the bands of the Islamic State, the armed forces and his auxiliary ones use in his operational strategy, some of Mao Ze Dong’s 10 military principles to direct the tactics of the Chinese guerrillas and semi regulars. Those were enunciated by Mao on December 25, 1947 in his speech before the Central Committee of the PCC. Let’s see, in not necessarily original order: 1) To attack first the isolated and spread enemies and later the stronger enemy forces. 2) To take first the small villages and, finally, the big populations. 3) Not to fight combats, if you are little prepared for, nor present combats in which the victory is not sure. 4) To concentrate always for each combat forces absolutely superior to those of the enemy. 5) To destroy the enemy while it moves and is more vulnerable. 6) To use the intervals between campaigns to rest and to regroup and to train the troops…but not allow that the enemy have a pause, not even a breather. 7) Take first the populations low defended. And, when the conditions are favorable to us, those with medium defenses. And wait to increase our advantages, to assault the better defended cities.

This operational strategy outlined by Mao, using simple, didactic and efective procedure, is of a low military level. As corresponds to an insurrection that had to grow, to develop and to spread. And that was employing rural uncultured forces and was arming itself principally with the enemy captured weapon. Mao said that he «had a call option in the weapon of the British arsenals».

IRAQI TANK WITH SHIA BANNER…

But this same orthodox operational strategy of the weak rebel against the strong military, is that are going to use the Allied forces, agglutinate and supported by the USA and Russia (in Syria), to attack an islamist insurgency, entrenched in his urban bases. And keeping the massive, repeated and overwhelming employment of the modern air and ground heavy fire on the rebels. So much in the battles and combats that appear, as for the wear and interdiction of the islamist positions, his facilities and movements.

Seeking as strategic aims to defeat the rebels and to occupy his bases or positions. That would be finally select for a policeman’s labor. Bases that are the only hard, definite and static aims, which the guerrillas have. With a qualitative difference with the diffuse, evasive, fleeting and slippery aims that the guerrillas offer in movement. Bases that are directly attacked, using the military forces (to those that is supposed better trained and equipped and, at least, equally motivated, that the rebels) and his enormous power of direct and indirect fire.

Resultado de imagen de german anti partisan operations RUSSIAN PARTISANS.

The military and social problem that exists here is that the Allied rebel Arabic groups, the Kurdish peshmergas and the Iraqi military men and his loyal militias, lack the military virtues of the National complete armies. And they have acquired not military habits on the preservation of his men in combat. Avoiding them at any price the mutilation and the death. In It have influenced decisively the religious and social origins of the different «allied» soldiers groups and his interests and divergent aims, at times even antagonistic, within these two civil wars. Social elements and parameters contaminated, spurious and, even strange, before the concept of the Umma or community of faithfuls of the same god, Allah.

IRAQI SHIA MECHANIZED ARTILLERY AGAINST ISIS

They follow for it this operational strategy of going very little by little, first occupying the weakest islamist positions that surround and defend the biggest. Devastating with the heavy fire from the distance the islamist disclosed positions, which are intermingled with with the houses and refuges of the civilians. Because the war they do, so much the Americans as the Russians and all his allies, in the urban fighting areas that are the islamist occupied populations of Iraq and Syria. And the prolongation of the war, the major time that they will use to obtain his military aims, preserving his men in the combat, the civilians will pay it. With his blood, with the destruction of his material means and buildings and with his massive displacements, seeking to save already only the life and without knowing who will receive and help them.

Let’s see a historical example of the action of counterinsurgents forces, in high unfavorable conditions for them. The German forces antipartisans in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In his manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that “the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be answered».

The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, for the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His antipartisans troops were consisting always of variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German troops of security and policemen; security troops of his Allies in the front of the East, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of Allied «Russian» forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes, insafe. The hard core of the units were the Germans. The posts did not have homogeneous troops. In them, the men’s qualities were intermingled, in order that mop or novice was encouraging by the presence of the strong, and in him was removed the thoughts of weakness or desertion.

Resultado de imagen de german anti partisan operations LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES GIVING SUPPORT TO AN ANTIPARTISAN OPERATION IN RUSSIA.

Before the inability to provide troops and security to his rearguard in the whole territory conquered to the USSR, at the west of an imaginary laid out between Leningrad and Stalingrado, the Germans had to select very well the points of garrison. These rarely had more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the post could be defended for a time. While, others, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor the vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of antipartisans forces, there were formed reconnaissance and combat patrols. Something like reconnaissance in force patrols, to locate and harass the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, against a guerrilla threat or the location of an important bands concentration, even there were temporarily brought troops from the forward line (of the operational zone), for the assault and destruction of that one, generally looking for his siege and annihilation.

It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational aim of his antipartisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies were kept reasonably opened from Germany, Poland and Romania up to the rears of the German forces and his allies in the East. And the flow of men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods that received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Millions Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and towards there there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch, in his continuous rotations.

THE TACTICAL FACTORS AND THE MILITARY SURPRISE.

THE TACTICAL FACTORS METT-TC OF THE RECEIVED MISSION FROM THE DIRECT COMMAND.

The Mission (M) determines the employ of the surprise, because it defines the «tactical environment«, over the merely spatial component, in which this one can apply and where it will be developed. The fulfillment of the received mission will determine decisively the possibilities of conception and application of the surprise. On having defined and express that one, the goal of the multiple and convergent actions of the efforts and means assigned by the superior command to a tactical chief. The detection by the exploration or the advanced “units of action” of a possible «interface of action» favorable over the enemy, does not authorize “per se” to a command to separate from the fulfillment of the mission of the top command.

The Enemy (E) is the essential and principal aim of a command. And the surprise is a multiplier essential factor of his potentials and means, to fulfill the received mission and to contribute to it. Surprise must then to look for: the spatial or functional dislocation of the enemy; or the economic wastage of his capacities; or a more rapid and effective fulfillment of the entrusted mission; or a positional advantage for the own deployment, for own immediate maneuvers; or the decisive assault or the counterattack to the critical or secondary vulnerabilities of the enemy, according to the plan of the top command.

The Terrain (T) and, for extension, the space is the essential support of the «tactical area» of the military action. This must use it always in its own profit, both in the assault and in the defense. In the rapid maneuvers, typical of the surprises, one will prefer using the favorable area for the employed weapon, in order that it favors the pace or tempo and the impulse or moment of them.

This way, the tanks (which fighting way is the attack) will use favorably in lightly wavy grounds and with great domain by the sights, without perpendicular cuts or water currents or rocky important outcrops. Nevertheless, the complete surprise can need the employment of tanks in difficult, not impossible ground, for them, so they are not waited by the enemy. Even, using in the spear of advance fewer armored units than the usual ones, which, with the surprise, would make feel with his presence equal fire power and shock.

The grounds provided with covers and/or concealments and the night and the atmospheric phenomena or meteors (rain, snow, hail), that reduce visibility and combative disposition in the defenders, favor the movement to the combat of the units and means of the surprise. Also, they allow their temporal concealment in the decided rest and departure zones. The inconvinient and/or disagreeable grounds facilitate the final approximation of the means of the surprise: gutters, edges of the streets close to the sidewalks, vertical walls that are practicable, cultivated fields, bushes, wetlands. In exchange for inconveniences and of time in the advance, we will win in the effective employ of the surprise.

In the defense, we will use the broken ground, with concealment relative heights (CRH) and covers for the small units (urban and industrial zones); partly resting on the rear slope and in natural obstacles (rivers, trees spots, etc.) that run parallel to the tracing of the defensive position; that impede or reveal the enemy movements, breaking his impulse, and facilitate the rejection from our own favorable positions. The counterattack from the depth of our tactical zone on the reverse or the flank of the enemy spears of advance, preferably after his determination, will be a very effective employ of the surprise. The fire traps (fire bags), the dispersed and small minefields, the fire blows from the defense points and resistance nests, retained up to the close distances with the enemy, are defensive surprises, but more waited by the enemy.

Being based on the ground characteristics and paying attention to the particularities of some part of the tactical area (enemy, mission, area, opportunity) the surprise will be planned and decided. And it will implement his assembly, deployment, support and unfolding, following a sufficient, protected and constant flow.

The Troops (T) necessary to execute and fulfill the conceived and decided surprise, must be adapted for the mission by his characteristics. The surprise is an offensive action over the enemy, developed unexpected, rapid and thougtlessly, in general. The equipment of the men and the air and artillery support must be the necessary and sufficient, in conformity with the determined plan. Besides his general training, the men must receive the specific training, depending on the characteristics of the mission and the actions to develop. The characteristics of obedience and initiative, patience, resistance and sobriety, physical qualities, enthusiasm and spirit of group, commitment with the mission, must be the best in the men. As they will be an important part of the actions. And they will act as chiefs and persons in charge of themselves and of his mission companions, in certain moments.

It is important a complete real time training of the mission. There are devices that fail at the X hours of use. The tension on the men and his sustained efforts affect their comfort and their efficiency and rapidity of action. With repercussions in his combative disposition, his alert and the precision of answers.

Often the heavy fire will be used to conceal the enemy from our surprise. The coordination of different weapon in the same mission or sector, is a critical point of it. For example, units of infantry, reinforced by some squads of engineers and supported by a few tanks sections, crossing a thick forest to surprisingly reach an enemy important position in the depth of his deployment. Acting in the same sector of advance or assault, the coordination between the small units must be tested and confirmed.

The Time (T) of the mission is a decisive factor of his success. On one hand, it must be the opportune one. For other part, the time must be enough and accelerated uniformly in the «successive cycles of action» of the development of the mission. In order that the concentration, the sequence or the simultaneity of employs and the forcefulness of our actions demolish the enemy human aim at which they are applied, once gotten the surprise.

It is necessary to consider always that all the actions need to happen an estimated planned time plus a complementary corrector time. This will depend on the degree of complexity of the mission: units, logistic support, demonstrative helping actions, crossing distances, passage difficulties, presence and intention of the enemy, simultaneity or sequence of employs, coordination. And it originates in the failures that arise in all the human activities and in the small and medium mistakes that are committed by the commands and men. Some call these the tactical friction of war. A serious mistake would suppose that the surprise was badly calculated or executed and it is an operational serious mistake.

The civilians (C) must not be damaged in a surprising mission. Even when the enemy mixes and protects in a civil area, it is possible to define and to make concrete a purely military aim. To isolate, attack and extirpate it with military accurate and mopping-up. Here is necessary the employ of the organic weapon of the ground attacking unit, which limit the not wished hurts and make concrete his effects in the selected targets.

The heavy indiscriminate air and artillery fire is a weapon of merciless and spread results for the employ in urban areas. His aim is not to blind, to disturb or to neutralize the enemy. The excessive and insistent heavy fire seek to destroy it. That is the more uncertain and less economic goal of all. Both the Soviets and the western allieds have used it with profusion in the civil wars of the Southwest of Asia. His use has as goal to destroy from far off and before to the assault, the enemy positions in the villages. Avoiding as much as possible that the own ground forces fight at close distances with the islamist rebels.

THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE. (SECOND PART).

AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

(CONTINUATION)

Results of the German counterattack and its trascendence.

Nevertheless, the booty gained was scanty. Von Manstein declared that there were approximately 23,000 dead Soviet soldiers and 9,000 captured Soviet soldiers. The materiel captured were approximately 615 tanks (probably largely recovered), 354 campaign guns, 69 anti-aircraft pieces and more than 600 machine guns and mortars. It was not possible to encircle the enemy and Soviet soldiers took advantage of this by leaving the heavy equipment and retreating. Von Manstein said that, because the extreme cold, his soldiers were bunched into small, tight groups, leaving wide spaces and lines in his rearguard, without effective cover. This partly happened because they were elite troops and because the war was without mercy.

COLONEL JOHN BOYD, AN AMERICAN TEORIST OF ITS MANEUVER THEORY.

At the beginning of March, 48^th panzer Corps pressed toward the east of Kharkov and the SS panzer corps of General Halder was entrusted with recovering the long-suffering city for the Germans.

At the middle of the month, the Germans had a defensive resistant front from Tangarov to Belgorod, supported on the Mius and the Donetz. They also possessed in the south of Russia sufficient mobile reserves to push back possible Soviet operational breaks in the zone.

As late as 1944, the Soviets had 26 tanks Corps and 11 mechanized Corps. Part of them joined together to form 6 tanks Armies. Each of which had two tanks corps and a mechanized corps (bigger and more balanced inn infantry and artillery). Some mechanized Corps joined a cavalry Corps, forming a great unit similar in capacity to the tanks Army but with fewer armored vehicles and more mobility in areas of difficult transitability (marshes, mountains, woods). These were used to exploit the break in the swampy areas of the south of the Soviet Union, as that of the Pripet river in the north of Ucrania. Although never coexisted more than two or three in the order of battle of the Soviet Army.

WILLIAM LIND, A CIVIL TEORIST.

The destruction of 6 tanks Corps of the Southwest Front (especially equipped with mobile forces) and dismantled them from their “support masses”, was an especially prominent, profitable and low cost operation for the Germans.

In addition, in its advance toward Kharkov between March 1^st and 5^th, the SS and 48º panzer Corps smashed from its flank and rearguard the Soviet 3^rd tanks Army, led by general Pavel Semjonovic Ribalko. This Army was launched to relieve the forces of 6^th infantry Army and had continued advancing toward Kharkov. This city that was by then, attracting all the attention and efforts from both sides.

As poor results and large losses mounted for the mobile Soviet forces, pessimism also grew in Stalin, who asked Sweden to mediate in seeking a solution to the war with Germany.

Nevertheless, the advance on Belgorod, outlining Kursk’s projection inside the territory occupied by Germany, sealed the aim for Germany’s strategic summer Campaign. After all these events had passed, the strategic initiative returned to the Germans at the level of the theatre of operations.

But, beginning on July 5, delayed in relation with the victories of Von Manstein, their action gave the Soviets time to extensively strengthen themselves, to establish “fortified regions” at the front level, and to assemble and organize a powerful counterattack force in the north and south of the projection. The allied landing in Sicily on the 10th of July, aborted the Wehrmacht’s already disastrous Operation Citadel. The Germans would never recover the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL DONN STARRY, HIGH COMMAND OF THE U.S. ARMY’S TRADOC.

Was it possible to avoid what happened to the Popov group and, thus, to the Soviet’s strategic plans for its 1942 winter campaign and to the Soviet’s strategic initiative, at least in the Southern theatre of the Soviet Union?

It was possible.

We have observed, in parallel and in a very second plane with some key facts, the getting absorbed (to get very much in …), the delight (to be delighted with …) and the fixation (to do without other rational arguments) of Stalin, in relation with the results that he promised himself with the impelled operations by the mobile corps of the Southwest Front of general Vatutin.

General Vatutin, one of the best field chiefs of the Soviet army, died before his time at hands of Ukrainian (anti-Soviet) guerrillas, only participated in this in a minor degree. Still, the delegate of the Stavka in charge of these crucial operations (Zhukov, Vasilevsky?) remembered him the transcendence that for the Supreme Commander and for the Soviet people they had.

A little time ago, Hitler also fixated on Stalingrad. This fixation led him to squander the capacity of his best Great Unit (the 6^th infantry Army of general Paulus—yes, without the aristocratic Von) in a street struggle and a force-to-force confrontation. Their enemies were arranged on a static defense. A position that they were better able to defend and maintain than were the Germans, in the gigantic steel and cement fortress that was Stalingrad.Fight in which was not counting the German superb capacity of operational movement, which reduced the effort done to a confrontation between man vs. man and machine against machine. And, thus, causing a terrible attrition to the combat and movement capacities.

We can discuss about the strategic mistakes of high chiefs. As the line of communications (branched out) is so crucial, it is necessary to protect it adequately. But this fact is obscured and blurred by the desires of commanders.

What are the possibilities of defense for the advance sector that contains the communications line?

Independently of the advance deployment of mobile groups and their support mass (which must include the securities elements adapted for marches in enemy areas), «advanced detachments» must be brought forward.

These will be integrated by 15-30 % of the forces that bring them forward and will possess sufficient operational movement and combat capacities. The time it takes for the main group to join them is a function of the transitability of the terrain and of the capacities and intentions of the enemy in the operations zone. Its mission in defensive operations is to be used as “stable hinges” between the deployments of Great units, facilitating and protecting the movement of forces and supplies between them.

If the mass of support is too slow for the mobile group to continue advancing at a reasonable rate, it will end up lengthening dangerously the distance between the units and their support. This situation is very vulnerable to a mobile assault by the enemy from the depth of his zone and the sector of advance would be under threat of being cut, depending on the means and intentions of the enemy. This probability would require that a “mechanized group” be placed between the mass of support and the mobile group to reduce the distance between all three deployments and reducing reaction times to respond to a crisis. This would reasonably stabilize the sector of advance after the mobile group.

The mission of the mechanized group, which has less capacity for operational movement than the mobile group, will be to carried out the “sector mobile defense”. And will last until the forces of the mass of support arrive to relieve it. The anti-aircraft and antitank defense plan, the centralization of reserves and the defense of key points of the area, by means of “delay positions” and together with necessary heavy fire support, will be characteristic of the fight to stabilize the sector.

That is to say, it is necessary to sacrifice speed for safety to consolidate the stability of the sector of advance in enemy territory. A territory that does not need to be all occupied in force. Because would be defended by a mobile defense for a limited period of time. Taking disproportionate risks would be reckless and would put men, materiel and the operation in danger.

But, men (in this case, Hitler and Stalin are two examples) continue to make mistakes when faced with such circumstances…

THE END.

THE ARMED DEFENSE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OR DAESH.

Introduction.

The Islamic State has the strategic advantage of his territorial unity, which allows him to support the fights following his interior communication lines. His enemies are dispersed by his borders and operate in multitude of combats sectors or strips. This advantage can be used to fix and keep his enemies, dispersed and operationally unconnected for the different countries and zones. This way, IS preventing them any concentration to attack him.

So, in his Mosul’s operational center, with approximately 2 million habitants, the major city under his power, and the third of Iraq, he keeps the Erbil’s peshmergas fixed, the capital of the Iraqi autonomous Khurdistan. These are not capable of throwing an individual offensive, to go snatching cities and zones from the ISIL and are kept at the defensive. They are Sunnis Kurds, that do not want to coordinate with the army of Iraq and the sectarian Shiites militias.

ABU BAKER AL-BAGDADI.

In Anbar, the ISIL occupied al-Ramadi, its capital, where the Iraqi army went out, here also, at the disbandment, in an unforeseen and accelerated retrograde march. Los iraquíes culparon de sus desventuras operativas a una gran tormenta de arena, que facilitó la “marcha al combate” de los muyahidines del DAESH. And he threatens the western flank of Baghdad, which says to be training and concentrating forces to recover her, departing from the new base in Taqaddum, at 25 km from al-Ramadi, where are a reinforce of 450 new American soldiers of the four stars American general James Terry. Which acts as a bolt, a ground perpendicular obstruction, against the projection of the ISIL over Baghdad.

The Islamic State has now three great operational areas.

The first great zone includes all the south of the Caliphate, from Aleppo’s south-east up to al-Ramadi, following the course of the high Euphrates. In her, the ISIL is spreading and being consolidated, occupying Palmyra city, finishing the expelling of the National Syrian Army from Dar-ez-Zour’s province (his last troops in her are surrounded at the west of the capital) and the Iraqi soldiers and the Shiites militias from Anbar’s province. At the west of Palmyra are Tiyas and the military airports of the Shayrat, occupied by the NSA, which are vulnerable targets for the ISIL, capable of attacking them from two marching directions. With it, a western defensive flank, directed to Damascus, might be established.

In the north of Iraq, the ISIL keeps his positions in Nínive’s province and part of Saladin’s province, so being consolidated also in the high Tigris.

In Syria, at Aleppo’s north and north-east, along around 400 Kms. of the border with Turkey, up to Hasaka’s frontier province, the ISIL keeps a strategic base, using small offensives and tactical retreats, in a zone of great operational instability. Trying to debilitate the Front al-Nusrah (near the frontier Azaz), the Syrian peshmergas (in Kobani) and other opponents groups and to keep open the narrow frontier sectors, Ras al-Ayn, between others, where he realizes his exchanges of crude oil and derivatives, seized goods, armaments and new supporters. Also he wants to stop the offensive of the opposition in Aleppo, since the ISIL does not have now free means to exploit any destabilization in Aleppo, that would be produced this way. But in Hasaka he wants to be consolidated, to increase his geographical continuity, to protect his frontier passages with Iraq and Turkey, here is Tel Abyad, and to increase his strategic rear, reinforcing this way the Palmyra’s projection over Damascus.

AN EXECUTION IN PALMIRA.

Turkey, which wants to keep in his south border a difficult military politic balance of power, suspects so much of the (Syrian) Kurds of the YPG and of the ISIL, both approaching in force to his territory. And Erdogan is considering to establish a safety zone of 10 Km. in depth in Syrian territory from the common border, occupying her with around 12 thousand Turkish soldiers. From her, the Turks might also partially control other more 25 or 30 Km. in depth, using his heavy artillery. It is a thorny and controversial topic, of international indefinite transcendence, so the command of the Turkish AA.FF. has asked Erdogan for a formal wrote order, that the President still has not granted.

The air bombardments of the Coalition of the 60 nations, assigned to the Operation «Inherent Resolve», erode and cause casualties to the Islamic State during almost one year. But they do not stop his military principal operations of fixation of his enemies and of increasing the territory of the Islamic State. At less that the western countries, including the USA, the NATO and the European Union, in any degree and practical necessary national combination, are ready and resolve to put on the Syrian and/or Iraqi territories a “sufficient investment of their own soldiers”, in the form of combined ground forces, distributed in the combinations adapted for the tasks that they will assume, the ISIL will not be beaten by his enemies of these Arabic infected countries. And it seems that the ISIL will possible be indefinitely defend from his frontier enemies. In the air raids in Syria take part Arabia, the USA, Bahrain, Canada, the Arab United Emirates and Jordan. In Iraq, asking for the authorities permission attack Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the USA and Great Britain.

The Geographical Scene of the Islamic State (ISIL).

This organization acts in a diffuse, not occupied, but controlled strip, of 300 thousand Km2., that spreads over Iraq and Syria, from Baghdad up to Aleppo and the mountains of the center west of Syria. The width changes along the route. The pillaged territory begins in Faluya, at 60 km to the west of Baghdad, and includes the nearby cities of Habbaniya and al-Ramadi and and Anbar’s extensive and desert province. And, following the Euphrates towards the northwest, it reaches the riverside cities of Haditha and Âna, before penetrating in Syria by Abu Kemal, leaving behind Níniveh and part of Saladin provinces. In the middle of the south and eastern desert of Syria, only relieved by the river, is Dayr al-Zawr. And continuing by the river, we come first to Raqqa, close to the river mouth of the river Belikh in the Euphrates. And then to the artificial lake al-Assad in the great meander of the Euphrates, to continue up to Aleppo and the Kurdish mountains of the center west, in the border with Turkey. Up to 10 million persons might be controlled by the ISIL in this territory.

EXECUTIONS OF ENEMIES OF THE DAESH

It is not easy to move by these lands, which are infertile, beyond the irrigations of the Euphrates and of the artificial lake of al-Assad, without leaving a «tactical fingerprint» of the march. The lands of this great strip lack concealments and natural covers, in the shape of forests, extensive bushes and mountains. This does that the most frequent refuges and stays for the yihadists groups are the villages and populations along his backbone: the Euphrates, his aluentes, as the Jaipur in Hanaka’s province, and his banks. For his defense and more lasting cover they have to disperse by them, forming one or several «muyahidins squads» of not more than 40 men each one.

Operational decisive possibilities.

In any case, the fight in the occupied territories by the Islamic State is an urban fight. It is not an area for a movements warfare. It was so in June, 2014, when the Islamic State spread out, uncontrollably and overwhelming, by the north and north-east of Iraq. And the 30 thousand Iraqi soldiers of the Niniveh and Saladin provinces, went out, afflicted and in stampede, towards Baghdad. Looking for protection and refuge between the walls of the gigantic city and his al-Sadr shii neighborhood, at the east of the Tigris (known as al-Sadr city). And it before the simple «march to the combat» of several hundreds muyahidins. Mounted in Toyotas pick-ups, half “roof opened”, without any armoured and armed with light cannons and heavy machine guns. Certainly, who does facilitate the always present Toyota vehicles to the muyahidines? Some neoconverted concessionaire to al-Bagdadi?

THEY LOVE TOYOTAS, WHOSE PAY IT?

The operational strategy of the irregular bands of the Islamic State centres on never let been got in combat by the Armies or other great forces in «lost in advance» combats. His technics and tactics are the constant and far-sighted mobility; the dispersion and the infiltration in the urban fight, going forward in a flexible and wearing out defense, with space cession; the small, dispersed and more or less simultaneous or sequential actions in an area; the flight by covered bounds; the fight with limited goals and in profitable temporaral conditions; the systematic giving up of positions, forcing the enemy to redeploy and to be prepared every time. They can win to the ISIL the necessary time to survive.

In the temporaral occupations of great populations, they extend his defensive positions beyond what it is necessary in the conventional defense. Covering this way a major surface. His «delaying points» are diffuse, secret and imperceptible to the strangers. It is necessary to enter the houses to detect perforated walls and to find alleys under a furniture or a carpet. The destruction that generates the vague heavy fire, reinforces his combat positions, surrounding them with debris that divide and impede the accesses of the enemy. Except when they are reached by one direct impact. The “resistance nests” have more importance in this fighting form. Because the occupation of the defense zone is more tenuous, they cannot strengthen too much the positions, the sights are more short and there exist numerous approximation routes. They depend on the delaying points, to which they return if they are invaded or destroyed. Numerous “alternative positions” exist. This “resistance structure” allows to deceive the enemy, who attacks and burst, on the forward limit of the defense position: about his real extension, the limits of the sectors that form her and the interest of the rebel commands in the defense of the zone; and manages to disperse the heavy fire of the attacker.

The Ground Ongoing: a Parameter of the Operational Strategy.

Introduction.

The «transitability» (or ground ongoing) is the geographical dimension, either superficial or spatial, where take place the ground military operations.

It is principally framed by the superficial capacity of an area to support the means or military capacities. It is completed nowadays in a spatial dimension, by the range of the heavy fire means and by the aircrafts.

It has independent and absolute functions, as are the “passing time” by a point, the distance traveled time between two of them and the not superficial simultaneity of the military means.

The transitability also possesses relative functions, dependent in general on the geography. They are more concretely determined by the roads, railway and fluvial nets (urbanized geography) and by the climate, the hydrology, the orography, the year station, the meteorology and the hour of the day (physical geography). These functions change with the different national and regional surfaces.

The transitability determines the facility or the physical difficulty for the maneuver rapidity and, in consequence, determines basically the total time of the operations, through the phase of execution of the successive «cycles of action«. Which are formed by the observation, evaluation, decision and execution phases.

The transportation Networks and the Transitability.

The roads and railroad nets are the most suitable physical support to obtain low times of execution in the operations or high «tempos«. Its transitability characteristics would be its availability in the operations zone, the road surface resistance, the traffic saturation conditions and the narrows or critical points in the nets and the continuity cuts.

In effect, the passing time of a mobile by a given point is almost instantaneous: at 40 Km./hour covers more than 11 ms/sec. But when it is a column of more than thousand vehicles of all kinds, a. e., an armored western division, crossing in march formation a distance of 200 Km. along one route, its passing time by a point tends to confuse and equalize with its distance traveled time in this march and it will approach to 9 or 10 hours. When both times are alike in the practice, we can say that a route is saturated.

Convoy Indio Del Ejército De Camiones Foto de archivo editorial - Imagen de indio, himalaya: 38314978

Another characteristic of the land nets, as restrictive tempo or pace of advance, are the narrows as mountain passes, small and median populations and bridges over obstacles. On having prolonged the passing time (covering those almost punctual elements in the map), they lengthen equally the distance traveled time in saturated or sole roads or lanes.

The resistance of the roads to supporting great weights is also a limitation of the tempo. The highways that support weights of 40 Tm in vehicles of several axes are limited to the principal road net of the developed countries. The reason is that the pressure that a vehicle axis exercises on the pavement is a function of the cube of the weight on it: any growth of the supported weight has an exponential effect and the construction and maintenance costs go off. So, the road availability to achieve a good pace of advance is problematic, since out of the mentioned countries the absence of highways is also very common. More than about transitability, we might speaks of non transitability, as operational element, against which struggling physically to move on.

Large group of German troops advancing up a hill on the Eastern Front. : GermanWW2photos

MARCHING WITHOUT AVIATION DISTURBING…

We can think, at first, in using the superficial dimension or even the spatial one to improve the transitability (or ground ongoing) in different cases, in which the better conditions before mentioned, already do not exist. The first one leads us to a cross country mechanized formation and due supported logistically, that would be the imaginative ideal of the more qualified strategists and tacticians during the decade of the thirties of last century. But there are problems.

NDP 2020: Mobile column to cover record 200km route and reach more heartland areas, Singapore News & Top Stories - The Straits Times

On one hand, the best all ground vehicle or on tracks moves itself better in a highway that on the field, for «easy» that it is the tour. For a given useful load weight, the all field vehicles or on tracks have more tare than the vehicles only for roads or by wheels. For total given weights, the vehicles both by tracks and by wheels that advance cross country, have more wears, more breakdowns and more fuel consumption, that those who circulate along highways. It raises an economic and logistic double inconvenient of very difficult solution.

Movement of military vehicles through SoCal is routine and not related to coronavirus, officials say | KTLA

Because of it, the ideal thing is to operate by steady road surfaces, even using if possible the railroad for marches up to little beyond the hundred Km. to the front or to the enemy. And the roads network up to where allows the operational situation and the need to deploy from the march. And to fight cross country, taking advantage of the covering, the concealment, as the tactical characteristics of the field.

The spatial dimension also encloses an impossibility, like that of the saturation of the land roads, which forbids the simultaneous arrival at a point of numerous aircraft. Or the airships fly in row, arriving at the same hour, but extended laterally or they go in line to unload or arrive successively in a «single» point or zone of discharge operations. The helicopters give more concentrated results than those of the airplanes, but these have more lifting capacity for means, men and ordnance.

Grounds characteristics and the Transitability.

The channels, the water obstacles, as continuity cuts, constitute another relative conditioner of the transitability of a zone.

On one hand, they constitute an almost inevitable restraint of the maneuver impulse. In effect, in almost any direction that follows an operational route during sufficient Km., it ended up confronting the crossing of a natural or artificial water obstacle. We have seen the bridges that surpass them, as part of a road network, but not always they will exist or be at hand of the marching column. Given the actual amphibious means, the main obstacle to the transit will offer by the water flows banks. So, it will be necessary to consider the slope of both banks and the characteristics of resistance, adherence, consistency, etc. of them and of their immediate approach soils.

Driving "Wave" on the shore of the enemy. Part one

Nevertheless, the rivers and channels are also means of insertion within a territory of a combat patrol platoon type. At a speed of 4 or 5 Km/hour of advance by the water, the patrol can cross several hundreds Km. in 3 or 4 days.

British Troops Show Off Amphibious Skills In River Crossing

The effects of the climate, the year station, the hour, the hemisphere will be superposed to the mentioned conditioners, worsening or mitigating them, to our favor or against us.

Orography deserves a specific treatment, for its special direct influence in the transitability. Orography affects transitability when makes difficult the development of the road layout and when increasing the slope to surpass in all the marches. The cross-sectional passing of “height lines” can get to be impassable, except by defiles or mountain passes. So being generated authentic bottlenecks, that collapse the maneuver momentum and prevent the deployments of the units that cross them. The fight in the heights has a generic gravity center in the control of these passages.

Diminishing in height gradient, there exists a less evident, but more frequent and very important factor, which is the «drop«. We call “drop” to height variations of a few meters up to dozens of meters in relation to the immediate surroundings. It appears in the cross-country crossing, in areas of more or less waviness, in broken grounds and even in sections of the highways that pass for them. It has also a high expression in the urban zones, so much residential as industrial, because the buildings, houses and facilities and conduction also shape «relative concealing heights» for men and arms. These generate protection and danger, definitively opportunities and risks, and are another expression of the «drop«. A stitch or detail: a difference in height of little more that 2 ms allows to conceal the hull of a tank or of an infantry combat vehicle in a smoothly wavy area, with full domain by the sight.

The Destructive Age of Urban Warfare; or, How to Kill a City and How to Protect It - Modern War Institute

The urbanized or industrial zones shape very numerous parallel and transverse lines of «drop«, which interweave. They canalize all the military effort in the above mentioned zones, generating innumerable «interfaces of action» with the enemy, that are determined frequently by surprise conditions. These zones, definitively, paralyze the impulse of the units and generate in them attrition (in military means) and wear (in logistic), disproportionate to the purely military obtainable results with its occupation.

The City Is Not Neutral: Why Urban Warfare Is So Hard - Modern War Institute

AN IMPROVISED AMBUSH…

For the winter warfare, you can read our article «The talvisota or Winter War of Finland and Russia in 1939».

JUST TAKING A REST…

The forest would be a special variant of this case. It offers antitank unsurmountable obstacles, concealment, cover and protection until the range of infantry fighting distances.