HAMAS AND ISRAEL – Conflictos Modernos

Yahya Sinwar: Is Him The Last Gazan Warlord?

Introduction.

The Israelis had the following strategic tasks for their invasion of the Palestinian Gaza Strip on Sunday, October 8, 2023:

Ensuring that Israel will not be attacked from the Gaza Strip again.

Organizing the political and administrative structure of the Strip and its peaceful and stable functioning.

Destroying (incapacitating) the capabilities of the Command and Structure and the militancy of Hamas.

That this terrorist organization, whose statutes state that the Palestinians occupy from the river (the Jordan) to the great sea (the Mediterranean) as their national land, will not again be a vital threat to Israel.

Development and means.

Israel has killed about 40 thousand Palestinians so far, according to Hamas sources, which are the least prestigious and least credible. And it has not yet achieved any of its important or secondary objectives. For example, eliminating the entire senior leadership of Hamas.

The tasks of artillery, as the heavy fire of an army, are, in ascending order of enemy annihilation: Blind, Disrupt, Neutralize and Destroy.

The last task is almost impossible to achieve. Because, the same debris produced by the first artillery fire or aircraft bombs, increases the chances of shelter and of creating ambushes and defensive positions by the attacked.

In the Plans for heavy fire support of ground units, normal and reactive artillery, heavy anti-tank defense, short and medium range rockets and ground support aircraft are included and intervened.

Normally it is impossible to kill or physically injure all the enemy. This may have been an impossible goal, sought by Israel in the first moments of the war. In the midst of the incapacitating intoxication of anger, pain, revenge and fear. When the Israelis found themselves in the middle of a strong and selective attack in their rather deep (operational) rear. That was not detected in any of its preparations and operational phases by the Mossad and other agencies, nor was it repelled, once it was launched, starting with the small garrisons of the IDF in the southeast and east of Israel, around the Strip.

If the objectives were more ambitious and provided with more resources, by the Hamas leadership (presidency and 3 vice-presidencies, with their advisors), and admitting the non-maintenance of the objectives occupied by Hamas, Israel would have been in serious military danger due to the damage to its rear military structures. The following could be attacked: military airports; land transport parks; obstructed roads and occupied or destroyed crossings; fuel depots; command and transmission centers; communication networks; arsenals…

The functions of the Hamas Structure.

The central structure of Hamas is made up of an external presidency (located outside the Palestinian territories) and three vice-presidencies. The Gaza one, under Yahya Sinwar‘s command, is the most influential in the organizational chart. Another is in the West Bank, operationally superimposed on the Palestine recognized by the UN, which is the Palestinian National Authority, based in Ramallah. The presidency and the other vice-presidency are abroad.

The president of Hamas was Ismael Haniyeh, who has just been sacrificed in an allegedly Israeli attack in Tehran. When Haniyeh was attending the takeover of the new Iranian president.

As a general rule, recently broken, Israel has the habit of not claiming responsibility for any attempt or attack on the enemy.

The importance that Sinwar has for Hamas in its organization and in decision-making, makes him surely the successor of the late president of Hamas. He will be in charge of making military and political decisions for Hamas. And in how to carry out the war and its objectives and in the difficult negotiations with Israel.

The liquidator missile entered precisely the room where Haniyeh was, protected by the Revolutionary Guard of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the Ideological Army of Iran. It is capable of protecting few within its borders. The precision in time and place of Haniyeh‘s Personal Data confirms that the Israelis have access to relevant information at the highest level in Iran.

And, it is in charge of developing the pro-Iranian revolutionary movements in the different countries of South-West Asia. Regardless of whether religiously they were of another belief or variety within Islam. Thus, they support Hamas, which is Sunni. In these activities, General Qassem Sulemaini, head of the al-Quds Brigades of the Revolutionary Guard, in charge of special actions outside Iran, where he entered at the age of 18, stood out with his own and shining light. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, referring to him: «He is a son to me, I am a father to him.»

One handicap Sinwar has is that his usual effective hiding place is the military tunnel networks that run through the Gaza Strip. They are a defining structure for rigid defense (without giving up space to the attacker, normally) and in depth against a modern and highly motivated mechanized army. But, this network does not facilitate external communications for executives and military personnel.

Another great difficulty for Sinwar to be the supreme leader of Hamas and to be able to negotiate with Israel and live, is that he was the Main Responsible and Theoretician (of what he wanted to be done; he always dresses in civilian clothes) of the treacherous, cruel and disproportionate military attack on the south and southeast of Israel on Saturday, October 7th.

From Gaza, the militiamen left, trained to the point of sufficiency, in models and assemblies, which matched and resembled the fighting terrains in Israel. Which they would find in their deliberate, calculated, known attack. Which they would launch with precision on the south and southeast of Israel.

And, the Hamas irregulars returned to Gaza victorious, after killing more than 1,200 Israelis, soldiers from small posts, civilians from villages and kibbutzim (group, in Hebrew), young people having fun at a popular concert and capturing and taking as hostages some 250 Israelis and foreigners of Jewish affiliation, men, women, children and the elderly. They had the characteristics indicated by the Hamas leadership in Gaza; if they are weak and die quickly, they lose them.

And, little by little, the political-military leadership of Hamas is cut down by the determination, the motivation and the intensity and permanence of the Israeli operations. Especially, the occupation and clearing of the territories and tunnels of Gaza.

Terrorism, Guerrillas and Violence. 2nd Part.

Books and experience are always neglected.

So, why did Hamas attack the villages, cooperatives and small military posts in central and southern Israel with an unleashed and ferocious venom and hatred in the early hours of Saturday, October 7, 2023 until the next day, when they withdrew or were evicted.

***YAHYA SINWAR, HAMAS’ HIGH POLITICAL COMMAND IN GAZA. HE IS MORE PROBABLY EXILED IN EGYPT.***

Because we don’t learn from books, because we are not born with experience and, what is worse, we have to earn it hard way. And, ultimately, because history repeats itself and you have to be very special to learn from the experience of others. Although, reasoning, we understand it well!!

But, there are those who believe that reasoning is the way or means to make a mistake with Conviction.

No guerrilla is harmless or irrelevant.

It is now worth dedicating a few paragraphs to a guerrilla “liberation conflict”, which could not win its war. But he managed to bring the conflict to a situation of impasse, stalemate, lack of commitment and loss of interest from his metropolis.

Where neither of the two combatants could militarily defeat the other. But, where the guerrillas could endure more time in arms than their metropolis. And time did not wear them down politically or socially. The British government was harassed by its people and by international public opinion to end the war. And, therefore, to give independence to its small colony in the eastern Mediterranean.

In 1925, Great Britain gave “colony” status to the small island of Cyprus, of Greek descent. Whose natives had “the illusion and identity purpose” of uniting socially and politically with Greece, in a political process called “Enosis”.

The Cypriots were good, rough and simple people, mostly peasants and without any military training. In 1955, Cyprus had about 550 thousand inhabitants and the island had only about 9,282 km2 of surface.

Its terrain did not offer special advantages in a guerrilla war. It has two mountainous areas, the Olympau and the Pentadaktilau, which are passable by paved roads everywhere by motor vehicles.

On the other hand, it does not have large and/or dense forests that host guerrilla bases that are welcoming, restorative, protective, and quiet. Where to indoctrinate the people and prepare for the combats and recover from them.

At the beginning of his war to liberate China, in the 1930s, Mao Ze Dong also declared that “a guerrilla focus needed to begin deep within a large country to prosper.” At the beginning of the communist rebellion, at the end of the 1920s, when he and the communists were even, the Kuomintang Chinese Army gave them a hard time and, in addition, Chiang Kai Shek was advised by German soldiers.

Finally, in October 1934, the communists left southern China and moved on a 12,500 km Great or Long March. and 370 days to Yenan, in the distant province of SiangXi, fighting along the way. Where 8,500 guerrillas and families arrived in October 1935, of the 150 thousand who left their crushed bases in southern China.

They were that disaster or annihilation.

Tactical Tables and Strategic Victory of Guerrillas.

From Nicosia, English troops can be transported by motor vehicle to any part of Cyprus within two hours. For the evacuation of the wounded or the transport of a patrol (a team or section), the English already had helicopters.

The limited size of the island allowed the English to thoroughly attack any part of it and at any time of the year.

In the early 1950s, Georgios Grivas, a retired colonel in the Greek Army, carried out a personal reconnaissance of Cyprus, to assess the possibilities of waging a guerrilla war against British domination of his homeland. In 1954, at the age of 56, he moved to the island, where he organized and led the E.O.K.A. ((Cypriot National Struggle Organization), using the code name “Dighemis”. The fighting began on April 1, 1955 and lasted 46 and a half months.

***PHOTO OF GEORGIOS GRIVAS, SIGNED WITH HIS CODE NAME***

The strategy, tactics and methods or techniques of guerrilla warfare were adapted to Cyprus. And that is the reason for the success achieved in that theater of operations.

There were two main offensive actions used by the guerrillas: sabotage of government facilities and means and surprise attacks, limited in their power and carried out by forces trained in maneuver, against the English troops. Both actions were limited at the beginning, due to a lack of trained personnel and a shortage of materials. Soon mines or, rather, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) began to be used quite a bit.

Excellent preparation and complete surprise of the enemy, together with the skillful leadership of the guerrillas, were the necessary characteristics for the success of the actions.

The British troops found themselves faced with irregular guerrilla fighting, without the slightest preparation for it. And they were not up to the task either tactically or organizationally. Thus, they needed a long period of preparation and training before they could attack the guerrillas. Which was equivalent to enduring some failures for a while.

For example, the British thought that the guerrillas were hiding in towns. Actually, they were hiding in the countryside, the mountains, literally “under the stones.”

British exploration did not know how to detect guerrilla hiding places. And, its discovery could mean falling into a trap: receiving fire from an unknown nearby position, suffering an explosion in the position supposedly occupied by guerrillas.

The British Army worked in platoons. It was the minimum tactical unit, because it could maneuver and operate on its own in the Micro terrain. And it was made up (this is just an example of a large one) of a light machine gun with its shooter and one or two loaders/defenders, a light anti-tank rocket launcher and a loader/defender, a leader and a second leader and two teams of two. men each. United and compacted like this, marching and attacking, they only made themselves more vulnerable to the enemy.

To raise and/or attack the guerrillas, teams or pairs of soldiers have to act, which may or may not be commanded by a corporal.

***ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS III, FI**RST PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC OF CHIPRE***

The section (platoon, in English) or company is divided into a multitude of “small tactical units”, to extend over an area and cover it, through action on the micro-terrain. This is like a zoom and uses the “action unit” and attack distance as appropriate, depending on the enemy target.

By 1959, British forces had found themselves in a quagmire. It was very difficult for them to locate the guerrillas. And, they were not capable of attacking and defeating them either. But, the guerrillas were there, demanding the Independence of Cyprus and Enosis or incorporation into Greece. And, just their armed presence and their small successes represented a tremendous political and social setback for the British.

The guerrillas were like an odorless, colorless and tasteless gas, which permeated everything and reached everywhere.

And, the central reason: the English were not capable of knowing and preparing an effective counteroffensive against the Cypriot forces.

And, the British press accredited and contrasted all this:

The Observer newspaper wrote that Cyprus‘ civil and military authorities had declared EOKA unbeatable. In turn, Marshal Bernard Montgomery said that the EOKA was strategically unbeatable. And the Daily Herald recognized that a field marshal, three generals and 40,000 British soldiers were not capable of defeating the EOKA.

The British agreed to grant independence to their colony and Grivas left for exile in Greece. This was one of the British conditions for the Agreement of Independence. He returned in 1964 and was appointed Chief of the Armed Forces of Cyprus.

THE END.

Terrorism, Guerrillas and Violence

Terrorists and guerrillas.

Terrorism is a complex Political and Violent operation with a wide Variety of actions. Their violent actions must be deliberate, Continuous or Systematic and seeking to Influence a wide audience (much larger than those directly affected by the violent actions) and generating fear, even insurmountable fear, in the “target or target population.” So that they carry out and take the attitudes and actions that the terrorists seek.

Thus, an isolated action or one without political interest is not terrorism. It will be vandalism, mad hatred, a psychotic break… but it is not, nor will it be, technically or legally, terrorism.

Another thing is what the authorities decide. That they consider the armed irregular enemy little less than the Loose Demon. And they usually deprive him of almost all rights, even personal ones. And they legislate progressively harsher laws against them. Guerrillas or terrorists fighting against a constituted country are easier to outlaw.

The different International Conventions only consider irregulars who are deployed or supported by another national State as “legal belligerents.” And they have to be established in their own territory, even if it is minimal, have a clear and visible command, wear a uniform and some identifying insignia (a “patch”, a distinctive), with their weapons visible and act in accordance with accepted laws from the war.

These conditions were only met by Soviet partisans in the last World War.

And, of course, they are not fulfilled by the jihadists ganged up in Europe, the winnower and blind with anger marksmen and slashers from America, France or Norway, and those so-called, with little accuracy, lone wolves, since this animal is essentially gregarious and, more so for hunt.

These would all be “armed soulless men.” And the soul is the Spirit of Man.

Pursuing them is just another Police activity, not war.

Tito‘s partisans, quite effective and intermittently deployed, did not comply with the conditions. And the national “resistance” of France, Italy, Poland was almost laughable. An enormous risk and immense pain to achieve Isolated damage to their Axis enemies.

A function that is ignored, like so many, is that one of the most important functions of the irregular rebels is to fix numerous enemy forces (for example, German, Italian, Allied) in their “territory of influence.” Which would otherwise be used by the military enemy in other more decisive and important strategic actions of the armed struggle.

Almost everything is unknown here too. One of the most extensive, prolonged and harsh cases of the terrorist struggle was the anti-partisan struggle of the Nazis in the USSR occupied by Germany.

Counterguerrillas.

The Germans had a wide network of forts, which formed a “network support base”, where the nodes were the forts and the ropes marked the rough directions of action for small local combats against the partisans.

There were also “mobile patrols”, strong in at least twenty-odd men, which continually pursued the localized partisan bands. If necessary, several of these were sometimes gathered in a region to carry out a larger attack.

The forces stationed in the forts were around a section (between 8 and 12 men). On nights without activity in their area, a part of the meager garrison was expected to go out to reconnaissance partisans or to integrate with other units to carry out an attack or pursuit proportional to their means.

The strongest units, used on the war fronts, were not normally used in the fight against partisan gangs. Except in cases of attacking or surrounding a large partisan unit with a certain probability of success.

Many times, operations to encircle and annihilate guerrillas turned out to be a fiasco. Due to the lack of secrecy and the abundance of temporary concealment in the siege that was established. And the partisans dispersed, hid or slipped away, crawling in pairs.

Results.

Were the results useful, necessary or dubious for the then called Red Army of Workers and Peasants, the activity of the partisans of the USSR?

The realities that the main and vital activity of the “line of logistical communications” from the Reich with its rear in the USSR was able to maintain throughout the war, the military, logistical and social activity (the comings and goings of the soldiers, sometimes due to illness or leave, and the units) of the Germans in their war effort. Supplies, weapons and troops passed through it for the advance and occupation of the USSR to the west of an imaginary line that ran from Leningrad to Stalingrad, passing through the west of Moscow.

If the Germans retreated relentlessly to the west, after losing the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, it was due to the very costly push of the Soviet Fronts or Army Groups, led by the STAVKA or General Staff. And “advised/commanded” by Georgi Zhukov or Alexander Vassilevski, as “Stavka Delegates to the Fronts” for the different major Soviet military operations.

Philosophy and mental basis.

Anyone who has come this far, may think of the horror of the fighting between partisans and German security forces on the Eastern Front. Because of the “rise to the maximum” in the harshness of military actions. And that the difference in races, religion or its absence, and divergent interests also spurred the belligerents.

Well, it depends on the temperament and character that each one had. And, in this case, common sense and a complementary nature led the Germans to begin to soften the “conditions of confrontation” at the individual level. It was about not getting hurt both. I mean, everyone.

The Germans learned from bitter experience that the firm and stubborn resistance of the partisans was due to their fear of suffering in captivity. And that this could easily be weakened by more humane treatment of the prisoner partisans.

Thus, the (German) Manual for the War against Gangs of 1944 included all these principles and ideas to be applied by the German security forces.

And, the partisans also began to behave like more civilized and less heartless combatants. This procedure or technique of respecting the integrity and rights of prisoners became an appreciated principle in the future guerrilla campaigns.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE URBAN COMBAT OF ISRAEL IN GAZA

The Israeli Tsahal.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Tsahal, is a fairly capable national army, with modern military doctrine and well equipped and regularly trained. It has about 190 thousand professional personnel (permanent). Which can be increased in two or three days to near 750 thousand troops.

Mobilizing for this up to around 550 thousand men and women, who are in the active reserve. These have a varied combat training, depending on their age, profession, training and missions carried out. The first 300 thousand are the most outstanding to decisively join the fight. The other quarter of a million are called according to needs to update and finish training them effectively.

***ISRAEL DOES NOT HESITATE TO USE PUNCTUAL MASSIVE BOMBING***

The ugdot or Israeli brigades (ugda is its singular name) of mechanized or motorized infantry are the main Israeli units to carry out a fight in enemy urban terrain. They fight against a much less capable enemy. But, with equal resolve and motivation, because they consider themselves muyahidin or warriors of Allah.

Let us see some aleyas or verses from the Quran, to realize the catechized and motivated Palestinian enemy:

“Oh, Believers, persecute the infidels (all others) until all Worship on Earth is given to Allah.”

“War has been prescribed for you and you shun it. Well, Allah will find another more obedient people and will disown you.”

The infantry ugda consists of 3 infantry battalions, another tank battalion, a field artillery group, 1 anti-tank fighting company, one motorized engineer company and 2 combat and tactical reconnaissance companies. The armored ugda consists of 3 tank battalions, one special forces battalion, one motorized engineer battalion, one armored reconnaissance battalion and a mixed artillery group.

***FORCES OF THE GIVATI BRIGADE MAKE A STOP ON THE ROAD***

The infantry ugdot are better known. Tanks are, however, the most effective weapon that Israel generally has in its wars. And, within the deliberate concealment and lack of precision of the data that reaches the public, which is practiced on these issues in Israel. Among the five infantry ugdot available, the “Givati”, “Golani” and “Kfir” stand out.

Characteristics of the fighting terrain.

Fighting in “urban or factory terrain” means that the combatants’ views are short in most directions. And, on the other hand, the enemy has a multitude of “relative hiding heights” that hide him and even, sometimes, cover him from opposing fire. This is a source of tension due to the uncertainty it creates.

***HAMAS MOBILE REACTIVE ARTILLERY WITH ITS TEAM AND INFANTRY SECURITY***

Physical and mental loneliness also act here. The combatant is separated from the officers commanding him. And, he is part of the squad or crew of the organic support weapons. Whose members are as affected as he is.

Automatic and more precise fires allow and force extreme dispersion and camouflage of combat forces in presence. And, the terrain of struggle here is particularly empty and hidden.

The maneuvers here consist of relatively very short movements. This also affects the loneliness and uncertainty of the combatants. The operational movement capacity of the units in motor vehicles is almost unnecessary, if we discount the direct heavy fire support from their weapons to the combatants. Other marches are simply “marches to combat.

**A SECTION OF HAMAS IRREGULARS MANEUVER INTO COMBAT**

Hamas members and others have built an immense defensive “fortress”. It is a structure of tunnels at two levels of depth (circa 9 ms and 50 ms) studied and created over years. This structure qualitatively resembles those used by the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese Vietcong in the Mekong area of southern Vietnam. But, it is more elaborate, larger and capable. Level A is used in the militants’ rejection fighting: here they fight, obtain shelter and temporary hiding place, allows them to move parallel and covertly to the ground of the Strip, use alternative delay positions against advancing or reorganizing soldiers, launch short and middle distance range rockets. Level B acts as a large refuge and general warehouse for Hamas forces and his men and relatives. Intermittently, there are direct paths between both levels of the structure.

***HAMAS IRREGULARS POSING FOR THEIR PEOPLE***

This “main protective cover” cushions the heavy fire of Israeli attackers. And it forces soldiers to fight at close range with Hamas irregulars. Thus, the “combat capabilities” of both enemies are quite equal and the sum of military casualties will inexorably rise to figures not expected by the population of Israel. The Israelis’ attempts to flood some tunnels with sea water or a kind of propelled lightweight foam rubber inside them, did not meet expectations.

General situation.

More or less, so far, there is talk of about 6,000 militiamen and about 200 Israeli soldiers as total casualties in Israel’s attack on Gaza. Also, there are just over 23,000 Gazeti civilians dead and 250 inhabitants of Israel’s cooperatives, party places and small barracks captured as hostages, in an unnecessary massacre that is overdone by its cruelty and ferocity.

On Saturday, October 7, irregular Hamas forces launched a “swarm attack” on southern and south-central Israel. Supported by the prior and/or simultaneous launch of thousands of short and medium range ballistic rockets. And, the small “action units” of Hamas, strong in about 3 thousand militiamen employed in total, achieved their tactical objectives: the defeat and/or destruction of Israeli positions (cooperatives, villages and small military posts), causing about 1,300 total casualties to the population and the Tsahal and capturing the said precious hostages. And, producing a strong and general commotion in Israel and in the Tsahal, much greater than the sum of the individual effect of each small attack received.

***YAHYA SINWAR, MILITARY CHIEF OF HAMAS IN GAZA, PROTECTED BY A CLOUD OF «PALESTINIANS». ISRAEL CANNOT DESTROY IT, BECAUSE IT LIVES SURROUNDED BY HOSTAGES.***

We are not going to repeat now the operations to be carried out by the Tsahal in the Gaza Strip, since in our recent article “The Urban Defense of Hamas in Gaza” they are already described.

We are going to discuss some ideological and strategic positions of both enemies.

Israel has estimated more than 12,000 Hamas military targets destroyed. Which include command centers, medium and short tunnels and their accesses, communications centers, storerooms, military materials, unit locations and small militia units. Also, it has killed (according to Hamas’ Health Department) 23 thousand civilians and injured tens of thousands of people; not exactly from chafing, punctures and large scratches or fractures. Israel is carrying out not only a military liquidation of armed enemies, but an “ironing” of the Gaza Strip with blood and fire.

This has no signs of progressing towards a stable and secure solution.

The total annihilation of enemies is a devilish mission or total objective. That would require a long and very high commitment of human resources and material means. A close comparison would be between artillery fire to neutralize or destroy.

***A VIEW OF THE LARGEST TUNNEL IN THE HAMAS NETWORK OF TUNNELS IN GAZA***

The Nazis were unable to eliminate the Jews of Central Europe and the West of the USSR in four years of presence in the territories of the Gehime Statz Policei and Himmler’s SS.

Nor could they eradicate Bolshevism from the USSR, inhabited, according to them, by “untermensch”, subhumans, an inferior race or severely degraded race by their vices. Which was supposed to be, therefore, affordable and easy.

The human soul, essential and shunned.

When you put a people, race, or large community under the threat of destruction, new “soul energies” emerge from it, generated in the depths of the human soul. They boost his “national morale” and lead him to fight fiercely. Recovering that certainty of survival that was taken from him.

Israel’s bombing has seriously damaged or destroyed more than a hundred buildings, including churches and mosques, some up to 4,000 years old. Belonging to the Gazan Arab cultural heritage. The attacks targeted the social cultural essence of Gazans, their identity. And the Israelis had to respect them, so as not to give serious arguments to the enemy.

Hamas’ Urban Defense in Gaza:

Irregulars mixed with Civilians against Regulars

Introduction:

The structure of Hamas‘s military deployment is based on the «short brigade«, which is a tactical operational unit widely used by irregular or partisan or guerrilla forces, when they reach a certain development in their military capabilities and deployments. These Hamas´ “short brigades” have between 1,000 and 1,500 men in their combat order, depending on their basic weapons. The most numerous are infantry and elite. They also have some independent companies specialized in adequate short staffing.

The brigades lack defense against aircraft or armored units as such or organic field artillery. This necessarily turns them into light irregular forces, capable of fighting in a mobile manner and using irregular fighting tactics. Looking more for their mobility and areas not adequately defended in the enemy deployment. The rejection in urban areas gives them extra effectiveness, protection and security against the regular military enemy. Since populations form or are molded into a multitude of hiding places, passageways, tunnels and relative hiding heights (floors, parks, gutters, windows, balconies, roofs and gaps in different classes of walls).

Intersections of major urban streets, high-rise buildings and steel-frame buildings (especially factories) can mainly form the core of defense delay points. The nests of resistance depend on these strong positions. Of them there are a large number, also as alternative positions. These nests, when active, are manned by two or three men and may be staffed by riflemen or a light machine gun, also forming an anti-tank or sniper position. In the interior patios of the houses, even on rooftops, they deploy their 80 or 60 mm mortars, whose position is changed as soon as they launch a few bombs. All of this gives cohesion to a defense position that operates in a sector of the Gaza Strip.

Normally, except in the final moments of an assault, civilians remain intertwined with irregular Hamas positions. The loss of Palestinian civilians is one of the collateral objectives “desired” by Hamas. To present to the world and discredit Israel for its “Asymmetrical against Unarmed Civilians” fight. Until now, the Palestinian civilian death toll is about 300 a day on average. A disturbingly tolerable number of “martyrs of Islam and its Minor Jihad.” The Mayor or Real Jihad is the Muslim Effort in the Path of Allah.

Development.

Among the few tens of thousands of Hamas militiamen, no more than 30% are currently trained to use time-limited defense as a form of fighting. These “urban irregular Islamists” protect themselves by extending their defensive positions beyond what is necessary in a conventional defense, thus covering a greater controlled surface. These “fortress” are diffuse, hidden and even imperceptible to outsiders. In just a few hours, the previous works are completed and reinforced. Their communication ways require more work time, but are also less obvious. You have to enter houses to detect perforated walls and find passageways or real tunnels under a piece of furniture or a rug. In their defensive struggle they try to cause the military enemy the highest possible losses and force him again and again to reorganize and redirect his deployment. But they always do it without exposing themselves excessively to a fight at short distances, to being overwhelmed or to losing their freedom of action. This is inexorably linked to the cession of urban space to the military. To do this, they withdraw at the moment they deem appropriate from the direct attack of their enemy, not from their extensive, imprecise bombardment or cannonade. And so it is announced, again and again, that this or that city has been liberated from “bitter enemies.”

Occupying towns is technically the same as raiding a block, an apartment block or a house. How is this? Because the structure of the objectives is similar: walls, spaces between walls and gaps in the walls. There are three stages of attacking a town: isolating it, entering and settling in it, and fighting inside against the defenders.

Isolation implies occupying or covering with effective and seamless medium and heavy fire all possible obvious and hidden escape routes for the rebels, from a certain distance to the population. Likewise, all water, energy and communications services must be cut off externally. As there is a possibility that a nearby enemy band will come to harass or distract the surrounded group to help them escape, it is necessary to establish an external fence at a certain distance from the inner fence, equally ferreous and without views or fire gaps, which covers all possible approach routes. We will call ring the sufficient space created between both discontinuous fences to provide protection, supplies and shelter to the assault forces. Throughout the ring, double sentries will be placed at sensitive points, reinforced by small mobile patrols, intended to thwart rebel infiltration in both directions. The ring will contain 2 mobile reserves of variable size, placed in opposite directions (e.g. north-south), to repel serious breach attempts. Command of the defense of the ring will be carried out by a single commander, different from the attacker command.

A good approach route must allow the attacker to take advantage of a space not covered by the defense and reach his objective without initial loss of his combat capacity. Sewer networks may contain booby traps. And here there are no adjoining forests to provide concealment and cover for the heavy fire. Given that the rebel defender is surely going to retreat from the urban edges, defended only by combat outposts, it will be best to reach the first selected positions inside the urban perimeter in a first push. Entries can be searched from multiple directions. And even to avoid civilian casualties, do some prior preparation on the exterior prominent buildings, starting with bursts of heavy machine guns and then using artillery or helicopter gunships.

As an example, a platoon would advance following the layout of an Arab street. One section would go inside the buildings on one side and the other through those in front, covering him with their light automatic fire. The third section would follow behind, alternately on either side. The forward observers attached to the Ugda (or Israeli brigade), whose plural is Ugdot, could go with it, while the direct heavy fire means would follow behind down the street. Tasks would be exchanged between sections. The reinforced company would advance along one or two semi-parallel streets and relieve the sections after a time. You would have a section in reserve to eliminate flanking attacks or hidden snipers.

The reinforced battalion would attack in a sector of the city, maintain the cohesion of the effort with the higher command plans, give the initiative in combat to the companies and guarantee a continuous and sufficient flow of equipment and material from its rearguard. It would also facilitate heavy fire support and have sections for clearing enemy, hidden or flanking positions.

Why is it not used?

And why is this not done systematically? I still vaguely remember the news about the high award-winning Captain Palacios and his comrades, after years of harsh captivity as prisoners of war in the USSR, arriving on the “Semiramis” at the Barcelona port.

I am also very fresh with the views and statements of all kinds of the 15 British sailors and marines, in March 2007: after their capture in supposed Iranian waters, their illegal display (against the Geneva Convention) before the cameras, their emotional farewell to President Mahmud (it could be pronounced Mammoth) and to Iran and his return home, immediately selling profitable news exclusives, in exchange for sensitive data not being leaked to the public.

They are examples of what we can expect in general from the ultra-technical Western soldiers of the 21st century. Radicalized fanatical Islamists will be rubbing their hands and renewing their resolve, inside and outside our borders. Well, that’s why…

Military and National Intelligence, failures and results.

Introduction and Development.

The intelligence services of large countries are often correct in their opinions and forecasts.

The specific intelligence tasks to which a few modern agents are dedicated usually end with partial or total success.

Complex works with ramifications and developments, which hide an estimable but not certain future, fail miserably. Because of this complex and future peculiarity. And, because the ability to observe and measure a parameter of the human soul is something elusive, doubtful and uncomfortable. Next we will see several specific cases.

The reasons for the divergence of successes between singular cases and the projection into the future (foreseen solution) of complex issues, transcending time, are partly in the difficulty of their conception, in the risk that is run in venturing and in the non contrasted exposure to the commands. Obviously, there is a dialectic here between the concealment carried out and the cognitive and intuitive process of its imagination, development and projection (estimated solution).

Only analysts freed from Scholasticism and field manuals are capable of placing themselves in the free, impartial and lucid mental state or position. To capture anomalous, complex and difficult enemy situations. Since they are paid for results and speed, which are contradictory variables, the luxury of putting an analyst agent in a “quiet position” for an unpredictable, indefinite period of time is not usually acceptable.

The new techniques for detecting, observing and tracking targets should not be underestimated. Based on computers, electronic sensors, Artificial Intelligence. But, the presence of field agents should not be suppressed, but rather supported and increased. Cyber monitoring can specify for our spy the precise area of investigation and study.

The field agent is an infiltrator in a neutral or hostile environment. Able to approach and penetrate the government, business or social media of the rival. And capture relevant, important information in a consistent and sustained manner. The field agent gives a seal of verisimilitude or even reality to the information captured from the enemy.

It is not easy to recruit, train and insert your own field agent. Hence, in an era of haste, superficiality and intellectual complexity, technological means have been favored over field agents for espionage work.

Afghanistan 2021.

We all remember the moments of the change of government in Afghanistan in August 2021.

During almost 20 years of staying there, the United States had spent enormous sums of money on said stay, providing various support to the Afghan State and to choosing, training and equipping the Afghan National Army. The Americans even boasted in their public communications, especially from the Defense Department, that they were making progress in the anti-terrorist fight against the Taliban.

This turned out to be like the “Potemkin villages.” That the Russian minister of that name prepared in the path that Tsarina Catherine the Great would follow on a trip. So that her trashy inhabitants would appear happy and shiny as her Imperial Majesty passed by.

As soon as the last American troops had to withdraw, the Afghan soldiers, who also turned out to be shoddy, began to surrender their weapons and escape the feared wrath of the Taliban. US forces were only able to secure a defensive perimeter of the Kabul airport. But, the “friendly Afghans” and their families had to get there to board a flight. Fleeing the tidal wave of the barbarity of the Taliban (scholars of the Koran).

As it had been negotiated with the Taliban to accept control of the airport by Western soldiers for a few days, this was not enough for many «collaborators» of the Westerners (translators, drivers, cleaners, etc.) and their families. Many had to make a painful journey to Pakistan to gain their freedom and their lives.

Vietnam War. American stage,

In the United States, during the Vietnam War, the “Igloo White” program was established, endowed with 1.7 billion US dollars, between 1966 and 1971, for the tasks of collecting information on the North Vietnamese and Vietcong supply routes in South Vietnam. The route started from North Vietnam, entering Laos, near the common border, and was the line of all kinds of supplies for the aforementioned forces, operating in South Vietnam. The route was strewn with devices that simulated a plant and were transmitters of information for US intelligence. They measured 1.2 ms. and their battery lasted 50 days. Many times an unmanned flying object, a drone, was used, which collected information from the ground and transmitted it via television to a distant plane.

***A SECTION OF THE HO CHI MINH ROUTE***

With the data collected from traffic on the roads, the Americans decided on interdiction bombing actions, carried out by their different aerial devices, including the invisible, inaudible and precise B-52 strategic bombers. In early 1971, data from aerial photos after the bombings, taken from planes flying after the attack formations, allowed analysts to assume that the “truck war” was causing a very severe strain on the industrial capacity of North Vietnamese suppliers (China and the USSR).

Historia Desterrada: La ruta Ho Chi Minh: Eje logístico clave en la Guerra de Vietnam

But, if it was true that so many trucks and equipment were destroyed, how was it possible that the communists maintained the initiative in South Vietnam? On the other hand, where were the tens of thousands of remains of trucks and other materials that literally plagued many of the roads and logistics parks on the Ho Chi Minh Route? Who bothered to remove them?

***A more primitive stretch of the Ho Chi Minh Route***

Another embarrassing issue was that the total number of vehicles counted by the US aviation as destroyed, exceeded several times the total number of cargo transport vehicles that North Vietnam had, according to Intelligency.

The answer to this essential mystery was soon given by the young American officers (juniors): they were eaten by a monster called the “Great Laotian Truck Eater”; a horrendous scavenger that rose towards dawn and devoured the vehicles destroyed by aviation during the night, after the required photographs for the “wreck count”, the count of debris achieved. Because Americans are very scrupulous with statistics and consider lying a «social sin» that is almost unforgivable for officials.

(TO BE CONTINUED)