Categoría: Strategy

THE CHINDITS: FORCES OF DEEP INCURSION.

AN OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION OF THE ENEMY REAR

A process that we will call of «cascade surprise» was created at the south of the operations theater of the Far East by the British general Orde Wingate at the beginning of 1.944. For it he used the deep incursion force, type light reinforced division, called the Chindits. This name is taken from the Burman god Chinthe, the protective god of the religion (or of the State), that could attack the enemies from nine different directions… His principal mission was to cut the internal communications of units (advance and retreat) and supplies (supports, substitutions and replacements) of the Japanese forces, that were opposed to the advance, at the north of Burma, of the Americans Chinese forces of general Stilwell. These were advancing from China towards the south, with the aim to conquer the Burman populations of Mogaung and Myitkyina and also to occupy and assure the zone at the south of these railway knots, so creating for them an area of stable rear. With it, they were seeking to be able to permanently open and extend a road and a pipeline from the north of Assam, in India, to Yunan, in China.

THEIR PATCH, FROM CINTHE GOD.

This would allow to supply a fleet of American bombardiers and their fighters escorts with base in Yunan. That would be destined to reinforce the effort of war of the wrecked Chinese, who were fighting from 1.937 their own war, against the Japanese expansionism in the continental Asia. And that were now unmotivated up to a point, that Chiang Kai Check wanted to go out of the war. This hypothetical armistice would liberate around 25 Japanese divisions, that were situated in China, operating and placed, to be destined where the Imperial High Staff considers to be suitable. For example, to accelerate the invasion of India, to include it in the «Co prosperity’s Asian Zone» that the Empire of the Japan was praising for the “Oriental and the Pacific Asia”. Under his politician and economic influence, opposite to the Western alien Powers.

OPERATIONS ZONE.

A conventional advance from India, by the Fourteen British Indian Army of the general Slim against this deep Japanese rear and from an expected and protected flank, was impracticable. Due to the distance to cross; to the area to winning and assuring; to the tenacity of the Japanese infantry soldiers; to the number of the Japanese deployed forces «in the same way and opposed direction”, as the Nippon were trying to reach the already nearby border of India with Burma, and to the difficulty of the the jungle fighting. That was a «thick» enviroment for the movements of the ground forces of both rivals, with obstructed and very nearby sights and where were abounding the tropical diseases.

 

The Development of the Operations.

The «second Chindit expedition» was inserted in March of 1.944, on the basis of the operational experience acquired the previous year with the first one. Where Wingate verified two essential parameters for the foreseen operations: that British Indian «line forces”, specifically trained for these tasks of deep incursion, could fight the Japanese in the jungle; and that these forces could indefinitely be supplied by air, as the Allies had the air supremacy in his operations zone and possessed enough air transport capacity for the task. They took part as incursion forces, the brigades 16, that from the first of February advanced afoot around 1.000 km towards Indaw, 77 and 111 of the British Indian Army, strong in more than 12 thousand men. That were joining in the 3th British Indian Division, of his «battle order». In April of 1.944 the 14 brigade joined it, landing in Aberdeen’s base, close to the way obstruction of White City, and immediately attacked several Japanese supplies depots. Wingate always thought in the employment of regular units, not about elite troops. And that their replacements were coming from the different units of the Army, specially the Fourteen Army of Slim. But did not count with the «perverse» trend of the units commands, of preferably being doing without the idlers and the problematic men, handing them over to other units. This way, the Chindits’ recruitment units had to reject at part of the candidates, as well as also those that were overcoming 40 years. Which is really an age very advanced to begin in the difficulties of the war in the jungles.

MARCHING ON: CROSSING A STREAM…

The gliders, freight planes and light aircrafts, due escorted, began to come to Broadway, in the north, and to Picadilly, in the south, of the chosen landing zone. It was a question of establishing a “fortified bolt” over the railroad and the road between Indaw, at the south, and Mohyen, towards the north, in the rear of the Japanese forces that were advancing towards the north, to China, and eastward, to India. The location of the place of the promising operational obstruction was discovered in the air reconnaissance done by Wingate, which chose her opposite to another alternative, because in the small valleys included in his perimeter, could be established, cover from the sights, all the auxiliary services of the defensive zone, as the mules, the health, the exterior communications, the stores, etc. White City, the defensive position, was due fortified by the engineers and equipped with 40 mm. anti-aircraft Bofors cannons, 75 mm. mortars and 25 pounds cannons (> 11 Kg and > 90 mm.) and Vickers 7, 7 mm. heavy machine guns. Between the hills that were framing the enclosure and that were integrating it, was installed even a runway for small airplanes.

A PACK OF MULES…

For the transport in broken and jungle ground, the Chindits were using packs of mules in all his marching columns. Each animal was in charge of a given muleteer, entrusted of his guide, care and subsistence. And not always, specially at the end of their operations, the muleteers were due trained for his trade. The packs were transporting the ammunitions, the provisioning, the heavy weapons, the supplies, the radio devices and other equipments and consumables. The train of mules of every unit was very vulnerable to a Japanese assault. Also, the animals of the redoubts, where it was difficult to bury them or to due protect them under covers, were vulnerable to the Japanese heavy fire. With it, the mules trains was turning into a serious vulnerability of the units. Since without it the operations of march and attack, consubstantial with the Chindits ethos, were impossible in this fighting ground of so difficult transitability. Bad going is not as precise definition and concept.

In the operations zone, the climate was hard, the comfort, which relieves the efforts of the war, was scanty, the life was rough and the woodland diseases seriously and repeatedly affected the men and the beasts, in high percentage and intensity, during the few months of operations in the Burma jungles. And the general task of harassment and weakening of the Japanese forces in their communication and supplies lines of towards Chinese and Indian fronts was carried out. The strategic operational concept that sublied was the exploitation of the Japanese deep rear, where were abounding his tactical and operational vulnerabilities and the absence of combat availability or readiness, on having been removed his forces from the combats fronts. The Chindits managed to fix indefinitely in this rear around two and half Japanese divisions, dedicated to their control and pursuit, or, around 2,5 times their own combat capacity.

Analysis and Interpretation of the Chindit Second Campaign.

The Chindits operations are exploitation actions in the enemy rear by enough and mobile forces. These are inserted deeply in it by their own aviation. This is not the usual case of the attack and breakthrough of a sector or strip of the enemy front. And then the irruption of “mobile corp”. That advances within the enemy rear to exploit his vulnerabilities; to destroy his units in reform or in march to their initial bases; to turn up the fighting fronts of his units at the defensive, so collaborating in annihilating them; to capture or destroy all kinds of logistic enemy means; to attack his valuable and vulnerable units (artillery, engineers, command and control, communications); to temporarily occupy ground communications hubs, defiles, mountain ports and riverheads and lakeheads, etc.

The necessary coordination of the “mobile corp” with his «support mass” or “immediate supporting rear”, is realized in this campaign by a stable, sufficient and not bothered airway. Whose link of union with the Chindits operational brigades (-) and battalions (+) are the fortified blocking bases (White City, Broadway, Aberdeen, Blackpool) established within the Japanese zone. And that were acting as “initial bases of depart” of their attack operations.

It was calculated that the Chindits caused more than 12 thousand losses to the Japanese forces, with their loss in combat of only a few hundreds of men. But the Chindits neither defeated decisively any Japanese great unit, nor conquered any relevant enemy position. So his transcendence, for the Allied military plans and the importance of the actions against the enemy, remained dispersed, appeased and darkened by the great maneuvers of the war in this South Asian theater and for the strategic and operational interests of the three great actors in it: British and Indians, American and Chinese.

GENERAL ORDE WINGATE.

After Wingate’s unexpected death in a plane crash, his successor, general Lentaigne, established in Blackpool, at around 100 km at north of White City, another fortified obstructionist position, as alternative and reinforcement of this. And since the Chindits operations and the interest of the war was moving more towards the border with China, the Chindits stayed already under the command of the Americans. And Stilwell, gave to them the task of a “great light conventional unit”, coordinated with the effort towards Birmania of the American Chinese forces. With the missions to attack in force from the south the positions over which those were advancing. It is of indicating that the same Lentaigne, which did not have the creativity, the ancestry, the respect between his equals and the will of Wingate, managed to partly accepted Stilwell’s conventional and orthodox points of view, in relation to the operational employment of the Chindits.

At the beginning of 1.944 Stiwell had one unit of «deep raiders”, the so called «Merrill’s Marauders». But they did not have the scope, the projection, the capacity and the operational conception that the Chindits had from the beginning, in his second incursion of this year. In addition, without the substitutions and replacements needed, used as another American Chinese advance spear in the Burma campaign and plagued by the infectious diseases, the combative efficiency of the Chindits plummeted very soon. And, a few months later, in 1.945, they were already totally demobilized.

THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAK AND SIRIA, II PART.

(CONTINUATION)

Contradictions of the ISSIL.

Since they do not have sufficient rooting between the Iraqi or Syrian population, to leave their temporal positions does not suppose abandoning the habitants to the armed enemy. The habitants of the occupied areas are not gained for the Jihad or holy war. These settlers are frightened, threatened and, at least, neutralized, in order that they give cover, subsistence and support to the jihadists bands and neither hinder, nor importune them in their activities. Only those that they cooperated with the » Enemies of the jihad » can be in danger before them. When they occupy a population, especially in the periphery of the Islamic State, the jihadists always prepare the evacuation routes towards the suburbs, and of retreat, from these to the established nearby meeting points. To escape from them to the reception or of occupation regional positions.

When they are liberated of the jihadists, many habitants, specially in the hamlets, try to flee temporarily and to shelter in the nearby major populations. The reason is that the imperious, inconsiderate and hammering despotism of the jihadists, is joined by the heavy fires of their enemies, used during the capture of the population. Both the military men and the rebels major groups (fundamentally the peshmergas) prefer avoiding their losses and hurrying up the evacuation of the jihadists, using the aviation and artillery, if they have it. Even, the free flight rockets with hollow load like the RPG-7V (an artillery of the poor), thrown in double or triple volleys, cause a devastating effect in the masonry or adobe buildings. This already would serve to make to withdraw towards downtown, the jihadists security forces from their anticipated positions, placed in the limits of the population or in adjacent points. And already finally, the Syrian army usually moves back soon, to realize other attack missions. So, the constant, fluid and up to reversible character of the military operations. Then, the jihadists can return and purify responsibilities. Because of all this, many civilians think: «once, but not more».

The decision, aggressiveness and the scorn to the death of the jihadists has given them military advantages over the lay rebel opponents. And his activity and significance is increasing in the military Syrian opposition panorama. In several Syrian provinces, as Raqqa or Deir al Zor, they have displaced the Free Army of Syria and have «settled» as the only operational rebel force. In December, 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria assaulted the headquarters of the Supreme Military Council of the lay moderate political opposition, in the frontier Turkish city of Bab al-Hawa and plundered the arsenals and depots. And the combats between rebels have been constant in the mountainous Kurdish regions during 2.014. All this took the USA and Great Britain to progressively suspending all kinds of military support to the Syrian rebels. For fear that parts of the proportionate means and supplies and reinforcements for the FAS, like the sunni commands trained in Jordan, lead to the elevation of the Western enemies.

TAKING A CONFORTABLE WALK, BUT, WHERE ARE THEIR ENEMIES?

Al-Baghdadi immediately established the Sharia, as civil and penal law of the caliphate. So, all the women, even the shops manikins, were forced to cover their faces, for not appeal the men with sinful suggestions. His Islamic courts apply the death sentence to different practices considered criminal, as the Muslim women’s rape, the homosexuality, adultery and blasphemy and some cases of thefts. The unfaithful or heretics people (Christians, yazidis, shiites, mandeos, etc.) that do not turn to the sunni Islam (initially they thought to make pay the Christians some exaction for the ISSIL), are violently chased. This way, successively, their houses are marked, their goods, seized, their wives, raped and their children, murdered. The pursued suffer summary executions and are taken as hostages, to collect rescues. There have been denounced of persons’ decapitations that deny to the conversion, including women and children, and the exhibition of their corpses in the public squares. This unleashed a religious genocide specially in the Iraqi areas of the rotter caliphate, which has provoked a massive flight of persons of the minorities towards the neighboring countries, Turkey, Jordan and The Lebanon, generating a refugees’ serious problem in them.

In his zeal for obtaining the adhesion of new followers, the ISSIL looks at West. His preferential aims are the deceived young persons, mentally unmotivated and ideologically, not educated in the virtues of the European civilization. And spoiled and overfed in our mercantile and materialists countries, who have turned all the desires into needs to be satisfied by the markets. This way, the IISIL spread at the end of May of 2.014 the first edition of a weekly magazine in English, the «Islamic State Report» and a video in German, but subtitled in English. In this one, a western jihadist, praises Baghdadi, the leader of the ISSIL, announces as «good news … the return of the Sharia and the Islamic State» and openly asks their sympathizers to come, «and join the ranges» of the ISSIL. The Islamic State Report tries to give an idea of the increasing degree of institutionalization that is acquiring the Islamic State in his bases. The publication gathers an interview with the person in charge of the formation of the new clergymen of this territory, the sheikh Abu Hawraa al-Jazaairi. That indicates that they already have educated dozens of them in a new educational center and that they have prohibited the presence in the mosques of those that they do not study in it.

The «Islamic State Report» published months ago an ironic and sensationalist article: “ Patrolling with the Protection of the Consumer Office». And Abu Salih al-Ansari, in charge of the specialized unit in verifying that food is not sell in poor condition, or that do not adjust to the islamist directives of the ISSIL, warns that a telephone has been enabled to attend the public complaints… Constantly they give images in the social networks of the daily life in the caliphate and spread videos with hostages executions, as response to what they consider the aggressions of the Crusaders. Also, the IS calls his sympathizers in the world to perpetrate individual and isolated actions in the enemy rear. Immediately after the air offensive of the Coalition, they called to commit outrages against the citizens’ life of the countries that form part of her. It is calculated that in March of 2.015 already there are in Twitter more than 40 thousand operational accounts of jihadists, with propaganda and proselytizing eagerness.

The Assault to a Universal Civilization.

Already in the summer of 2.014, after Mosul seizure, the IS began to destroy the heretics temples of the Islam. And presented a video, announcer of the barbarism who would strike on all the territories that rules the Caliphate, titled: «The destruction of the unfaithful sanctuaries and statues in Nineveh (province)». Where without mercy appeared the blowing-up of the shiites and sufis mosques of the city. In all that, al-Baghdadi‘s jihadists emulate with more efficiency, insanity, extension and giving themselves up the blind mullah Omar‘s Taliban. That in 2.001 destroyed with dynamite, because their direct heavy fire was not effective for their technical dimness, both Buda’s giant statues, of 37 and 55 ms. height, in Bamiyan’s mountain, Afghanistan, which were Cultural Heritage of the Humanity.

THE BARBARIAN FLAG…

Following his wild run towards the human sewer, the al-Baghdadi’s bearded at the end of February tackled against the images, statues, bas-reliefs, busts and coins with effigies of the old Mesopotamic cultures. Mosul’s Archaeological Museum was going several years in restoration, to overcome the hurts suffered after the first War of the Gulf (with the repression of the Kurdish revolt) and the insurrection against the American occupation. In it were hoarded great collections of historical art, proceeding from 1.800 archaeological deposits that surround the city, where were standing out the remains obtained in the Assyrian cities of Nimrod and Nineveh. There were statues of the Assyrians kings, a collection of winged lions or bulls, bas-reliefs and friezes showing activities of the daily life, as hunting, and a great statue of Lammasu, his protective god, with body of lion or bull, wings of eagle and human head. In London already has been detected the arrival of a hundred of small pieces, ceramic, coins and crystals, plundered in Syria by the jihadists. Always will exist collectors capable of buying the stolen material, justifying themselves in that «if I do not buy it, another one will do».

But, all these objects were gathered, preserved and hoarded from the beginnings of the written History by the successive habitants of the «Great Mesopotamia» and the «Great Syria». That were turned to the Islam when the Muslims conquer the Sasanian Empire around the 644. Between these settlers are included the primitive Muslims, the pious ancestors of the Islam, the examples to be followed by the Islam of pro, rooted traditions and orthodoxy. That are the models who presume imitate and continue the salafists jihadists of all the epochs. And that form the «group of the ancestors», formed by the Prophet, his companions and the first 4 sunnis caliphs, known as the Rashidun or «straightly guided by Allah». How do they dare to try to destroy what They preserved? Armed with hammers and working maces and radial saws and dressed like messes, working with zeal, we all have seen the videos distributed by them, announcing their deeds and to frighten the foreign people, in the television newscasts.

The most affected places, placed in Mosul’s surroundings, were the ruins of the Assyrian city of Dur Sharrukin, Nineveh, Nimrod and Hatra, the capital of the Phartian kingdom between 247 and 226 B.C. This one was declared Heritage of the Humanity and is included from 2.010 in the list of cultural sites on the verge of extinction by the Fund of the World Heritage, due to the plunders and the lack of protection by the Iraqi government. Impotent, the Iraq government asked the Security Council of the UNO on Friday, the 6th of March, help to preserve all this historical heritage of the humanity, attacked with impunity by the IS. It is of worth indicate that Nimrod is half of way between Mosul, left also to driven to despair by the Kurdish Iraqi peshmergas, when the IS attacked her at the beginning of last June and Erbil, the capital of these. And never the “Kurdish warriors” tried to counter-attack the lightly escorted squads of wreckers of the IS. One sees also that the general James Terry and his American expedition for the formation of the new Iraq army, who came in November of 2.01, go with some delay in their missions. Oh, how easy the al-Baghdadi mujahidins are motivated, trained and fight!! Also, the Mosul’s Christian legacy was a goal, months ago, for Allah’s brainless. That attacked the Chaldean and Syrian orthodox cathedrals of Mosul, two fundamental symbols of the Assyrian Christian inheritance. And the ISSIL immediately replaced the crosses in the exterior of the temples by his black flags with the Shahada.

In parallel and without continuity solution, the hallucinated jihadists attacked also during February of 2.015 the Mosul’s libraries, the third city of Iraq (the second is Basra, with almost 4 million habitants) and the most important in the hands of the IS. For them, for books already have the Noble Koran. And other texts are creations of the human mind, alien to Allah. First, was plundered Mosul’s Central Library, where they extracted from the shelves between 2 thousand and 8 thousand books (according to the different reliable sources that inform us) and took them in a dozen of vehicles and opened light trucks. In the principal racks only Islamic texts stayed. After the theft, the jihadists demolished with explosives part of the principal building of this knowing temple, to condemn it for his activity and rendering useless it for this infidel use. Then, they assaulted the library of Mosul’s University, where burned hundreds of profane books (science, philosophy, literature), in front of his pupils summoned for that witches’ sabbath. Also were object of pillage other known libraries of the city, like that of the Latin Church or that of the Monastery of the Dominicans Friars, whose books also were withdrawn without been destroyed, in vehicles. The university texts were of common use and were handled, but other stolen writings are of major value and are destined for the marketing with international venal buyers. A person in charge of libraries in Mosul calculated that the losses and the thefts concerned more than 112 thousand books and manuscripts preserved in them.

Everybody wants to be in the «Islamic State».

Though without having the operational unity of the irregular forces of the ISSIL in the territories of Syria and Iraq, in other countries of the Muslim wasp’s nest of Southwest Asia and the Maghrib, spontaneous and emotional regional adhesions have arisen for the first sunni Caliphate of the third millennium. Lacking of military operational action unity, it is a question of some «ideological emotional bonds», arisen from the zeal to belong to something more than to a terrorist diffuse and profuse Network, with distant commands and without the feet in the Arabic immediate and desert land, as it is with al-Qaeda.

In Libya, almost irreversibly crushed between the hundreds of local, regional and semi nomadic tribes, spread for his 1.760 thousand Km2. of surface, exist 2 great enemy groups who were disputing the favor of the tribes and that were operationally stagnant. In Tobruk, in the Cirenaica, resides the Libyan government recognized by the community international and supported by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And in Tripoli, which occupied her in August of 2.014, the «rebel» government of the Libyan Dawn coalition, with high islamist presence, which denies again and again to have links with al-Qaeda, and that are supported by Qatar and Turkey. And this is the original humus, the favorable environment, the fertilized ground where once and again we see that appears and prospers the poisonous, stinking and purulent virus of the salafists jihadists: the social chaos and fracture.

This way, on Wednesday, the 18th of February, the IS local groups occupied the important city of Sirte, placed in the gulf of her name, between Tripoli and Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica. Sirte is also Muammar al-Gaddafi’s natal city, whose death 4 years ago initiated the decomposition and the total clash in the country. To celebrate it, the jihadists, which are not bombed here by the Obama’s Coalition of the 60, realized an impressive parade of victory and force. Hundreds of jihadists and sympathizers realized a power exhibition in the streets of the city, where paraded the «battalions» of their irregular infantry and dozens of light armored gunned transport vehicles (type, light opened van) with mujahidins, that were accompanied and greeted with cheers and acclamations by the habitants during their tour for the city. The government in Tobruk did not react to these facts and the «rebel» limited himself to make advance towards Sirte, without other intentions, the Misrata’s «brigade», placed at Sirte’s northwest. This way, the Islamic State in Libyan version has managed to hoist his black flag in Sirte, in Derna, a fishermen town with 50 thousand habitants of the Cyrenaica, where his tribal militias already swore loyalty to al-Baghdadi, and in other minor enclaves of this country, where it began to appear in force.

In Nigeria, the Boko Haram’s fighting chiefs are usually the familiar or tribal chiefs, their local leaders. They attack forming a «swarm» of small units that act simultaneously or successively, coordinated by a «combat chief». This primitive, tribal, «free» character, does that among the regional chiefs exist rivalries, which prevent a vertical integration of the terrorists. His tactics and methods are: all kinds of ambushes; the harassment at certain distance of marching units and garrisons; the liquidation of sentries and small patrols; the harassment to the supply and communication lines of the military and the local self-defense forces; the sudden attacks against small garrisons; the capture of hostages of all classes with varied aims: to execute them, to sell them, to incorporate them into his ranges, to obtain the price of rescue; the execution or mutilation of the enemies or elements that hinder them: journalists, collaborators of foreign organizations, local authorities, religious. They take advantage to the maximum of his knowledge of the ground, of his high mobility, of the people support and of his natural fighting capacit. These bands always plan their retreat from the action zones, because, though they are fanatical and does not matter too much for them to die, it is not in their goals to be immolated deliberately for the Cause.

THE NIGERIA’S CRAZY MAHDI.

Shekau, called the black Ben Laden, is a controversial type at the eyes of the westerns, included his own name, Abu Baker Shekau, because their followers called him Darul Tawhid. He was born approximately 40 years ago in the wide zone between the south of Niger and the North-East of Nigeria. His formation is not known, but he knows the Koran and speaks the tribal languages of the zone (kanuri, fula, hausa and Arab) where the terrorist band operates. He fluently uses the means of the propaganda and the fear. He repeats Ben Laden’s theatrical bits (to raise the finger as a sign of threat towards the cameras, to his lookers) and mounts an equal staging (black flags, Kalashnikovs and Korans) in his appearances to the enemy means. One of a major declarations he did, was in a video taken after killing 180 persons in 2012: «I enjoy killing anyone that God orders me to kill, the same I enjoy killing hens and sheep». It is said that he is solitary, introspective and cruel. And is distrustful up to with his own men. He lives protected by a close loyal group, in the style of Ben Laden, and remains away from the majority of the group. Always, in these more or less chased principal commands, is inevitably developed the paranoia, which ends up by altering their cognitive and emotional functions. One of four wives of Mohamed Yusuf, executed in a police station in 2.009, which was his predecessor and the founder of Boko Haram, has returned to marry Shekau, according to the Nigerian intelligence. Nobody knows who finances him. Not only he is a mystery for West, but for many of his sectarian companions. He was given for dead in 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2.014, but the information was incorrect. He has a bullet wound, already recovered, in the leg. Now, he only goes out to outside the cloudy days, to prevent to be located by the drones or the spy satellites. The USA offers $7 million for the relevant information that leads to capture him.

In a qualitative jump in his terrorist activities, Boko Haram kidnapped in the middle of April 2.014 270 Nigerian girls in a Chibok’s school, at the northeast of Nigeria, which whereabouts are still unknown. These fanatic rebels are called themselves «the disciples of the Prophet for the spread of the Islam and the Jihad», that express «Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad”. «Boko Haram is a serious threat for Africa and for Europe. His will is to destabilize the north of Nigeria, the neighboring countries and the whole region», declared François Hollande in the high-level meeting celebrated in Paris on Saturday, the 17th of May of 2.014, on occasion of the terrorist escalation. «Boko Haram already is not a local group, but he is clearly operating as an arm of al-Qaeda in the center of Africa. Without the help of all the countries of the African west, we will never be able to win him», declared, in turn, the Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan. The Nigerian government possesses 20 thousand soldiers, planes and intelligence units deployed in the North-East of the country, where Boko Haram is more active. But, «these troops are not prepared to face an armed group with these characteristics», Indicated the British secretary of Foreign Affairs, William Hague. Nigeria and his neighbors Cameroun, Chad and Niger realize «coordinated patrols» to look for missing persons and hostages and to control the traffic of weapon, in the frame of the Commission of the Lake Chad’s Basin.

Three devices exploded in Maiduguri, at the North-East of Nigeria, on Saturday, the 7th of March of 2.015. It was the worst assault to the city realized by militants of Boko Haram, which try to occupy the population from ends of January. It is confirmed that approximately 58 dead and 139 injured have taken place in the explosions that shocked the city. So cruel like al-Baghdadi, but more histrionic and higher stoned than him, Abu Baker Shekau has seized this opportunity and the consequent merits, for declared himself a subject of the Islamic State on Sunday, the 8th of March. “Baya” to the caliph of the Muslims, proclaimed Shekau in an Arab recording. The “baya” is the loyalty oath and submission to a religious politic Islamic authority. And several islamic, but minor groups, of the whole world have given already his oath of loyalty to the caliph of the IS.

WHITHOUT COMMENTS FROM ISLAM’S PIOUS ULEMAS AND MUFTIS…

INSANITY ATTACK TO A KNOWING TEMPLE, UNIVERSITY OF GARISSA, KENYA TO KILL CHRISTIANS…

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The Western Defense and the Great Strategy of his Nations II.

(CONTINUATION)

This way, for us, to cut away in our National Defense is to damage, hurt or mutilate, according to the cases, the solidity, conviction, credibility and continuity of the internal and external projection of the Spain “seal». It is not a question of having up to an elite unit of «infantry on donkeys» (as «mountain dragoons»). To be able to clean an affront in Bolivia or in the Central African Republic. As the one that had needed Great Britain, when she wanted to avenge in the 19th century an offense from the Bolivians. That showed off her Ambassador mounted in a donkey. And found that neither the Royal Navy, nor her embarked infantry could coming up to lands so deep inland. But it is a theme that our Smart Defense, praised already by the NATO, supports and balanced and adequately distributes her budgets and means. In order that she can face the three mentioned kinds of wars, in the framework of the European and Western Joint Defense.

The modern units must be adapted for every type of fight and, at the same time, be bivalent or polyvalent. For example, the small elite units are suitable for their employment in the three types of wars. Their tasks are to attack diverse enemy’s critical vulnerabilities, using assaults with limited aims in his tactical or operative depth. Realizing always a study, the exposition and very rigorous tests of their insertion and extraction, which are their tactical weaknesses. The artillery units and the nuclear tactical missiles units are useful in the first phases of a nuclear conflict. And when the conventional war enters a serious conflict, which cannot get lost. Using them as part of a flexible response operational strategy and by successive steps. The modern anti ballistic missiles of the system AEGIS and the Patriots can serve to collaborate destroying the enemy missiles of any origin and in the three types of conflicts. Let’s remember that Saddam Hussein provoked repeatedly the Israelis in the War of the Gulf of 1991 (a regular war), using his different types of SCUD (ballistic antiquated missiles of calculable paths) with conventional heads. And that Hamas, in the totally asymmetric conflict at ends of 2012, was throwing with great profusion and diffusion theirs over Israel’s south and center. Managing to reach without any precision Tel Aviv’s beaches and the suburbs of Jerusalem, using the missiles facilitated by Iran. That is to say, almost all the types of existing units are necessary, incorporating them In a balanced and sufficient combination, to attend to the challenges of the different armed conflicts.

The Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (not driven planes of exploration and of bombardment) also has content and usefulness here. But always operating as part of the «combined weapon sets». The planes without crew can substitute profitably one «reconnaissance long range patrol» (exploration patrol in the operational enemy zone). To confirm with the sights the presence of an eminent enemy chief, hidden between the walls and courts of his shelter residence, placed in a cultural and ethnically related to him country. An exploration patrol would assume undue risks in the deep interior of an hostile territory. And even they might precisely and cleanly execute him with the AGM-114 Hellfire II missiles. If it was not because the most probably of doing it (that belongs to God!), which is looked for by the «overkilling», «over liquidating» the enemy. In spite of the «dead and injured men and collateral property damages», that grow this way lateral and exponently. And the almost neurotic «body count» or checking the corpse or the remains, to properly value the mission. Both are «appearances» (or spiderwebs, as is preferred) taken root in the mind and know how of the commands and military doctrines of the USA.

For example, when they tried, with only a pure attrition action, to operationally destroy the long distance and distribution transports and the logistic support structures (stores and distribution centers towards the different enemy supply areas of its tour, sections with hard surfaces roads, vehicles repair centers, etc.) of the Route Ho Chi Minh. Using the «saturation bombardments» of the B-52 (a strategic bomber in constant tactical missions!) and the most precise attacks of their ground support bombers. These were principally the AC-130, with diverse variants, and the light bomber B-576, a highly improved device, designed from the British Canberra of the 50s of the 20th century. The Route allowed enough abaster to the Vietcong and the regular North Vietnamese forces in the «demilitarized zone», between both Vietnamese republics, and at the south of that. And it was thinking up from North Vietnam across this of Laos. The support bombers were attacking in the night the trucks’ rest parks and the trucks marching groups. And, following came the “body count”, using airplanes with cameras. Looking to measure and quantify the success of the missions of the Command Hunt (or Command for the Route). The problem was that, the following day, the whole attacked section of the route was turning out to be unpolluted, without debris, not even any residue. The junior Americans officials explained ironically it, speaking about the effective action of a «Great Laotian Truck Eater Monster». That was taking charge at dawn, stubbornly cleaning the route for the North Vietnamese. For 1972, the total of enemy vehicles destroyed in the Uncle Ho’s Route, according to the most rigorous body count, was overcoming in more than 50% the calculated by the Military Intelligence in the total North Vietnamese park.

And this has continued happening in the «stage» of the War called of the Information. Whose paradigm or principal metaphor, is the computer and its derivatives. It was supposed that, after the «dispersion» created by the introduction of the internal combustion engine in the operations, it should turn to give a major sensation of control and security in the area of their direction and control. And allow to automate many of the of the military operations’ phases. But, during the so called Kosovo’s War, the Serbian were high capable of teasing the ultramodern sensors of the NATO’s airplanes. Using for it cheap artifices of elementary technology: as were the diverse camouflages, the decoys or false targets and the fleeting emission of their machines. When the «fog» in the air operations vanished, their inefficiency, after 78 days of bombardments, was evident. And in this period, the NATO was encouraged by a false sensation of success. «Newsweek» published an article in the year 2000, where appeared an investigation realized by USA Air Force years ago, to «measure» the results of those air raids. So, they detected the rests of 14 tanks (of the 120 initially «targets reached»), of 18 armored infantry transport vehicles (for 220 «targets reached» declared) and of 20 towed or self-propelled artillery pieces, while they confirmed in its moment up to 450 «struck» pieces. More things of the electronics, optics and the great distance to the enemy…

THE END.

The Western Defense and the Great Strategy of his Nations

Since more than two decades, the USA has been systematically reducing his Defense budgets. Free of the threat of a global confrontation with the USSR and his allies of the Warsaw Pact, the USA has dedicated growing quantities of the contributors money to increase their squalid «social public expenditures». But, the USA is something more than a «continent in their self», only subject to the mercantile globalization. They are the principal pillar of the West Defense. And they are one of his two poles or vital, active, ideological and complementary nodes. And the other are Western and Oriental Europe, joined now with their anxieties of freedom and by a several social and economic systems, that are imperfect, but assumed and in development.

Development of the situation of weakness.

During the application of the Marshall Plan (known there as the European Recovery Program, name toked from the general of five stars George Marshall, chief of the High Staff of the US Army during the World War II and Secretary of State in 1947) for the reconstruction and development of Western Europa, this was nourished with the American assistances and investments. And before his voracious Red enemy «ad portam», that might cross theoretically the German plains in a few hours and reach Hamburg and the Benelux, the western Europeans did not have to realize relevant expenses for their Defense. Europe was entrusting it to the weapon systems and the soldiers of the USA. Which were covering and threatening the whole low abdomen of the Red Czars Empire. Forming so placed a protective insulating cordon, from the North Atlantic up to the Pacific Ocean and creating strategic alliances from the NATO to the SEATO (or South East Asia Treaty Organization). If we want to estimate how much money and effort the Europeans saved themselves, been able to do without these inevitable expenses of pure survival, we can see an example. The overwhelming weight of the military expenses that supported the USSR in his last ten years, was the necessary reason, though not sufficient, of their social economic asphyxiation. That took them to the inevitable precipice in 1989. A second range Soviet leader accepted later that, «we even did not have anything to eat».

But Europe also was contributing an ideological counterpoint, a psychological balance and a socio cultural magma to this transversal «mutual exchange» in the West. That were giving to the USA, continuity, sense and belonging to a tradition and to an active, enterprising, expansive, Christian and millenarian idiosyncrasy. That were taken root in the Greeks, the Romans, the Christian Revelation and the identities and baggages of the peoples westernized successively. This helps to constantly create and adapt the collective identity of the USA and his raison d’être as «primus inter pares» of this actual civilization. And this «double osmosis» of thoughts, experiences and identities, creates the modern western society, as we know her. That, with all his failures, mistakes and faults, continues being the «social identity and entity» more anticipated social, political and economically. And the one that more individual and collective rights recognizes to her citizens and inhabitants.

Now the purple and the control in West weighs to the USA. And, in the retreating phase of one of their vital cycles, they have partly forgotten their belonging to the Western Civilization » dependent of the international commerce». But this multi polar world is not safer than that of the two antagonistic irreconcilable, liberal and communist, social blocks, which disappeared almost 15 years ago. Let’s see several examples of prominent «nodes» in the actual «multi polar network» of nations and their associations and alliances. An expansionist China governed by the Communist Party, who looks for regional alliances, for the moment only with commercial interests towards the scanty and strategic materials, with the emergent countries of all the continents. And that tries to create her «sphere of influence and co prosperity» of great metropolis in the western Pacific Ocean. A full of contradictions Russia, a great power that always has reacted and has grown bolder with the dangers and vital difficulties, with an increasing importance and ambition. The South American and African continents, in that almost only the lack of leaders and effective elites, which are the principal antidote against the corruption and the lack of stable investments, hinder and stop an exuberant and endured economic and social expansion during decades. A Middle East and a north of Africa in full social boiling, that are guided by an expansive, global and exclusive religion in her more vindicator interpretations. More than for a few democratic «green buds», which do not have any tradition in their social idiosyncrasies.

A stationary and bureaucratized Europe, very advanced technologically and developed. But that is ideologically lethargic and without «reasonable illusions». That motivate and stimulate it to the social phase of motivation and expansion of a new cycle. And without having attacked to his time, still, the most difficult integration of his supranational institutions. To that there are opposed passively all the national and European bureaucracies, for his own inert existential weight, and in reason to the structural present and future complications and to the zones of power in game. That motivate and stimulate it to the phase of socials motivation and expansion in a new vital cycle. And without having undertook in time, still, the most difficult integration of her supranational institutions. To which are passively opposed all the national and European bureaucracies, by their own inert existential weight. And in reason to the structural present and future complications and to the zones of power in game. Because only when the belonging to a social superior entity produces social, political and economic tangible benefits, will be when the peoples, regions and many of their leaders appreciate, be interested and prefer the Joined Europe, to a commercialized and amorphous union of European nations.

Correction of the course of the Western Defense towards an expansion phase .

The USA and the countries of the old Europe must remember that the expansion and yet the maintenance of the civilizations begin with the arrival of the colonists, merchants and adventurers. That assume the first risks in interacting with local natives and create the first bonds between strangers. In order that all they start feeling interestedly complementary between them. And without nobody perceives between them a potential threat. That the falling back civilizations or yet «stable and crystallized», create an existential emptiness. That attracts and favors the penetration, deployment and new developments in the neighboring civilizations.

And that no healthy civilization cannot be supported without a sufficient Armed Forces. That must assume and face the different and yet contradictory challenges of the three classes of conflicts or modern wars: the regular, the nuclear and the irregular. In the European intervention in Libya, authorized only for the air protection of the civilians, was observed that the Europeans lack, for example, of airplanes of supply of fuel in flight. And these had to be facilitated by the USA, to carry out our air interdiction missions and of bombing the reinforced positions and the tanks of Libyan government. And the ground attacking French aviation to support the operations of the French and of Mali troops has also needed the airplanes of supply in flight of the USA. To be able to increase her attack to land capacities, in firepower, effective range and time of service and optimize his offensive flights. And to displace from Azawad’s Islamic Republic, in the north of Mali and with a surface of 600 thousand Km2. (The major European country, France, only has 550 thousand Km2.), all the radical islamist groups (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib, Ansar al-Dine and others), that established themselves in Mali at the beginning of 2012, when Gaddafi was eliminated. The significant European lacks are not corrected in reasonable time due to the national diminishing budgets, which we have to apply in an economic long stagnation phase. But, also, due to the own absence of an European sufficient, integrated and flexible Defense Politic.

Nevertheless, in May, 2012 a summit conference of NATO took place in Chicago, to define his joint strategy for Afghanistan and to deep into the «Smart Defense». And, on the occasion of its preparations, at the end of April, 2012, the General Secretary of the NATO, the Danish Anders Fogh Basmussen declared that: «I do not believe that Europe is being militarily threatened just now, during this crisis». Is it necessary to see the wolf’s ears to buy and to provide the shepherds with dogs and cudgels? How much time is necessary in creating new units in combat capacity and in designing, making and deploying new weapon systems?

(TO BE CONTINUED)

MODERN WEAPONS: THE DRONE AND THE SUICIDAL MUJAIDIN II.

(continuation)

The explosive Taliban: from the Jihad to the Garden of the Houris, without scales.

The suicidal mujaidin is a personally advanced weapon (just look for who has nowadays the fearlessness of removing itself from life, defending some ideals and a prize at the Other Side), abundant, nearby and cheap. It possesses the highest «combat specific capacity», (according to the parameters established by colonel Trevor Dupuy, which refer to real values of the different armies, calculated in conflicts and wars): many military men, policemen and civil authorities of the enemy are definitive losses for each own loss. And speaking in terms of the universal good administration principle of the scanty available resources, his actions (as «investments») have also a high ROMI; or (military) return over this marginal investment. The suicidal jihadist optimizes this way his asymmetry with the weapon and the highly available enemies. This soldier of «one use» knows, takes advantage of his opportunity, decides and acts. Because he can be a hallucinated fanatic, but he is not an idiot. For his personal and ideological character, his effective action raises the moral, the conviction and the decision of his companions, collaborators and sympathizers. The islamist suicide «appreciates» this way his enemies. Because they are his infallible key to «going out under canopy from this Valley of Tears «.

The explosive fighter is a common weapon of the Talibans. If the explosive charge, her characteristics and the vector are suitable, the sophisticated enemy sensors and the protective jackets are of little use against he. And the armored vehicles and the buildings also do not serve to be protected from he. The “trigger carrying agent” can be man or woman and adult or child. And can cooperate in his suicide attack, a bushes, a goods stand, a donkey, a bicycle or an engine vehicle. A «suicidal fighter of one use», is not a select marksman: he is not necessary to train militarily (basic, technical and tactical knowledge). His other complementary, fearsome and almost unbeatable weapons are the surprise, the freedom of action and the initiative.

The aims preferred by the «explosives sworn-ins» are the enemy security forces, so much «unbelievers» as «traitors», and the Muslims belonging to the heterodox branch of the Islam (the Shiites and Alauites). To the enemy security forces they bring over disguised as recruits in formation, candidates for the enrollment, supplies personnel (outsourced services), companions, «collaborators» of the ISAF and civil innocent prominent figures. Their target is human always, because the property damages hurt less the regular enemy. And they are located in the policemen or the enemy armies agglomerations, in the barracks, recruitment centers and points of obliged and frequent passing and with motive of stops, farewells, ostentations and exhibitions, of those. To the Shiites they bring over taking advantage of their inevitable concentrations: the annual international peregrinations to his holy places, his stopping places in the different stages or the Fridays midday prayers, specially communities, in their mosques. Though the latter assaults take place rather in the bordering countries, Iraq (Shiite majority) and Pakistan (Sunni majority).

The great problem is that is very difficult to fight (to offset, stop or neutralize) against a few enemies, more or less isolated, determined to die and of another etnia and idiosyncrasy. And with the suicides this sharpens up to making it almost impossible to realize «a priori». Because they are combated with modern, technology and trained forces, prepared generally for wars of third generation. That would theoretically face similar forces or of the second generation. And their commands have almost as an unavoidable premise, preserve from physical (the principal thing), mental and moral hurts the men under their orders. The suicide must go unnoticed in the place chosen for the attack, by its age, genre, aspect and attitude. He has also to conceal perfectly his appliance and his equipment. To be able to approach his target and make exploit that one. His passport for the Garden of the Houris is to take with him the major number of dead and mutilated enemies.

The added human and material hurts to Muslims, caused around the explosion point, are “collateral damages”. The Sunnies jihadists looked for an overcomplicated, but sufficient «solution» in the practice, to ignore the Koranic rule «thou will not kill Muslims». On having lacked a clergy and an only religious doctrine, the interpretations of the Islam and, especially, his applications for the daily life, can be multiple. In effect, to calm the repugnances in producing them, an al-Qaeda «ideologist», Abu Yahya al-Libi, developed a «religious» theory about the «not looked hurt». According to her, is allowed to the militants jihadists to kill Muslims, when is inevitable. And, even, when it is useful. And the mujaidins express their desire that the collateral dead men, should also be considered by Allah as martyrs of his «holy war». And to believe this, comes very well to the fanatics who direct the groups and to the insanities fanatics that follow or support them.

The motivations of these “explosive sworn-ins” are simple. An effective material motivation is their chronic loss of the basic natural needs: sustenance, family, safety, refuge and cover, expectations and reasonable progress. It is an effective spur to induce the employment of the liberating violence by a part of the society, specially the idealistic young men. The «positive» motivation would be the economic prizes that Talibans give to the families of the martyrs. And these are so much the fallen in combat as the suicides. The religious motivation is the powerful mean of persuasion and conviction. The suicides of the Jihad are methodically and intensely catechized. The Koranic verses related with the Jihad, are known by heart by them. The other suicides «example» surrounds them in their daily life. In the way of photos, manuscripts, testimonial videos and destiny companions. Their preachers clarify their doubts and encourage them to prematurely reach the Paradise. That is destined specially to the martyrs of the Jihad. Everything is like to the initiation functioning of a toxic sect: that destroys the personality of the lowest members. The universal character of the Muslims’ community, facilitates the flow and the insertion of «internationalist voluntaries» suicidal fighters from other countries.

The operational key of the Taliban are their innumerable local chiefs, with their small bands of radical irregulars. They are the persons in charge of intimidating, teaching or catechizing, scaring, attacking and occupying more or less temporarily some of the numerous settlements and hamlets, on both sides of the border. The Taliban movement follows a constant elementary cycle of «teaching, training, supporting and delegating» between the small «sheiks» and his deputies. So that they obtain a certain rotation in the command and in its exercise. These local «maliks» are practically immune to the assault of the «drones» of the ISAF. That explore, attack the irregular enemy and execute his evident, it is supposed, out-standing commands.

The drones cannot follow and attack so many minuscule and evasive targets. From an enemy network that turns out to be profuse, diffuse and confused. They cannot substitute, as is claimed by extrapolation from a few first successes, the ground active and aggressive patrols of exploration or combat. That, together with the military units and the civic and political action groups, are destined to dispute and gain his “bases refuges” to the enemy and, later, the popular majority support. Like the «American saturation bombardments» could not cut the Route Ho Chi Minh, supplying the Vietcong and the regular North Vietnamese forces in the «zone demilitarized» and at the south of this. Going from North Vietnam across Eastern Laos to South Vietnam. And all was because their air attacks, were not accompanying a «ground action» over that Route. That was complementary, systematic and constant, not necessarily exhaustive, of the air action of pure attrition.

And waiting in peace death from sky does not scare, even not worry sufficiently the mentally normal people. This only happened to the imaginary chief of Asterix’s Gallic village. And is something like what Ramon Gómez de la Serna was saying to his acquaintances and less intimate friends in Buenos Aires: «Here I am, waiting for the cancer». The intimidating threat, which could change the conduct of an enemy chief, must be something real (that is tended to magnify), sufficient, felt and immediate or near. Like the sirens installed in the Stukas. In order that his precise diving bombardment terrifies in land all his possible human targets, which were not yet veterans. Or as the explosive mujaidins, whose behavior is for the enemy like a “gas”, without own volume or form and that can reach all the available sites.

THE SOVIET OPERATIONAL STRATEGY III.

(continuation)

THE TANKS ARMIES AS SUMMIT WEAPON OF THE ART SCIENCE OF THE SOVIET WARFARE.

Its structure, its operational characteristics and its performance according to the Soviet military Theory and in the practice. The practical failures of the Soviet deployments.

His tactical and operative employ in the marches and combats.

Once inserted the tanks army inside the enemy operational zone, his employ was generally much separating of the Soviet theory of the mechanized modern war of «maneuvers». The mechanized or tanks brigades were often used in untidy or even rash form. They were separated and simultaneously looked for many aims, using the maximum possible operating speed: To displace towards the west, pushing them, the major possible number of enemy units or other times, to cut off them. To liberate many populations, villas and places. And to attack in a too much broad sector, all the enemy units that were occupying defensive positions in it.

The logistics left a lot to be desired even for these elite units, as they were moving away from his lines and were consuming his initial resources. The units and small units were lacking equipments, armament, supplies, ammunitions and food. And the scanty and late restoration of the long-suffering falls, dead, injured and sick men, had very soon and almost permanently the units below his maximum authorized endowment. This tightened to the maximum the resources and men was leading to the units to a chronic lack of sufficient combat and operational movement capacities, in the spears of advance detached by the battalions, in the way of companies and even platoons. And without these combined joint capacities it is not possible to exercise a real, solvent and devastating “influence” on the enemy. That would move towards the units and their commands in the shape of “waves of commotion”, through the enemy rear. Except that, during a time, the enemy believes it or is in worse operational conditions that the attacker.

Frequently the offensive operations were realized without operational exploration, not even of combat, lacking the small attacking unit of information or intelligence about the enemy, his means and supports and his positions, and let’s not say on his intention. The formation of assault, even in these elite infantry units was usually the more or less thin line of advance (in «guerrilla»), formed transversely in the direction indicated by the chief of company command to the platoons chiefs, without any intentional deployment in depth and with scanty support of organic heavy machine guns or mortars. It is worth indicate that in last 2 complete years of war (spring, 1943 to spring, 1945) it was very normal, according to the above mentioned thing, that the endowment of a company was from 20 or 30 to 50 men, as the maximum.

When the aim was important or extensive, 2 companies were deployed by wings, serving the rough direction given as limit between their advance strips, to prevent them from intermingling the platoons. It was then very possible to count with artillery support from the brigade. For example, a battery of reactive artillery of 132 mm., the Katiuskhas, with 4 rockets launchers with 16 tubes each one on Zil 6X6 trucks, that were shooting more or less simultaneously, turning the surface target into a destruction zone. Or, in case of see or be waited enemy tanks, they were receiving the support of a 2 or 3 tanks T-34-85 platoon. Or, later, type JS-2 with the 122 mm. cannon, with a much slower shooting speed. Since, for industrial difficulties, it had the projection load separated from the perforation or explosive round. Already in 1944, with the foreign territory occupied by Germany very restricted, it was frequent to see the Tigers or Panthers or the assault or antitank cannons, supporting German small and fixed defense positions.

The German fortification works, in the great majority of his fixed rejection positions, were scanty and of circumstances, except in the big occupied populations. They consisted in more or less long trenches, infantry foxholes and shooting positions of the heavy weapons, and vertical cuts and reinforcements of the natural obstacles. Generally, they had too much reinforced and hided points, which could be used then as alternative positions, and they were lacking men to manned these. The usual ignorance of their enemy, was often leading that the attacking Soviet line, without noticing, was left to approach up to the last tens of ms. of the supposed defensive occupied positions. Then, it was counter-attacked from flank or reverse by one or two of German infantry platoons, commanded by an energetic official, that had slipped out of the defensive perimeter and were remaining hidden. The security lack to the flanks and of proper depth deployment of the attacking forces, as well as battalion reserves, provoked that the attacking unit was destroyed and repelled, with more or less falls. The Germans did not usually pursue. And sometimes, taking advantage of his enemy reverse, they get from their positions at full light and without major measures. And to retreat. And even, without being received, to move to another defense support point more in their rear.

Neither the Soviet tanks units were enduring too much better. They were using in their marches or even in the assaults, too much known and stereotyped deployments, and without taken care habitually of the exposed flanks. This could be taken advantage by some German veteran tanks unit. The count Hyazinth Strachwitz von Gross-Zauche and Camminetz is almost not known in West. For the simple reason he fought during almost 4 years of war in the East front. He managed to be rewarded with the Gentleman’s Cross of the Iron Cross (that was hung of the neck). And that he was successively adorning it with the Oak Leaves and the Diamond swords for her. He was one of the best commanders of a panzer regiment. And his successes might assume at equal parts, to a good tactical sense and a particular knowledge of the Russian idiosyncrasy. He gave his better tactical blow being already major general and commander of the panzers of the North armies group, in the autumn of 1944. His front sector was in calmness, being reorganized the Soviets, and Hyazinth Strachwitz sensed beforehand where they would attack on having renewed the offensive. With only 4 tanks he deeply penetrated behind the enemy lines and established an ambush over the supposed approximation zone of to the front. In its moment appeared at full speed a small Soviet tanks unit, completely ignorant of the presence of the German tanks, that was destroyed. More tank units were approaching and followed the same luck. Incredibly, the Soviet commanders allowed that the massacre should continue, without establishing the combat exploration or the march security or, at least, verify the origin of the enemy so precise fire. After about an hour of the first shot of German cannon, in the ambush zone (killing zone) were lying the smoking and deformed remains of 105 Soviet tanks. Almost equal of inexplicable was that the count returned behind his lines with his 4 intact tanks.

The Soviet great combats in the German rear.

When the Soviets were waiting the presence of the panzer corps or divisions, that were the only enemy great units that could attack their mobile corps with profit, the tanks army was advancing in the German operational zone with more prudence. His marching groups were forming a deployment that was guaranteeing tactical cohesion, protection against surprises and combat capacity.

The fuels supply was the first Achilles’ heel of the Soviet great mobile units. Though the infantry divisions of the Fronts were always continuing after their mobile corps, to support them, consolidate the enemies’ clear regions and garrison the populations, their pedestrian speed was insufficient to reach them rapidly. This way, sometimes a mechanized or tanks corps could remain aground and isolated. And on him were falling rapidly all the mobile reserves that the Germans could have to hand in the zone and which employment was not unprotecting other sector. On having known their near forced detention, the mobile corps were immediately going on to the defensive action and were establishing their campaign fortifications. The mechanized corps resisted well, in spite of the falls. But the tanks corps, smaller and less complete, were swept off easier by the panzer and their mechanized infantry. These cases happened even in 1944.

In these cases, always came a moment in which it was supposed that the Soviets had fought well and that already they could not win, nor get out of the combat and move back. Then, the crews and the soldiers of these elite units were dispersing in small groups, leaving behind their valuable heavy equipments and were trying to infiltrate up to their lines. And this was very difficult to get. But this was a war for the survival and mercilessly. And already Stalin had indicated the luck of the Soviet prisoners of war, if they were managing to survive the captivity in the deep rears of the Reich, his allies and the occupy countries. And that had surrendered too soon to the Germans, specially at the beginning of the war. Charging the enormous military national effort in their following comrades and the people. «Nothing will be forgotten, nobody will be forgotten”.

When the situation was difficult, the Soviets were not hesitating to spend an Army of tanks to stop the enemy by pure attrition.

In the tanks battle of for Prokhorsvka’s villa on July 12, 1943, as part of so called Kursk’s battle, faced the 5º tanks army of the Guard of the general Romistrov against 2º panzer army corps of the SS, commanded by general Hausser. The Soviets were counting with approximately 900 tanks and assault cannons, but were not joining any of the modern SU-152 assault cannons, the so called «beasts killer» (Tigers, Panthers) and the majority (around 500) of their tanks were T-34 76,2 mm, which could not distantly perforate the Tigers’ frontal shielding. The Germans had around 600 tanks (of them, approximately 100 were Tigers) and assault cannons. But none of these were of the Ferdinand or Elephant model. These only were used in the north attack on Kursk’s salient.

The Germans advanced towards the village with the Tigers forming the top of a great blunt wedge, with the Panzer IV and III covering the flanks and the assault cannons in its interior. The Soviets went to get them. The shock of the armored masses of both armies transformed in a fierce and chaotic whirlwind. The speed and the great maneuverability of the T-34 allowed them to very rapidly advance to reach the nearby fighting distances. Which would allow them to attack the Tigers with fruit and preferably at the flank. These would lose this way their advantage of being able to do effective fire at long distances and keeping the invulnerability of his frontal shield. The combat developed in multitude of small actions between 2 or 3 tanks.

The result of the battle was undecided. The Germans lost approximately 300 vehicles, including numerous Tigers, and the Soviets suffered the fall of approximately 450 vehicles. Though initially the Soviets moved back, remaining the Germans in control of the area, the Soviets recovered it little later. With what the Germans could not recover all their damaged or broken down tanks, which were total falls in their units.

The modern evolution lines of the Soviet operational strategy until 1989.

After the irruption of the Fronts or Soviet groups of armies in Eastern Europe and all the broad of the front of the East, the Soviet theoretics and the high commanders realized the need to change the structure of their tanks armies and corps. In effect, the urban, industrial and semi urban areas of the European East were demanding a major employment of the infantry support for the fight in them. They were new types of areas, full of obstacles to the advance and innumerable covers and/or «concealing relative heights», highly suitable to the active defense in depth. Here, the mechanized infantry (it was begun to call also motorized, though it was using the «combat» armored vehicles) was the principal weapon of the fighting. Also in the predictable future, a possible tactical nuclear war or not towards the Western Europe, would even accentuate this need of the motorized infantry.

It is not until 1965, 12 years after Stalin’s death, in which are started recognizing the contributions and the works of the mentioned theoretical purged military men. Assuming already to each person theirs ones and not as part of an ambiguous and impersonal Soviet military collective popular thinking school.

In turn the tanks armies and theirs corps and divisions units were adapting and changing. This way were created the so called «operational maneuver groups» (O.M.G.), destined to the exploitation in the lands of West Germany and Benelux in the decided operational directions. They could be formed by one or two tanks armies, reinforced in infantry and artillery. But their battle orders changed with the time and with the appearance of the atomic tactical weapon (missile, air and artillery). This brought the dispersion of the deployment after the irruption in several tanks and mechanized corps. That would advance very unfolded by all the attainable ground routes of the enemy area, to avoid to turn into an eligible target for the atomic fire. Also for they would have to approach with rapidity and unfolded to the “forward limit of the enemy positions”. The speed of march and the precision and range of the heavy direct fire would compensate their dispersion and the loss of shock. So achieving an effect of «crumbling of the enemy rear» thanks to the higher number of insertions and exploitations in the Western Front and its depth rear.

MODERN WEAPONS: THE DRONE AND THE SUICIDAL MUJAIDIN

If Plutarch was living today, surely he would write one of his «Parallel Lives» (one of two collections of his works), dedicated to trying and comparing the not crewed planes («death from above») and the suicidal yihadists («Allahu Akbar»). In effect, both are annoying and asymmetrical weapon, directed against the personnel and the mental and volitional factors of the enemy. That are not tactically decisive. And whose military effects are limited, but accumulative.

The Not Crewed Planes of exploration (reconnaissance) and ground recognition and of bombardment.

They are technologically advanced weapons, which began to develop several decades ago, destined to eliminate a minimum of «designated enemies», so much real as «ideological or potential «. And to minimizing the own losses. Which does irrelevant his economic cost for their rich owners. They have a highest effective range and are of the category of «intelligent». Though are not yet authorized to decide the moment to throw their missiles, once acquired the target. Their operational strategic use might be named the «War of the Drones».

The specific tasks that were distinguishing the CIA and the Pentagon, were intermingling during the first decade of the 21st century. This was owed to the operational and strategic failure of the USA in the long asymmetric wars of IV th generation (be read of guerrilla warfares and, be added or not, as be the hostiles, of national liberation) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Actions that they carried out after their short «armed conflicts» after 11/09/2001 against the masses armies (of second generation) of their tyrannical regimes. And using in them their trained and very technologically equipped forces (of III rd generation). Closed in false the Iraqi front and initiated the retreat in Afghanistan, the White House is endowing the CIA of more military means to give hunt to the salafists terrorists. So she has increased his drones or planes without crew fleet. And is considering to authorize an increase of the Pentagon’s spies’ network, to exercise a bigger control on the refuges of al-Qaeda in the Arabic peninsula and in the east and north of Africa.

These changes in the strategic and operational aims of the CIA and the Pentagon and the suitable endowment of means, culminated during the Barack Obama’s first mandate. The CIA has taken more active part in the eradication of the international jihadism, and has expanded notably his program of assaults with missiles thrown by drones. In the summer of 2011, Obama nominated the former director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, chief of the Pentagon. And the commander of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and chief of the Central military Command, David Petraeus, was nominated director of the CIA. Petraeus, before resigning 9/11/2012, for that of the erotic (his biographer) of the Power, asked Obama for a reinforcement of the drones fleet of the Agency. To be able to effect assaults beyond the habitual aims in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. The Agency and the Pentagon have their looks put in Mali and Libya, in view of the increase of the activity in the zone of the franchise «al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, the Ansar Dine group and the Anzawad’s Islamic Republic, seated at the north of Timbuktu. The tuaregs have changed his former employer Gaddafi for the salafists terrorists. To whom Gadafi accused of being his armed opposition. And that are destroying the universal heritage of Timbuktu, under the pretext that its monumental representations rival with Allah. Sources of the North American intelligence say that the drones fleet of the CIA does not excel 35 at the end of 2012 and Petraeus requested ten more.

The CIA has a list of «threats» to the USA, of which he has authorization to kill. In September, 2011 he got a famous success on having killed in Yemen the imam Anuar al-Aulaki, an American well-known personage of al-Qaeda. The Pentagon also has his «ist of authorized targets». That are checked every week by approximately 100 security analysts of the Administration. Their function is to recommend to the president the changes of names in the list. The procedure is semi officially called the «Tuesday of the terror» in the White House. The CIA and Joint Command of Special Operations of the Pentagon cooperate in many of these attacks. Their targets are supposed leaders and even simple militants of al-Qaeda and associate groups of jihadists. And the tactic is to exterminate them before they act. This is one more step in the foundations of the military doctrine of the USA. Determined for decades by the contradictory parameter of «not suffering losses in any war or conflict «.

The Obama’s «war of the drones» has much of «preventive» character”-– before that crime has been committed–and the executions are summary, without judicial sentence. And ,for this reason, it supposes attributing the right to realize extra judicial executions in any part of the world. So, Obama’s right hand in this theme, John Brennan, a veteran of the CIA, is called the «Czar of the Assassins». The program «Death of the Sky» (Death from Above) is legitimized only » by the person of the president «. The executions are legal, because the president decides and arranges them. Obama has obtained with the drones a weapon to appear «hard and effective» in the fight against al-Qaeda, without turning out to be unpopular with the voters. But, according to Christopher Griffin, in an article published by «Rolling Stone», «Obama’s secret war supposes the major air offensive not driven by human beings, never realized in the military history». And paraphrasing Churchill, he adds «never so few had killed so many people by remote control».

The Administration does not admit explicitly the existence of the program of drones, for safety motives. Though the White House declares in her calculated filtrations, that the not searched victims are almost non-existent. Not all the analysts accept this “surgical precision” without authentic information, attributed to these assaults from well away the horizon. An important problem is that the drones terrify entire areas, with some of them flying a lot of time over the settlements. On the other hand, as is the case of Pakistan, the «basic information» for the creation of intelligence for the mission, is facilitated by the local paid people. That also offers false information. More important and controversial is the question of the euphemistically so called «collateral falls», as if they had less importance on having been caused by the imprecisions and the operational mistakes. Some assaults with drones have caused tens of civilians deaths, including women and children, as is the case of Saleh Mohammed al-Anbouri in Yemen in December, 2009. And only in Pakistan, according to The Guardian, the drones would have killed around 3000 persons, of which a third were clearly civil, between 2008 and 2011.

The assaults against the human aims are realized by missiles thrown from drones. Since 2002, the USA has realized almost 450 missions of this kind in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. President Obama authorizes the assaults in Somalia and Yemen. But he is consulted only about a third of the missions in Pakistan. Where the «operational at charge» decide on the basis of “general received orders”. The Pentagon also uses the drones in his operations of exploration and of assault in Afghanistan. The CIA has his principal role in Pakistan. Where exists internally an ambiguity calculated of the FFAA, the intelligence services (the ISI is the most important, with much) and the Government in the relations and preferences towards: his foreign ally, the USA, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban and the pashtunes tribes of the frontier zones, near the former Durand line, and the southern baluchis (the Baluchistan). A strategic national aim for Pakistan is to support an important, preferably decisive influence, in the internal Afghan matters. And a strategic military aim at the east of the country is to have monitored, controlled and neutralized his own Taliban and other hostile minor groups, at the east of Peshawar’s meridian, and without they act at the east of the Indus river.

George Bush’s strategic national doctrine established, but without being due explained, not accepted tacitly by both Parties, that «asymmetrical wars» (irregular and with low level of military means) were carried on and were necessary, to keep away from the American territories and those of his allies, the threats of the “foreign fundamentalist terrorism” of any origin, religion or ideology. This justified the post war occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But, with an exploded fiscal and exterior deficits and with a democrat Administration, is necessary for the USA to save more in military resources. To dedicate them «to constructing a nation here, at home». This way, the USA qualitatively lowers the bar of the exterior terror, putting al-Qaeda as almost the only not national violent enemy. This terrorist salafist internationalist «network», without own territory, with his operational chiefs known, fled and not wished as guests in a normal country, is a more attainable, adaptable and manageable aim for the American forces and means of «rapid punctual incursion».

This justifies the increase of the use of the drones, spy satellites, own or local agents in the hostile area, attacks with limited aim by elite small units and small expeditionary forces and units of Marines amphibious assault, transported in «ships of control and transport» of strategic projection with his naval escort. The deployments of tens of thousands of military men and his luggage and equipment for several years in a theater of operations, are rejected indefinitely by the new «doctrine» of the «diminishing defense». This way, the Pentagon has to operationally center on the counter terrorist tactics and technologies. And he seeks to reinforce his own espionage branch, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The reason is simple and clear: as the CIA has been effective giving hunt to terrorists abroad, the Pentagon wants to be more like it, and less as an army at use, to adapt to the new aims and national strategies. In November, 2012, Panetta asked Obama to allows him to recruit 1600 new spies. It would double the size of the DIA. At the end of this month, the secretary of Defense declared that: «The campaign against al-Qaeda will take place out of “declared combat zones”. And using tactics that leave little track, with precision operations».

The principal not crewed planes are the Predator and the Reaper. And cost more than $13 millions of dollars per unit. The Pentagon possesses approximately 19000 for the tasks of espionage and combat. The CIA has his own fleet, with reserved information. The General Atomics makes the drones. Their weapon more devastating are the missiles AGM-114 Hellfire II, the Lockheed Martin. In October, 2012, the USA entrusted 24000 missiles for his use and that of allied authorized countries. There exist the variants of antitank hollow load (HEAT), antipersonnel (with diverse types of explosion and fragmentation, reinforced or not) and with self guided (fire and forget). Each one weighs 47 Kg., with 20 % of useful load (warhead), it is guided by laser with diverse technologies and has a range of 8 Km. The effect of a volley of several of them on a block of houses of adobe or masonry is devastating. But it guarantees the elimination of the human selected target.

The equipment of the base is very simple and highly elaborated: the remote control of the drones, several screens and a pedal, in front to the ergonomic chairs of the pilots. The drones have cameras that transmit their views to the pilots in land. A deliberate observation precedes an assault. The pilot of the drone and the controller of the camera, which form one «killer team», observe to his «designated aim» during the whole day, checking his activities. The assault would be realized when, for example, his family has gone shopping. In fact, all the «teams» talk about an «established intimacy» with the Afghan families, observed during up to weeks. Thing that, for example, the foreign soldiers of the ISAF on the area would not know. Neither it seems, according to the medical statistical studies realized, that the pilots and observers were affected by the enemies dead in an important way. Also they reject that their work is like a video game. Though some of them argue that they do not know any video game that is required to observe the aim for hours.

The US Air Force of the Pentagon possesses more than 1300 drones pilots, being employed at 13 bases in the USA. And he would need at once approximately 300 more, at least. The majority of the military missions are in Afghanistan. The Pentagon calculates that for 2015, the Air Force will have to count with 2000. Already he trains more pilots for drones that for the conventional flights: 350 in 2011. And from 2012 the formation is specific for them: the pilots only pass 40 hours on board of a Cessna, without flying in fighters or bombers, learning to direct a drone. The chief of the Air Force HHQQ, general Norton A. Schwartz, recognized that the pilots of drones might overcome the classic ones in the next years. The halo and the combat pilot’s profession change for that of “armchair screen viewer civil servant”. And air bases in the USA increasingly stop dealing with traditional flights «to «direct» drones.

In November, 2011, after an assault with drones in the border with Afghanistan, where died at least 24 Pakistanis soldiers of a control fort, Pakistan blocked the way of the logistic convoys of the NATO following the routes of Khyber and Shaman to Afghanistan, from Peshawar. They are two crucial routes in order that the soldiers of the ISAF, that have used them during the last 10 years of asymmetric combats, receive fuels, equipments, provisions and military material. The Pakistani Defense minister, Ahmad Mukhtar, indicated at the end of 2011, that they might reopen them to the ISAF, if they pay for it. And, according to sources of the Pentagon, Pakistan forced them to dismantle also a platform of drones installed in a base in the southwest of the country, principally manned by the CIA. Washington lost temporarily one of his more powerful weapon: the permission to throw missiles from the not driven planes against the insurgents in the provinces of the northwest of Pakistan, tactics that generalized there from 2008. In turn, Panetta, also indicated then that the USA is «coming to the limit of his patience» with Pakistan,»for his disability to act against the armed groups in the tribal zones». At the beginning of 2013 the drones pulverized the so called mullah Nazir in the province Pakistani of Southern Waziristan (in the tribal zones). The volley of rockets thrown to reach him, also killed two of his more nearby collaborators, Rafey Khan and Atta Ullah, who were accompanying him in the vehicle. Already the USA had previously realized several assaults to finish with his life. This guy belonged to the «neutral» Taliban in Pakistan. And, at least, it was giving cover, helps and logistic support to the members of al-Qaeda and to the Afghan Taliban, who operated at the other side of the border. And probably he was a collaborator of Pakistani «authorities» during some long periods. It is confirmed by the fact that in November, 2012 Nazir was object of an unsuccessful suicide attack at Wana’s market, the provincial capital.

In a declassified report of the Central Command of the Pentagon, published in December, 2011, is assured that «the catalyst of the assault was the opening fire by the PAKMIL (the Pakistani Army)”. But are added that «the cooperation and collaboration in the border were disabled by a mutual distrust climate»; that the orders given by the NATO «were lacking clarity and precision», and that the goal of the mission was «inadequate». The final result was that the Marines’ James Mattis, in charge of the Central Command, ordered a series of changes in the protocols for the frontier operations. And, would not it be that for routine and lack of commitment with the missions, those which existed were not fulfilled well? Finally, bureaucracy will kill the initiative and the inventiveness. And it will turn out that, as with the black greyhound of the Han Chinese, when, being tied, he was asked to catch unattainable hares…

The mutual distrust exists in all the cooperation areas between the USA and Pakistan. Since both countries were sealing an alliance after 11-S, to fight al-Qaeda, the Congress of the USA has sent $ 20000 millions as «economic aid» to Islamabad. The real and practical results of this «alliance» are lean and scanty and the loyalty of Pakistan to the interests of the USA, for which this collaboration is paid, is questionable. Because Pakistan keeps his firm loyalty to the aims of his great or national strategy. Several members of the USA Congress asked for a change of approach in his relations in this geostrategic region. The representative to the Chamber, Duncan Hunter, declared that «Afghanistan needs economic and political stability, to guarantee that the victory of the USA is lasting. And the relation between the USA and Afghanistan must be also a point of interest, not only for the future of Afghanistan, but for the whole region». And Frank Wolf indicated: «It is clear that to manage to triumph in Afghanistan, we must solve first a series of problems in Pakistan. To obtain a military victory in Afghanistan is a thing, but our general success depends on more factors».

The authorities of Pakistan and Yemen, allied of the United States against al-Qaeda, have protested several times, so much for the violation of theirs sovereignties with war actions, as for the death of people who did not have any relation with the conflict. And they warn that this war carried out secretly, destabilizes them and gives arguments to the jihadists.

(to be continued)

THE BEGINNING OF A CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA

The Syrian troops cause hundreds of dead and injured civilians in their attack to Homs’ city since Friday, 3rd of February. Justifying themselves with making “hot pursuit” of a group of supposed regular rebels in retreat. These actions in force spread already to other cities and small populations of the west of the country. This would be the summary of the news that are received from Syria during February. And with them an important qualitative change has taken place in this masked war. That is increasingly near to burst out and to develop and spread, with the typical characteristics of an armed sustained internal conflict.

Geographical Conditionings of the military Theater of Syria. His operational Characteristics in the Modern War.

Syria is fundamentally a flat country. The life and activity of his inhabitants is assembled and supported by 2 great rivers, the Orontes, which flows from north to south, and the high section of the Euphrates, which crosses his extensive and desert plains of the East, in south-east direction. A thin heights chain, the Ansariyya, which extends in its southern part in the Antilibano and Hermon mountain ranges, now close to Damascus, limits his narrow coastal plain, with Mediterranean crops. At the east of this heights succession, the Orontes, which feeds the irrigation of different crops from the Gab natural depression, allows different urban emplacements, principally Hama and Homs, from north to south. Around the Euphrates, the life sustains, thanks to the irrigations from the river and Tabqa’s dam, in the cities of Raqqa and Day the-Zawr and other minor populations.

As we have seen, the Syrian territory offers a favorable area for the operational movement and marches of the mechanized and motorized units and small units. That are capable of rapidly crossing large and surprising distances for their enemy. Using for it departure bases in their operational rear. This allows also that, any semipermanent concentration of the Syrian Free Army (SFA) could be easily reached, isolated and annihilated by the National Syrian Army (NSA) of Bashar al-Assad.

The Prolegomena of the Civil War in Syria.

Till now the combats between the rebels and the NSA were harassments, skirmishes, ambushes and small assaults to populations, which did not have the character of a «circle and siege», even partially and temporarily. All those had two key characteristics: they were very limited in time and did not have any operational projection. The falls of both «rivals», compared with those of any armed conflict that boasts, were ridiculous. On the other hand, many «minishocks» were not even detected by the normal observers or the international press.

The NSA has made one more step towards the crushing of the revolt, still in his tender buds. But already armed and spreading in «spots» over the whole west of the country. Using also in his «task», the artillery, the infantry heavy weapon and the heavy direct fire of the tanks. Heavy fire that, till now, seeks to sow the panic between the enemy soldiers and his civil supporters and the neighbors of the redoubts and strong temporary rebel points. Without that, with the direct and indirect support of their fires, take place military ground actions of operational transcendence. Only there happens the employment of «groups» of snipers by both parts. The select military men infiltrate and establish themselves, forming a short, discontinuous and broken front line, that covers a sector or strip of great frequency of movements in the population or city. And the rebels realize the neutralization action of the military snipers. And, while the panic produces the people’s move out, but rarely the flanks overflow, the soldiers advance, rolling in the created «emptiness». But without penetrating in it in force and decisively, to dismantle the rebel defense. Or to divide in sectors the enemy enclaves, as maneuver before their mop up by parts.

The self named Syrian Free Army in the Syrian Civil War.

It is a conglomerate of dispersed and unlike forces. That come from the intermittent desertion of small groups of members of the different forces of the NSA. There do not exist elements of the Air Force, which we know, between the rebels. The SFA is far from constituting an organic stable and consolidated structure. His order of battle is constituted, in his pinnacle, by the regional «brigades». These operate tactically in the “urban bed” of the Orontes. Looking only for limited goals of harassment or sudden attacks against the security forces and local important authorities. They do not have intention of defending the goals that are occupied. And they shelter at once, more or less deployed, in the nearby mountain chains. Or, forming small but integrated units, in some neighborhoods of the turbulent cities of Homs, Hama and other populations.

This rebel Syrian army, is better qualified and trained that the local «brigades» (hundreds of Lybian improvised «qatibas», in the style of «sans cullottes» or of the Iranian «basijs») of the questionable Libyan National Counsel of Transition. At least, his men possess a unit of doctrine, regulations and armaments. They have plenty of the varied personnel weapons, including the RPG family and her improved HEAT rockets of hollow lcharge and free flight and some heavy infantry armament (mortars and machine guns). His great weakness is his penury of armored vehicles, of artillery and of the antitank organic weapons of the companies and the specific battalions for antitank fighting. And the lack of a logistic stable network, sufficient and provided regularly.

Here also exists the social psychological phenomenon of raising in 2 or 3 degrees the category, the real size and the capacity of the real deployed and operative units. And that, for stale, does not cheat anybody.

Other active Protagonists of the Civil War in Syria.

The Syrian Army is the army of the nation. And it is formed proportionally as her, by a majority of sunnies recruits. That is which feeds, together with NCO s and junior officials of same origin, as an exuberant nursery, the ranks of the FSA. The Army is formed by approximately 200 thousand persons, most of recruit. The potential of the nation for a supported annual recruitment is around 220 thousand men. And it can reach even more than 320 thousand persons, with the first mobilization. Army is integrated by 3 army corps and varied and numerous independent units, with all the branches and available services. Within his upbringing is included a «political indoctrination». Not as severe, extensive and constant as that in the Communist armies, that look to imbue them with hatred towards the Zionist enemy and with loyalty to the Government and the Party.

The Army is «observed and controlled» by a younger brother of Bashar, Mahir, from his headquarters of the Republican Guard (the Haras al-Jumhuriyya). And by his brother-in-law Asef Shawkat, who directs the whole State Security, through his different institutional branches. In all the military «units» are «observers» of the Military Intelligence. Also there are several «Special Forces»units, formed exclusively by alauits volunteers, that nowadays received the joint name of «Force of Rapid Deployment», at the usage of other national armies. They are light infantry reinforced units, with the highest level in motivation, training and combat readiness.

If we want to speak about the combative efficiency of the Syrian Army, we have to depart from his specific “combat capacities». Definite and calculated by colonel Trevor Dupuy. And that refer to real values exhibited in conflicts. The last ones, calculated from the Yom Kippur’s War, were giving a value of 2,54 Syrian soldiers for one of the Tsahal. This was placing them over Jordanians and Egyptians, with values below 2. For more than 20 years, an improvement is perceived in the quality of the military personnel. And the junior officials receive now more tasks and are promoted also by his value, within the habitual parameters of the Arabic armies.

In this multicolored social military scene, are also present a few purely local autonomous militias, without operative connection between them. They do not exist in all the places and neighborhoods. There are out of the Baaz and his politician paramilitary militias that, for the moment, are inactive. Those try to keep a minimum of social internal order and the safety and the movement of the citizens and goods in the different enclaves, small populations and slums where they act. Their armament is merely the infantry personnel weapons and hunting firearms, in very varied number and composition depending on their location and contacts. Both the «task groups» of the SNA and the rebel bands keep, in this period of development of the fighting, a tolerant status quo with these civil militias. Which realize a suitable civil police labor for all.

In many alauits neighborhoods operates a paramilitary governmental militia (the «habiha»), formed by select militants of the Baaz. In different Sunnis neighborhoods act irregular armed rebels from the Muslim Brothers. It is very scanty the presence of radical religious Salafists and his furthermore exiguous local appendices. The past suicide attacks in Damascus were ascribed to them. This introduces a “social instability factor” in the “real parameters” of this war. That performs major effect and importance, that would correspond to it by the number and aggressiveness efficiency of these social religious radical Islamic. Finally, there also are «Sunnis irregular volunteers» from Iraq, without pays since the retreat of the USA. That would be crossing the Syrian border and her Eastern desert, to join the armed fight against the regime of the Baaz.

(to be continued)

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

What are they? How many there are? How do they serve?

A historical analytical tour from the Fighting Kingdoms of the ancient China up to their modern expression for the irregular or asymmetric war

The so called «principles» of the war or advises for good acting in it, which also are permanent, so as are reinterpreted with good sense and flexibility, are the compendium of «what to do” on war. Nevertheless, not always were agree the authors or the doctrines to define or to enumerate them, the results being characterized by its extreme diversity before the same phenomenon.

Following their best theoretical experts and skilled users.

Following General André Beaufré, Clausewitz proposed three fundamental principles: the concentration of efforts, the action of the strong on the weak and the decision by the battle in the principal operational theater.

Nevertheless, the reading of his book «On the War» allows to extract at least other eight conclusions, milestones or advices in his great work. And they have the character of principles of the war. These would be: Simplicity in the plans and executions. Concentration on the enemy and relative economy of forces in other sectors, to help to get it. This way, the establishment of a principal effort and enough reserves to guarantee it through time. The surprise, as multiplier of the own military capacities. Superiority of the defense, which must be active, as a fighting form. Need of the offensive, to obtain positive and/or decisive results at the operational and strategic military levels.

Liddell Hart proposes six positive principles: Following a flexible and adaptable plan, to prosecute a constant goal, fitted to the available means, looked for by means of the line of action that offers the less resistance of the enemy and, therefore, the most unexpected for his deployment and following an operational direction that offers us alternatives and, therefore, that disconcerts and disperse the enemy forces. And two negatives: to not throw the forces in an unique blow or attempt, while the enemy is on guard or in conditions to elude or resist that blow and not to repeat in the same form or direction an assault, if it has previously failed. We can synthesize all this saying that: it is necessary to apply our concentration against the enemy weakness, once his forces are dispersed, and if before they were not, by our calculated enticing deployment dispersion .

Though Napoleon commented frequently and wrote very much on the principles of the war, he did not enumerate them anywhere. In presence of the marshal Saint Cyr he once commented: «If some day I have time, I will write a book describing so precise form the principles of the war, they will be understood by all the soldiers, being able to study the war as easily as any another science». The general John Frederick Charles Fuller, from the study of Napoleon’s campaigns, deduces undoubtedly that him used the following ones: Employment of the rapidity, faith in the resolution of the offensive, the surprise, the concentration in the decisive point (not necessarily the weakest in all his battles) and a carefully projected defensive system.

There have been really done diverse collections of the Napoleon’s maxims and military rules. Considered the best and first of all, the published in Paris in 1.827 and which was almost immediately translated to the rest of the principal European languages, certainly the Spanish. It is said that Stonewall Jackson was taking a copy of this opuscule in his rucksack. The colonel G. F. R. Henderson, biographer of Napoleon, considers that this summary «contains a complete enough account, in the Napoleon’s own words, of the great universal principles of the war». In this famous edition there appear 78 maxims, which were extended in other 37 rules in the later editions. But, the “Military Maxims» of Napoleon constitute rather a “tactical breviary” of approximately 35 pages, adapted to the technology of his time, similar to the expressly wrote and with bigger extension, already in the epoch of the mechanization of the war, by the Swiss colonel Frick.

For his part, Fuller analyzing Clausewitz and departing from his phrase, «the war only is a duel on a large scale», he is deducing up to seven general principles for the conduction of war, explained through a of box fight paraphrase. Those are: The conservation of the goal. The security. The mobility in the action. The utilization of the offensive. The surprise. The concentration of the forces. The economy of the forces. These Fuller’s principles were accepted and assumed by the North American military doctrine from 1.921, with the due updates in its exhibition and possibilities of application, and adding those of simplicity and unit of control.

The French traditional strategic school represented by the generalissimo Foch, victor of I World War, summarized the strategy in two principles: the economy of forces and the freedom of action. For its generality and abstraction they can be applied to all the tactics and strategies. General Beaufré summarizes them in to reach the decisive point thanks to the freedom of action, obtained by means of a good economy of forces.

The school of the North American great strategy or total strategy represented by the general Maxwell Taylor used, during its confrontation with the U. S. S. R. in the long cold war, two basic principles of performance: the adjustable dissuasion and the flexible response.

Stalin, the great victor of the II World War, whom was asking ironically, «how many divisions has the Pope? « (now we will see the reason), defined the five Soviet principles of the war, which he called «operational permanent factors»: The stability of the national civl rear, the fighting and political moral of the Army, the quantity and quality of the divisions, the armament of the Army and the organizing skill of the cadres, officials and commanders.

These are in contrast with the so called “transitory factors”, of which only one has been specified, the surprise. Surely because it was the only one that Stalin mentioned as such, in the period following its lucky use at the strategic level by the Germans, on having invaded the U. S. S. R. The Soviet exhibition of the mentioned principles, necessarily does not mean that there do not exist other principles, that are so valuable as them in the military Soviet doctrine. But only that are not mentioned as such by her.

In «The Art of the War» of Sun Tzu there are also definite the roots of the principles of the war. They are not stated explicitly as in the West, but they appear expressed with that global sense of the Chinese philosophy. Which seeks to bear in mind everything at the same time, the particular thing and the general. More as an intimate perception and an experience, than as a «check list», a prescription handbook or a vademecum.

On the principle of the offensive SunTzu says:

«The invincibility resides in the defense, the opportunities of victory, in the attack». «When you have enough means, the suitable thing is the defense; when you have more than sufficient means, the assault.» «Those who are expert in the art of defending, hide themselves under the land of the nine folds; those who are expert in the art of attacking, advance as launching from the ninth sky. Thus, they are capable of be protected and insuring themselves the total victory at a time».

(to be continued)

A THEORY OF THE CONTEMPORARY WARS II.

(continuación)

The Last Operational Projections opposite to the Most recent Threats.

The balance of the nuclear weapons between both great atomic hegemonic powers («guides and leaders» of their partners), is defined by the new START Treaty. This has been ratified on December 22, 2010 by the American Senate. And is hoped that the Russian Duma ratifies it, after her established by protocol study, in an only voting at the beginning of 2011. This new agreement replaces the START of 1991, which expired on Saturday, the 5th of December, 2009.

The START 2 supposes a qualitative and substantial limitation of the number of heads and nuclear strategic vectors of the USA and Russia. Far are the times in which the number of operational, stored and dismantled by pieces nuclear devices were reaching 50000 between both. By 2013, each country will deploy only 1550 strategic nuclear warheads and will have 800 carrying and multicarrying vectors for them: submarines, free flight rockets, ballistic rockets and planes. Also is established a new system of inspection of the arsenals and nuclear means.

Several are the deficiencies or topics not solved by the Treaty. One is the not limitation to developing the defense systems against the vectors. Also is kept the storage freedom of not operational warheads and of deployment of the atomic tactical weapons. Between both «models», each signatory power can have nowadays near 6000 warheads. The tactical nuclear weapon, destined to the battlefield, can be an intermediate step in a direct warlike confrontation between nuclear powers. Before using the nuclear strategic volleys against the operational or deep enemy rears. The USA claims that, at least, the last two topics been an object of a later treaty.

The rigorous limitations of the nuclear weapons do not eliminate them. No weapon has never been abolished, once acquired and extended the technology for his manufacture and use. It is necessary to learn to coexist indefinitely with them. An excessive control (very few explosive heads and vectors) does that they all are directed to attack the enemies population and industrial centers. This paradoxically goes in opposition with the pacifists aspirations. When the number of weapon systems overcomes a survival or practical threshold, it allows to follow an atomic flexible, variable and staggered strategy. In her, many of the vectors are pointed to destroy the enemy vectors in the diverse phases of his path to the goals: in and over the hostile territory or platform; in ballistic or autonomous flight towards the goal and over the own territory, both at high and very low level. This keeps limited the number of heads destined against populations and industries. Even it allows their tactical employment against profitable goals of military enemy concentrations, specially before reaching in force the forward limit of a principal defense position.

The modern communications have rushed, marking character, into the contemporary wars: the wireless or waves of wide spectrum; the road networks and the diverse engine vehicles. A special challenge, which appears in all the coercive conflicts, not necessarily armed in all his phases, is the so called cybernetic war. Made concrete in the attacks to the «enemy» across the universal wireless communications network. These aggressions are capable of penetrating the first and second levels of security lines, most known or common. And to commit an outrage against the databases and the processes of the normal computers of companies, individuals and institutions. Until a few years ago, only the developed states had access to this vanguard technology. And this also connects the 3th and 4th generations wars: the employment of the cyberattacks is not already only in hands of the big powers. As example, driving mad the computers of the hostile plants of enrichment of the uranium 235. Today, small nations and groups of fanned rebels or of conceited little rascals, with certain knowledge and lean resources, can realize successfully cybernetic assaults at certain level.

In the last decades, the wars are showing in very asymmetric levels of means and efforts confronted. So much is so, the Americans are called them wars of 4th generation or asymmetric wars. But they are nothing more than the old guerrilla wars of the History. And, often also, of national liberation. Let’s not forget that always the rebellious and insolent enemy is despised. He is judged by the laws of armed sedition and attack against the National Security. From May, 1808 Napoleon so had in consideration the Spanish. Or the European powers to the nascent nations in Africa and Asia, after the World War II, from Algeria up to Indonesia, passing to Angola (the Portuguese were saying that she was a national province) and Vietnam.

In these irregular wars many of the parameters of the previous wars are absent. There is no declaration of war by the Legislative Power of the strong or military contender. The victory is not obtained occupying the enemy territory. The military means lose a part of his leading role, in favor of the social, economic and political means, necessary to gain the will and the fervor of the societies at the stack. The treatment and the care given by the contenders to the civil population of the guerrilla infected territory is fundamental in the development and the result of the conflict. The duration of these wars is major than that of the conventional wars. The time, necessary in order that the rebels make and develop their total war effort, works, in general, in favor of the weak or irregular contender. The military means are not adapted, at first, to the type of fighting that is asked to them. Neither exist clear goals, nor territories at stake, nor front lines or enemies deployments, nor strengthened positions. If the guerrilla are it sufficient skillful and steady, to not directly and unnecessarily confront her chronic weakness to the enemy strength.

The Great Operational Lines of the Counter Guerrillas Forces.

Nowadays, in West, in Europe, the exterior leading role of the conventional armed forces seems to center in them, throughout the time and in varied theaters. The military western action opposite to their exterior irregular global threats demands an effective, light and mobile counterinsurgency forces, specialized in not orthodox tactics and technologies, as part of the conventional troops. That must always operate in conjunction with the national forces of the countries infected by irregular hostiles and supported with decision by the own economy and the diplomacy. This will strengthen their missions and compounded role, The counterguerrillas forces must not be enslaved to the strategies and tactics of the conflicts of the second and third generation or classic contemporary ones. Though these could arise punctually in the armed conflicts with the «urchin States» of each time (for example, Iran, North Korea or Venezuela).

Some of the operational characteristics of this different type of war, but not new, are:

To always avoid a protracted war. With her the enemy organizes, spreads and strengths, sometimes irreversibly. While the military men lose way, get angry and weaken. The war of Afghanistan is squarely in this long critical period.

To always attack the concentrations and the rebel bases. These are the hard and conventional goals that they offer to the military forces. To always defend and support the own communications and to attack those of the enemy. To take advantage for it of the light armored vehicles mobility and of the aircraft, which neutralize the information of the different enemy observers.

To keep the passive defenses of the war to the possible minimum. The big «protective» and costly barracks in relatively calm zones, only serve to socially and military isolate the regular forces, from the fluid and active environment of the irregular fight. If the military forces were initially not enough, is necessary to concentrate them temporarily in fewer zones and to promote between the population the self defense forces. To always use a constant, creative and energetic patrolling. So much for the exploration and the attack, as to hinder and isolate the guerrillas from the friends or neutral populations and to cut their communications. In both cases, is necessary to keep mobile, even airborne forces, to give them supports. To use the concentrations of regular military forces only to attack the guerrilla bases or to surround and chase his operational concentrations.

This will keep the initiative and the surprise, created by the regional network of small light “action units”, in hands of the military men. That by formation, training, means and vocation should clearly overcome the hostiles in the military operations. The principal goal is not to keep a “front line” or a «cultivated field» of barracks, redoubts and forts through a whole country or strategic region. But to active destroy the combat capacity and the operational movement capacity of the armed rebels.

And only the military «initial» and continued successes, will lay the foundations for a firm, irreversible and progressive pacification of the different regions of the country.

Let’s see now succinctly the possible distribution of the military bases depending on the enemy activity. In the enemy most favorable zones, the military positions must be solid and resistant, few and with a bigger garrison. In these areas must predominate the exploration of the bands and the major offensive operations against them, over their bases, concentrations, refuges and passages.

In the zones where the rebels try to settle, progress and manage to dominate the civilians, the military positions will be more numerous and with fewer troops. These are the more changing zones, of more irregular war, of combat meetings (the ambush is it) more frequent. Here is decided, first, the advance and the progress and, finally, the victory of one of both contenders. The enemy communications and the rebellious centers in these areas are the operative goals of the loyal forces, together with the defense of the populations. Resting, partly, on local self-defense forces, reinforced by highly mobile military patrols, even transported by helicopters. Assured the defense of an area in these zones, is possible to demand loyalty to the protected population. And to begin the labors of national economic support and civic rearmament.

In the most loyal or neutral and pacific areas is necessary to test the technologies and the methods of sincere and effective approximation to the population. The self-defense native forces, supported by military mobile patrols, in charge a manageable zone, must support here the weight of keeping their own security. In this zone can be located the helitransported and the mechanized sufficient reserves. To be sent to other 2 kinds of operational zones in support or assault operations. Also the brigades of economic support and of civic rearmament, can have here his stores and central big barracks.

When scanty military means are available and the enemy sustain an all-out war, is it possible to fight against armed and motivated rebels?

Let’s see a historical example of the action of military forces against insurgents, in unfavorable conditions for them. The German antipartisans forces in the USSR always tried not to be forced by the guerrillas to the passiveness of the garrison or the escort. In heir manual of «War against the Bands» they were establishing that » the initiative must be always ours. Even if the commander only has a small force at his disposition, he must not show failures in his resolution. If it is possible, every action of the bands must be replied».

The Germans not only were prevented in his operations against guerrillas by a men’s habitual inferiority. But, also, by the heterogeneous quality that they were having. His anti partisans troops were consisting of an always variable combination of forces of diverse origins and qualities: borders troops and German security troops and policemen; security troops of his allies in the East Front, specially Italians and Rumanians; and a high-colored mixture of «Russian» allied forces of security and of self-defense, sometimes insecure. The hard core of the units were the Germans. In the positions usually were not homogeneous troops. In them the qualities were intermingled, in order that the more mope or novice was encouraging by the presence of the forte. And it remove from him the thoughts of weakness or desertion. Before the inability to garrison her rear in the whole territory conquered from the USSR, at west of an imaginary line between Leningrad and Stalingrad, the Germans had to select very well the points to garrison. These rarely were possessing more than one platoon of counterguerrilla forces. In addition, it was thinking that with 4 or 5 men, the position could be defended for a time. While, the rest, in 1 or 2 patrols, were going out to chase the partisans in the nearby villages, to monitor their vital line of communications or to support other positions. When new units were created or if there was a temporary «surplus» of anti partisans forces, they were formed exploration and combat patrols. Something like a reconnaissance in force forces, to locate and to scourge the guerrillas. When it was necessary to realize an offensive major action, before a guerrilla threat or the location of an important concentration, even were temporarily brought troops from the first line (of the operational zone) for the assault and destruction of those, generally looking for his encircle and annihilation. I

It is true that the German results were limited. And also it is true that the principal operational goal of his anti partisans forces was fulfilled. The lines of supplies from Germany, Poland and Romania were kept reasonably opened up to the rears of the German forces and their allies in the East Front. And the men, armaments, equipments, supplies and goods flows that they received was constant. To allow the gigantic effort of war against the almost inexhaustible resources of the USSR. Million Soviet prisoners were sent to the Reich and to there came back countless units and men of the Wehrmatch.

A THEORY OF THE CONTEMPORARY WARS

The appearance of the atomic weapon at the end of the World War II supposed a milestone in the exposition, development and manifestation of the wars. The industrial modern powers, not necessarily advanced (neither China nor India were it), could develop, on having ended the World War and in a ripeness period of around 30 years, first the nuclear weapon of fission and then that of fusion. The military revolution that supposes the atomic weapon resides in the frightening concentration of fire, in time and place, of which it is capable. For example, an atomic bomb of 20 kilotons of TNT is equivalent to the simultaneous and concentrated destruction power in a few km2 of 4 million 75 mm. rounds for the Schneider rapid shooting cannon.

The Atomic Weapon as the Center of the Fires Plan.

All that overcomes qualitatively the mobile and fixed barrages and the punctual and concentrated blows of fires used by the heavy artillery. Nevertheless, that keep their usefulness in the forms of fight without atomic weapons and as tactical complement of these: inside positions, in the fighting near the outside limit of these and in urbanized zones, in the mobile war and in the guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfares. With it, also, the atomic tactical weapon is raised as the king of the fires. And to the plan atomic fires, if existed, must adapt the fires plan and the aviation support, both in the preparation and development of the battles.

In difference with other known or existing weapon, the atomic weapon does not have a proportionality or direct, sufficient and habitual correlation between the means used for it (its different vectors are a rocket, a plane, a heavy artillery round) and the destructive instantaneous effect that it develops. And let’s not believe that at the end of the World War II the fires plan of a battle was paltry or a snot of turkey. But with the atomic weapon it is necessary to mobilize neither big air fleets nor artillery divisions in support, to achieve a destructive given effect.

Let’s see a case of tactical employment of the overabundance of conventional fire means. Not looking for the neutralization of the objective, but his difficult destruction. In July, 1944 the Americans were trying the break of the German front at the west of Normandy. To operationally penetrate with the Third Army of Patton in the strategic rear of this great German rejection front. The Lehr Panzer Elite Division was spreading out in static campaign fortifications, including her scanty tanks as centers of support points of the defense, at the west of Saint Ló. She was occupying a sector of 6 km abreast and 4 km in deep. On July 24, 400 American bombardiers attacked the defense positions without causing serious hurts. The following day, approximately 1600 Flying Fortress attacked systematically them. The units that were supporting the German lines were eliminated almost at complete. The ways and roads of the zone remained impracticable. Towards the midday, the area was resembling a lunar landscape. The effect on toughen, formed and motivated men was indescribable, maddening some ones.

An effect of the atomic fires is the general decrease of the efficiency of the active and passive protections. The effect of the atomic air explosion is spherical. And on a ground surface is circular. This way, the forces must spread out in subunits, looking for the circumference that borders the area, and to realize the marches in smaller or deployed groups. Avoiding this way to offer useful goals to the atomic tactical enemy fires. The armored vehicles, for their speed, maneuverability, cross-country movement and crews protection, are useful in the atomic environment fighting. The burials, in the form of trenches or reinforced pits, and the concealments, the rear slope positions, the forests and the urban and industrial (urbanized) zones, continue having an important value in the tactical defense.

The Strategic Projection of the Nuclear Weapon.

The fission weapon has a potential limited by the characteristics of her critical mass. This is the necessary mass of explosive in order that all the neutrons issued in the fission of the atoms of uranium 235 or plutonium 239, produce in turn an atomic fission and a tremendous emission of energy at an almost instantaneous speed. From a certain size, around a dozen of kilos, the own “exogenous and centrifugal” reaction drives the garbage of the reaction and the chunks of fuel still not fissioned, towards the atmosphere and the land, as part of the radioactive cloud. The fusion weapon, by her part, needs a tremendous activation energy at a temperature of million degrees. For it, she only was achieved to have when the fission weapon was at disposal. This is used as “percussion cap” for the fusion of the «explosive».

In this case, her «size» or explosive capacity only is limited by the general considerations of conception, design and assembly. It is a beyond, fundamentally technological step, which leads the atomic weapon to the areas of the national strategy and of the human morality. This way, weapons can be created with the destruction power of millions Tm. of TNT or Megatons. So, a real barbarity. To what there adds the general, extensive and indiscriminate character of the destruction on persons, equipments, goods and households in many Km around the explosion point. It is an abominable vileness, adapted for a unfavorable and implacable Final Judgment.

The Soviets, in their zeal for the more «visible big», to compensate their real lacks, managed to design the «Tsar» bomb in the 50s. It had a destructive capacity of 100 megatons. Finally, they made exploit a minor variation with almost 60 megatons of power, to avoid failures in the operation. Premier Khrushchev cynically complained that his scientists went away the hand and the device was working out slightly more powerful that the foreseen. The device detonated on October 30, 1961, in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, around 90000 Km2, in Europa’s extreme North-East, in the Arctic Ocean. Immediately after the event, ABC Daily published a front page, where they were turning out to be superposed on our Spain, the impacts of 5 of these insanity devices. We returned to the Middle Age, without capital means or productive infrastructures.

The Trends for the Wars of the XXth and XXIst centuries.

Till now, the wars were making between big and small «nations». They were the only capable of generating a «will of defense». This .made concrete in the Armed Forces and in the economy, the diplomacy and the people support of their societies. Looking for the defense of their strategic and national interests and their survival. A procedure or protocol existed for the war declaration and for the signature of the peace agreement. The one that was not respecting the honor procedure was considered to be infamous. And if he was turning out to be defeated, could wait for a severe punishment. President Roosevelt, on Monday, the 8th of December, 1941, at 12:30 pm. hour of Washington, in his speech before the American Congress assembled in Joint Session, and transmitted by radio to the nation, was declaring: «Yesterday was a day marked by the infamy…I request you declare the existence of a State of War between the United States of America and Germany, Italy, the Japanese Empire and all their Allies». And ultimately were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The contemporary wars lasted a few years. After which, exhausted the industrial capacity and the will of defense of the defeated nations, not necessarily invaded or occupied, these were accepting their defeat and the peace was signed. When the armistice or the peace conditions were too leonine and humiliating, they were originating new vital defense «impulses or take-offs» in the defeated people. Seeking to overcome and avenge the received damages and offenses. Those were the sure germ of a future war within a generation, measured in around 25 years. Just remember the treaty of Versailles or «Diktat» against Germany, signed on June 29, 1919, promoted by Georges Clemenceau, called the Tiger. Whose last payments referred to interests of the already liquidated principal debt, the reunified Germany has just done at the end of September, 2010, approximately 90 years after accepted.

The threat of the use of the atomic weapon in the war between the industrial powers, removed indefinitely the historical and recurrent danger of a war of interests of any class between them. The civil and military leaders of all of them, have exhibited throughout more than 65 years an exquisite tact, supported by the nationals diplomacy and economy, in the international relations and in the resolution of the raised conflicts. No «minor» relative question was deserving to assume the risk of an uncertain, costly nuclear warfare and without clear «victors». In any case, the big hegemonic powers or the principal ones in a strategic zone, were solving regionally his ideological and of interests fighting. And they were doing it by means of regionally limited sectoral wars. Where were fighting their partners and like-minded, local, not atomic and subsidiary nations, even out of their strategic natural zone. There we have the case of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, after the decolonization of the first one. Also the fight in the Horn of Africa between Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Ethiopia, Cuba and Siad Barre’s Somalia. The latter’s overthrow, after his defeat in the war for getting the Ogaden Desert in 1991, precipitated Somalia in the chaos in which still is. And we have the Israel and the Arabic bordering countries case, which threaten her from time to time with her elimination and with throwing to the sea the surviving Jews.

The International Politics alters the initial Status Quo.

But the unstoppable proliferation of the atomic weapon between nations of cultures and idiosyncrasies very different from those of the big industrial original nations, can present a new, serious and complex problem. The nuclear threat is so radical and dangerous, that already now the «confidence» does not turn out to be sufficient in the rationality, the goodness and the good perform of all the world leaders, for its exposition and launch. The weapon systems to use will determine if the wars will be or not total. And it is necessary to apply real and practical limitations to those, which guarantee the rights of the Humanity in her survival and peace.

Let’s remember, in addition, that nobody grants the personal and collective human rights. It neither gains them nor obtains any group, supposedly anticipated and activist. They are inherent in the human nature and in all those who take part of her. What can do the political and religious collectivities is to recognize them or not and to defend them or not.

The mentioned systems include the defense systems against the military conventional vectors of the nuclear weapons: ballistic and selfguided rockets and aircraft and several types of ships. But a suicidal group can be also the vector of an atomic weapon of several hundreds of kilotons. That introduces it in an enemy urban center (city, barrack, industrial center). Any rascal power, even as part of a delirious strategy, can facilitate this type of devices to radical anti Western groups, which do not lack economic resources. This would connect intimately the types of contemporary wars.

Nowadays, the Islamic radicals are those who use with profusion and diffusion the suicides. Candidates to use this type of “arm of use and throw», do not lack to any group. And even a certain market exists between the radical Islamic groups, to punctually be facilitated «voluntaries». In the last years, the followers of the Sunna are who are using the suicide in the Islamic Yihad. It is used by al-Qaida, the Afghanistan’s Taliban of the mulhas Omar and Haqqani and the Tehkrit-e-Taliban Pakistan, the members of Hamas and the Pakistani separatists in the Indian Kashmir, accused of the assault to Bombay. The shiies of the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran do not habitually use it. Though in the assault against the barracks of the western forces in Beirut in October, 1983, which was the presentation in society of Hezbollah, the drivers of the trucks, full of explosives, thrown against those, were suicidal. Also, the Iranians used their basijs militias in frontal massive assaults against the fixed reinforced positions, supported by mine fields, of the Iraqis, during the war from 1981 to 1989. The basijs were «popular militias» of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Without organization, method, discipline, resources or too much military instruction. But they were full of religious and patriotic anxieties. They were the last to come to the Khomeini revolution. And they had to demonstrate their fervor and militancy for her. In the Iranian cities they had turned into a rebellious problem for the clerical shii authorities. That canalized his redeeming impulse towards the lay enemy front. The militias were authentic, dispensable «cannon fodders».

(continuará)

McChrystal, Petraeus and the Allied Strategy in Afghanistan

At the end of June, 2010, diverse analyses appeared in the written press, that brings over the possible changes that might happen in the direction of the war in Afghanistan, on the occasion of the substitution of the general in command McChrystal by the more notorius general Petraeus. The above possibility would exist if it was a question of a company, which manager or first executive had been fired. But not, it is a question of the substitution of the general in chief of a theater of operations.

The Definition of the Military Strategy for Afghanistan.

It is elaborated by the Joint Chiefs’ of High Staff (the Pentagon) and is approved by Mr. Obama. Corresponding, then, to the general in chief to develop it with his operational strategy. Where already it has a few limits his autonomy, to stamp his way and his stamp. The general of the theater of operations is a great manager, a high managerial command, of the immense means that the USA and his allies, jointed in the ISAF, put to disposition to reach the goals of the war.

The total strategy raised by the USA can be summarized in obtaining the defeat of the Taliban and the extirpation of Al-Qaeda’s extensions in Afghanistan. And in the progressive incorporation of the Afghans to the labors of public order and against insurgency, possessing a government increasingly strengthened, respected and obeyed, capable of attracting the least radical insurgency to the democracy rules. All this, intermingled with an economic support for the reconstruction, the public health, the people education and the civil infrastructures. But that reaches from the provision of the military means to the delivery of bribes, donations, incentives and sinecures to certain fighters, in order that they leave the weapons, and to civilians, in order that they facilitate information or collaborate in the multiple necessary tasks. The famous strategy against insurgency of «gaining the hearts and the minds» of the native peasantry, which dates back to the intervention in South Vietnam in the 60s, assumes in this triple aim.

The Substitution and the Loss of a Commander in chief in Operations. They had Tired and Bored up to the eyebrows the old good Stanley.

Let’s see two cases, similar but not identical, in which the loss of the commander in chief turns out to be irreparable. Sometimes the military commander constitutes a critical strategic vulnerability of his armed people, at hand of his enemies. This was the case skilfully handled by the Spaniards in the 16th century during the conquest of America. It was a question of the capture or the death of the great chief or «emperor» of the indigenous coalitions in the big countries to colonizing: Montezuma, Atahualpa. And that was possible because the «great adorned with feathers» was presiding his army in combat. This was giving a devastating blow, though temporal, at the indigenous forces. Because once turned into hostage the symbolic representation of a chief of this type was plummeting. Since the social vitality of the collectivity to which he was directing, was now demanding his renovation, as if he had died.

We have also the cases of great political military commanders, as Alejandro, Gustavo Adolfo or Napoleon. They were incorporating in them selves the essence and the virtues of a whole military style and of a political regime. That were radiating permanently to their peoples, galvanizing them for a common task of historical transcendence. His disappearance in operations had been fatal for their collective interests. As it happened in case of Sweden, with the death in combat on November 6, 1632, of his king Gustavo II Adolfo in Lützen’s battle.

Stanley McChrystal’s case was different. He was only an emphasized military man inside a professional, enormous, diversified, technical and modern army. As already he had almost 30 years of service, nearly the retirement, certain luxuries could be allowed. He was tired of interferences from the court politicians of Washington in his «way» (his kingdom was the operational strategy) of commanding the war and in the cuts that they were imposing on him to his requests of means to attend a long, unpopular and versatile war. His crime was to publicly call, in a published interview, «wimps» to some of these politicians of the rope of the “presi”, with whom it ran up in his honest way. The name defines a weak, coward, irresolute and ineffective person for the matters. His aggravating circumstances were the premeditation and the mockery that were exhibiting in the magazine.

The Coalition that General Petraeus gets.

In Afghanistan are present military forces from approximately 46 countries. Some of them are dedicated to support, garrison and rear tasks. As being a great coalition, without subordinating to it any of the interests that to each country dictate his needs and his political commitments, the coincidences between the allies are partial, have solutions of continuity and are unstable through time. This intrinsic fragility of the coalition, is born of that almost all the allies do not practice State policies. It is necessary to indicate that this owes largely to that there is not a clear perception of the Afghan problem. Not of his direct or indirect, immediate or distant nearness, to the national respective interests.

The Dutches, with approximately 2 thousand soldiers in Uruzgan’s province, at the north of that of Kandahar, have confirmed his march from Afghanistan in August of this year. By 2012 also there want to go away other 1550 Australians, which garrison this province. It is supposed that this multinational «brigade» will be replaced with efficiency with American, and especially, Afghans forces. In the province of Kandahar, the old fief of mulah Omar and the first national quarry of the Taliban, there are more than 2800 Canadian troops, joined with British and American forces. It is one of the first «fighting fronts» against the country insurgency, together with Kandahar and the eastern afghan provinces. The Canadians will move back from Afghanistan between July and December, 2011. They remain the British and the Americans.

And, which is the «vital path» (or curriculum vitae) of the British in this conflict? Of the warlike fervor of these «European technologically modern soldiers», give faith the operations carried out for 8 years in the Pashtun province of Helmand, at the south of the country. After the war of 2001, which ended with the medieval radical intransigent regime of the Taliban, around Lashkar Gal, capital of the province, approximately 8 thousand British soldiers established permanently, successively relieved by their replacements in «tours of duty». This powerful quota of professional experienced soldiers was unable in almost 8 years to fight the opium culture in Helmand. Nor to appease the province, for the effective implantation in her of the government of Kabul.

To finally achieve these goals, apparently very difficult to realize, on Friday, February 12, began the Moshtarak (United) operation in Marjah’s region, at approximately 40 km from Lashkar Gal, by approximately 15 thousand allied soldiers, from the NATO and Afghans. That had to go demonstrating that all the efforts and the money spent in the formation of his National forces, have not squandered wretchedly. The Taliban, a light irregular infantry, without aviation, with a pedestrian and insufficient logistics and without artillery, were beaten and removed from his combat positions in Marjah, dispersing finally to the bordering provinces, largely. To extend the information, see our article «Marjah’s Battle» in this Blog. Nevertheless, already the out-standing journalists (this is better than «fixed») in Afghanistan warn us, that the green outbreaks of the insurgency are appearing, as vigorous and firm renews, around Marjah and Nad Ali areas of Helmand province.

Finally, the Americans have indicated the July 1, 2011 as a deadline to initiate the retreat of his deployment. They are approximately 94 thousand soldiers in these moments and will reach 98 thousand at the end of the summer. They are spread through the whole Afghan territory, as a framework that supports and stimulates the general effort of war against insurgency and al-Qaeda. By then it is supposed that they will be enlisted, trained and equipped near 400 thousand Afghans joined the forces of Police, some regional militias and the Afghan National Army. Will they be motivated also to defend an inorganic western democracy? For the present time, the tayicos and the hazaras form most of the actual security forces of Afghanistan: there are approximately 100 thousand policemen and approximately 90 thousand native soldiers, with variable degrees of motivation, loyalty and training. In the Pashtun districts there are in general no enrollments to the national army nor to the Afghan police. A Pashtun liberation war is outlined this way inside an oppressive or neglected country towards them.

THE CAPTURE OF BIN LADEN.

Introduction.

Bin Laden is the principal responsible for the attempts of September 11, 2001. And also probably those of March 11, 2004. But in a lax way, of ideological religious sponsorship. As he was in these dates, first sheltered in Afghanistan, and later hidden in its inaccessible and intricate Eastern mountains.

Al-Qaida is the principal reference franchisor of the radical Islamic, at level of the Umma, or Islamic universal community. And this is very important, because the Islam is a very socialized religion. Neither Hezbolla, nor Hamas, nor Iran, nor the Moslem Brothers, nor Tehkrit el Taliban have Bin Laden’s or al-Qaeda’s global ascendancy in the modern radical Islam.

His strategic principal aim is to implant a universal Caliphate. And neither of the Moslem actual states serve them. Because they are heretics, as the chií Iran. Because they are «corrupt», in spite of her religious radicalism, as Saudi Arabia, in hands of the thousand (or are they seven thousand?) «princes» of the family of Ibn Saud, the State founder at the beginning of last century. Or because they are «westernized», as almost all the remaining ones, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, etc.

It seems to be necessary, then, to capture Bin Laden or the high command of al-Qaida. Some looking for revenge for the received attacks, as Spain and Great Britain. Others, as the USA, to eradicate an islamist violent extremism. That extends his influence through the world and that from time to time commits an outrage against his country or against his allies.

Is it possible to do it? Which will be the difficulties? The direct actions against al-Qaeda, will turn out to be quite effective as are glimpsed?

The «last» Occurrence of the Military American Strategy in Afghanistan.

The general Stanley McChrystal closes the «Infernal Circle» of searching and apprehension of Osama Bin Laden. At the beginning of December, 2009, the general McChrystal, chief of the American Forces in the theater of Afghanistan, in one of his appearances in the Congress to explain and to defend the need of the intensification of the military operations in Afghanistan, has revealed his new find, after a «well-considered» reflexion. The general has conditioned directly the success of the fight against al-Qaeda to Bin Laden’s elimination. Is it certain this, operationally speaking?

Introduction. The Situation of the «Problem».

The Taliban and al-Qaeda form two vertically organized movements and from below to up, same in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That does that its cells do not know exactly which are the top chiefs. They only know where they have to go to receive support or to send or to receive information or to communicate with another «peer» cell. The ideological and geographical nearness allows them to collaborate tactically. The commands of these movements act by exception, not by presence or by deliberate action. This way, they give doctrinal orientations, establish essential lines of military and proselytizing action for the different territories and areas, they throw threats and warnings to the enemy governments and indicate punctual important (strategic) aims at the level of the set of the organization. This allows them to operate well, without the intervention of its high commands. The death of the mullah Omar or mullah Haqqani and two or three chiefs in an American bombardment, would concern little its efficiency, at its real military irregular levels of action. The «martyrdom» of the aforesaid or Bin Laden or his «managing director» al-Zawahiri would perform almost equal importance as their existence.

The operative key of the Taliban resides in their innumerable local chiefs, with their small guerrillas bands. They are the persons in charge of intimidating, teaching, scaring, attacking and occupying more or less temporarily some of the numerous settlements and hamlets, at both side of the frontier. According to the pressure degree that they should exercise on the villagers in order that they inform them, hide them and support them. Evidently its elementary degree of operative development keeps the movement at the defensive. Without being able to dispute to any of the present Armies in these areas, any territory or village. Without being able to realize other attack actions beyond ambushes, assaults to very small enemy isolated units, harassment by medium range fire, kidnapping, short duration isolated incursions and ways and paths mining. Ideologically concentrated in the conversion to their movement, to their semi nomadic cells, of the most related or nearby Pashtuns. In a minor and less extensive degree, operate the cells of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The First great Attempt of Capturing Bin Laden and his direct close Friends.

In the autumn of 2001 took place the rapid crumbling of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, seated in a precarious and bad constructed state, which was giving cover and logistic support to the headquarters of al-Qaeda. This one, together with his «escort agents», a small group of active members and of training proselytes, gathered with time, forming an extensive and lax march deployment. And they slipped, following the narrow and steep routes that the zone was offering them, through the Afghan mountains up to Torah Bora. It began then, in December, 2001, the great operation of search and apprehension of the maximum leader of al-Qaeda. That was the direct and declared responsible person of the attempts of September 11 against the USA. Americans met for it near 100 groups specialized in «Long Range Independent Operations», in the zone in which it was supposed that Bin Laden was hiding. Why they did not catch or killed him? Possibly, if they were Israeli commands, they had achieved it.

In its day, according to the reports that are appearing to the public light, they said that it was for «lack of means». «We needed more soldiers there!, there declared recently the agent of the CIA Gary Bernstein. During his testimony, he assured that «we might have finished everything there». In 50 pages of a report published this year, are mentioned the testimonies of several military persons in charge. That saw how their High Commands were denying to them, for example, the thousand necessary men, according to them, to stop up the entrances and exits to Pakistan, or several bombardments.

Did they needed more than 100 elite commands for an operation of circle and annihilation of a band of irregular in fugue, terrified by the typical vague and nearby bombardments? Operation that would be limited to the zone where the enemy tracks and their electronic sensors, satellites, spies and intelligence agencies, were locating approximately the enemy. Surrounded the zone, by means of a double ring, not necessarily unbroken, but effective, the commands would penetrate centripetally in the suspicious area. Acting simultaneously, patiently, methodically and secretly, like a «swarm» of small units. Where the flank and the rear of every small unit would be defended by his initiative and offensive activity. And by the «influence» radiated by a nearby companion unit.

Also they imputed part of the responsibility in the escape to a “falcon” like Donald Rumsfeld. In those days, they say now, that Rumsfeld declared that if the USA was so hard in Afghanistan (for cleanly capturing the responsible person of that treacherous and civil tragedy?), it would wake up an anti-American feeling, bigger than that already existed. And because of it, he was supporter of a more «light» tactics, using controlled bombardments and with the collaboration with the Afghan Army.

The failure of an operation constituted a decisive strategic failure. In fact, for years there has not been trustworthy information of Osama’s whereabouts. As has just admitted the secretary of Defense Robert Gates, last December 7. And now, in 2009, al-Qaeda is renewed and spread. And Bin Laden, as the dead Che, inspires but does not command, a new generation of Islamic extremists, spread over numerous countries.

The Historical Precedents. The Geostrategic Present Stage.

Abdur Rahman, proclaimed Emir of Kabul in 1883, saw his sovereignty progressively reinforced on the totality of Afghanistan, immediately after the crushing by the British of the uprising, the same year, of Ayub Khan in Kandahar. In November, 1893, Abdur Rahman signed a “formal agreement” in Kabul with sir Mortimer Durand, secretary of Foreign Affairs of the British general governor in the India, Lord Lansdowne. That one fixed and established the political border between the India and Afghanistan. It was known since then as the line or the frontier tracing Durand.

The problem generated by this tracing was that the pashtunes, as definite and different race, remained divided geographically in 2 parts, placed in 2 territories of different sovereignties. The pashtunes lands of Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dhir, Khyber (with its gorge between Pesahwar and Kabul), Kuram and two Waziristans, stayed inside the British India. After the independence of the India, all these territories were incorporated to Pakistan. The Islamic state created at the time to satisfy and shelter the most part of the Indian Muslims. And that was including originally Bangladesh, at the far end of the Indian subcontinent, where the Bengali Muslims were living.

The pashtunes are nowadays 12-15 % of the Pakistani population. They are a poor minority, placed in zones with insufficient ground networks and of difficult development. But 25 % of the officers of the Pakistani army are pashtunes. As well as also about 40 % of officers of ISI (the Pakistani secret information service). The individuals of pashtún race are approximately 25 millions in the country.

In the northern part of Baluchistan live tribes of pashtún race. In the South and North Waziristan’s regions the Pashtuns are more concentrated, forming a real Pakistani Pashtunistan. Within the great pashtun race, the Mahsuds (these specially inclined to breaking the agreements and treaties) are in the Waziristan central zone, the Wasirs and the Afridis live in the zone of Tirah and the Mohmands, at the north of Tirah. The great zone of Chitral, at the north of the border, is formed by the Bajaur, Dhir and Swat districts. The Waziristans are the most problematic, independent and turbulent tribes.

In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are at the south and south-east, reaching 35% of the population and around 12,5 millions persons. Another important Afghan races are the Uzbecs (10%) and the Tajiks (25%), which live in the north of the country, bordering the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan independent republics. In the center live the Hazaras (20 % of the population), related with the Persian and in the south are the Baluchis (10 %), related, in turn, with the Pakistani Baluchistan tribes. The flow of Afghans, specially Pashtuns, towards Pakistan or coming back home, when the military conditions are smoothed, does that the figures, lacking for decades of an official census, are variable and vague.

After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the dispute arose with Afghanistan, which was looking for an exit to the sea, for the possession of the wide frontier tribal zones. Both countries almost came to the armed conflict, until they signed in 1963 an agreement of borders determination. The borders existing during the British domain were ratified in it. And Afghanistan stayed as an interior country, without access to the sea routes.

A pashtún independent and sovereign state does not exist. Their nation is divided between two Islamic states, not rivals and complementary. In none of them the pashtunes can impose their social and economic demands. Till now the Afghan Taliban revolt realizes her ambushes and assaults with limited aim mainly in the districts of pashtún majority. The tayicos and the hazaras form great part of the current security forces that get up slow, painfully and with reluctance in Afghanistan: approximately 90 thousand policemen and approximately 80 thousand native soldiers, with variable degrees of motivation, loyalty and training. In the pashtunes districts neither are enrollments to the national army nor to the Afghan police. Sometimes It looks like a pashtún war of liberation inside a country oppressive or neglected towards them.

These administrative colonialist policies were a frequent practice of all the imperial metropolis. To distribute the sovereignty of the territories, following geographical considerations. As a child would do it, drawing vaguely a map in his games. And leaving the different «regional races», separated and distributed between the forced resultant states. So creating permanent instability and, therefore, dependence and intervention need or foreign guardianship from the superpowers. There we have the cases of Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Ossetia, etc.

Barack Obama wants to reach 400 thousand operational and effective men in the Afghan security forces. To be able to leave them the defense of Afghanistan. Will he be able to motivate and to achieve that they enlist? Will they be loyal to a staggering and slightly representative democracy? Will they be effective in the hard fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurrections?

How is it Necessary to Attack in the Pashtunes mountainous tribal Zones?

We can say that, inside a partial area of these, the gravity center of the fight resides in the control of the passages and in the dominant heights of these. The military deployments must be long and narrow, as is required by orography. And in the marches, they must take advantage simultaneously of the whole net of paths, gorges and ways of a zone. This offers to them a certain previous deployment for the combat. It is not easy to rely on the support of air fire, for the requirements of maneuverability of the aircrafts. Punctual bombardments of saturation can be realized on an enemy reinforced position, which he has decided to defend. There must be avoided the heavy fires on the settlements, even suspicious, which do not answer to the unquestionable safety of the own expeditionary forces. The units to employ in the «interfaces of action» with the enemy in these hostile zones, are the small units of elite light infantry with high mountain training. No principal «mother» column, methodically advancing through these areas, can survive without deploying a combat advance guard, which should be occupying temporarily and successively the dominant points at the flanks of the advance path, and a rear guard that goes forward by successive observed bounds.

The advantage of the pashtunes over the regular forces, specially the foreigners, resides in the knowledge of their own area, on it they can move at great speed. They have a tactical elementary natural skill and a special trickery incorporated into their survival sense. They are capable of waiting patiently for a favorable opportunity for action, choosing generally when and where to do it. And they do not have shame in moving back when they can not realize their plans and can be threatened or cornered by the infidel modern enemy.

In addition, nowadays, the Taliban enjoy a complicated system of natural caves at several levels, in some frontier zones. That is reinforced by tunnels of communication, provided with zones extended for the waiting and the storage of goods of all classes. This system is used to facilitate the traffic between both countries, without having to use the frontier passages or the most habitual and known gorges, as «stages» of the complete journey. And as temporary refuge when the allies carry out operations at battalion or regiment levels, of search of rebels or of reprisal, on the pashtunes zones where they have been more active. The highland villages are numerous, small and spread for both zones in the Pakistani Afghan border. In them also a small group of Taliban can be camouflaged, waiting for the passing through of a military “flood”, as the mentioned ones.

The pashtunes have small military collective discipline and the enemy heavy fires air and ordnance affect their spirit and decision. Also, it affects them very much to see threatened or occupied their line of retreat and the light and medium enemy fires, when they receive them from heights superior to those that they occupy. The pashtunes can attack at night some aims that worth it, but they are not natural night fighters.

Prologue.

The global, polyvalent, integrator knowledge that needs the approximation to an armed religious politician revolt, is diverse and multiple. We recommend our readers, as complement, the reading of the different articles that, on the Taliban and al-Qaeda revolts we are publishing in the last months. With it, they will acquire a «prism» to observe, to discern and to predict the development of those «modern conflicts».

A Theory for the Modern Warfare

Her Historical Context

Her Theory and Evolution

Introduction.

The theory of the maneuver warfare tried to give a practical solution to the predisposition of the North American ground military forces of using exaggerated or inopportunely the heavy fire support. As their principal «argument» or action over the enemy, in the combats or in their preparation. Also she was seeking to consolidate the concept of operational strategy in the ground military operations. As new and precise level of action placed between the military strategy and the tactics.

The Principal Theoreticians and the Developed Situation.

Several are the theoreticians, both civilians and military, who helped to create a coherent, sufficient, practical and effective “doctrine body” for this new theory. We will point out the analyst and lecturer William S. Lind. Another fundamental personage was the colonel John Boyd, who was a former fighter pilot of the USAF. Also is important the contribution of the colonel professor of the Marines Corps Michael Wyly. Chronologically in a second row, stands out strongly, expanding the torrent of ideas of the theory in march, the colonel of the US Army Robert Leonhard.

The renowned Israeli military analyst Martin van Creveld was saying that «the Armies» were turning throughout the time in «paralyzed bureaucracies», losing in this process great part of their efficiency. They could continue killing, but they were doing it badly, slowly and expensively. Probably their excessive endogamy demands and forces them to allow that, from outside of the organization, renovating ideas are given them. At least, the North Americans did it and accepted them. And they tried to incorporate them into their doctrine, regulations and manuals. And, even they tried to put them into practice in their conventional following wars. They did not this way in their counterinsurgency wars, the lifelong guerrilla wars. To which now they call pompously “asymmetric wars” or wars of fourth generation.

In this introduction to a theory of the modern warfare we want to give a joint vision, holistic and applied of the developed ideas. And, sometimes, implemented, by those men,throughout a decade in last century: from first of the 80′ up to first of the 90′. Also we will permit to develop or to extend the concepts or the explanations. When the own development or account of the theory asks for it, for her better comprehension. And their authors and theoreticians have not been so explicit or prolific on having presented it.

The Fundamental Ideas of the Theory of the Modern Warfare.

The definition of tactics in this theory is important. Because from her firmly stems almost all her later development and applications. Tactic is the harmonic and sufficient combination of specific knowledge, experiences and military skills, to produce a surprising, sufficient, effective and powerful action on the enemy, in these given conditions of time, climate and opportunity. This «combination» must be tinged and modulated by the principal struggle and the “mission type” orders of the chief. And by the “resistances” and the “emptinesses” of the “combat capacity” that the enemy presents, in his tactical deployment and according to his intention.

«Combat capacity» are not only the present soldiers or military specialists. But also their equipment, their arms systems, the logistical support and their motivation, training, combat readiness and resting or existing combat deployment. She is the combined result of men, means, full situation and commands «cocktail». That usefully qualify the units for fullfilling their combat military operations. 

In the battle, in the combat one seeks to introduce the enemy in successive cycles of «observation, situation, decision and action». That are more rapid than his capacities of action. In such a way, that the enemy successive «elementary» tactical actions, turn out to be progressive and fatally increasingly inadequate and ineffective, to offset, to overcome or to be opposed to ours. This must tend to destroy his unit structural operational cohesion and to foment and to extend the panic between his men, before the manifest military uselessness of the actions that he tackles.

The basic skills of how to shoot the weapons, the physical training or the reading of the maps and the ground orientation, etc. Or the advanced skills of how to realize the different operations of march, advances cross-country running, defense, the employment of a system of combined arms, some special type of assault, etc. Those will be given at their moment in the schools, the academies and the destinies.

You can see that we have not touched yet the «foundations» of the theory. The important thing in this theory is the acceptance and the assumption of her new approach, which highlights the qualities of initiative and creativity in the commands. To save physical military and economic means, the lives and the invaluable time, being thus much more effective.

The Functioning of the New Style of Action.

If we want to be more rapid and effective than the enemy, we have to have a sufficiently decentralized military organization, acting on him. Let’s remember the “cycle of action” with his four phases. If the observations of the subunits in contact with the enemy must be passed up, following a chain of control. With the definition of the situation made and the decision taken at a high command level. And then, the order for action transmitted downwards, across the mentioned command chain, and, then, executed the action. You can deduce that the cycle of action is going to be slow. And, even, it can turn out to be late and unproductive, in a tactical very fluid and changeable environment, far from the outdated combat linear fronts.

But we do not want that the military subunits in contact with the enemy at the tactical “interfaces of action” wander senseless thorough the combat field. Without our command superior sense or without efficiency. To guide them profitably in their activity, their orders would be “mission type”. In them the chief shares, entrusts, a part of his military intention to the subunit. And he gives her freedom of action (the how to do her job). In return for the fact that she realizes this part of his intention (the what to do). Also the command establishes a principal

centripetal combined effort on the enemy. And the subunit that acts in the principal effort receives the cooperation of the actions of her companions and the majority of the supports of the unit. That the unit command receives of his Superior in tactical or of war subordination.

But battle matters are fluid and highly unpredictable. Because we do not have all the factors, decisions, actions and circumstances that concur, perfectly known and controlled. The subunit acting in the unit principal effort can be going, without entering, to an enemy hasty prepared bag of fire or to an obstacle covered by the fire, not detected by the exploration, or to a defense position, reinforced with campaign fortifications. And a subunit companion could have flanked the not continue positions of the enemy. And being in conditions to accede easily to a park of trucks or to a position of mortars, deployed in the enemy tactical rearward. Then the chief would name to this another unit his principal effort and would stimulate his new promising action, giving her heavy fire supports and the cooperation of others. With this way of undertaking the actions, if a subunit remains isolated or get lost temporarily, she will know what to do during enough time. To be able to be surprising, unbalancing and going forward the enemy, the command must observe and feel the combat from enough ahead. But without taking part or been mentally trapped in it. And to be hearing (through his forward HHQQ) in the network of communications of the unit.

Except the known and evident cases, the indications about the battle ground should be that, explanatory indications of his intention, limits of the sectors of advance, points of control, and not direct units goals. It is better to order a subunit: » prevent that the enemy crosses the “Blue, 32 height, Red, beeches groups line». That to say her «you should occupy and defend the 63 height» (the dominant height over that line in her sector). This last does not guarantee that the enemy does not infiltrate, working at the micro ground area, taking his time. Or finds a no enfilade line of advance (a waviness of the ground of 2,5 or 3 m. can conceal main battle tank to the horizontal enemy sight), up to the other side of the front «line». The command has to split hairs, thinking, making concrete in words, briefing well, always observing and taking responsibility for everything. And his secondary commands have to be active and creative and taking responsibility of his actions.

The Consequences, Responsibilities and Results.

There start appearing some fundamental characteristics of the military organization, in order that this works well. A double and high responsibility of the commands and commands of the subunits. And an indispensable reciprocal confidence between them, created by the experience and the cooperation shared before. A major implication of the NCO in the bureaucratic and routine tasks of the administration of the unit and a better and intense dedication of the officials in conceptualizing the combat: looking in the decision or in the exploitation for his operational transcendence.

As inevitable consequence of this form of decentralized, fluid, surprising and rapid resilience action, mistakes will always arise in the realized actions. These will add to the inevitable «friction» generated by all the tactical and operational actions. And because the almost countless number of «individual and collective actions», that meet to shaping a warlike action and the inevitable absence of “total complete” information. It is necessary in general to agree and assume the mistakes as a minor, surmountable evil. And whose ballast is more than enough compensated by the goodness inherent to the followed operational method. But never accepted, not tolerated, as result of a previous incompetence, of the passiveness, of the negligence or of the lack of active commitment with the goal intention of the unit. You can enlarge these ideas in my book “On the Nature of War”, chapter 2, “Chaos and Error as Practical and Conceptual Spaces of War”.

Finally, there is a general approach towards the decisive and transcendent action in the operative level. Guided by the superior command intention, transmitted and entrusted to the chief of the unit. And for this to his subunits and supports units, with the cited direct and resilience methods.

Situations and Tactical Favorite Means of the Theory.

In the modern warfare is necessary a great activity of the combat reconnaissance, to generate the sufficient information to create the intelligence for the application of the appropriate skills and the definition of the general situation and the enemy situation, means and intentions (the first phase of the cited “cycle of action”). The deployment of the subunits in the “interfaces of tactical contact” might be in the shape of “snub reversed wedge”, when the enemy situation is not clarified at all. Or, at the other end, to take the approximate form of the “sharp long wedge”, when we are working in the micro emptinesses of the enemy deployment “combat capacity”. To cleanly burst in the rearward of the enemy defense zone (its first lower belly).

The means of the command emphasized in the maneuvers war are the reserve, the counterattack and the intelligent use of the supporting heavy fires. The reserve must always exist and, at least initially, must be in the hands of a capable, experienced and energetic subordinate. The reserve is the bet of the chief for his tactical transcendent victory. She must not be used to reinforce an effort or to compensate, without further ado, a mistake. For this various tasks, there are the bigger heavy fires, or the tanks and engineers, used in cooperation. Or the tightening of the units advance sectors or the units deployment in depth. Or to realize a secondary assault or a diversion. Therefore, the modern reserve is not a secondary subunit. Nor one that is reorganizing and having scanty means, poor in combat disposition and moral.

The counterattack offers initiative and tactical mobility to a more or less looked temporary or necessary defense. He must be opportune, powerful and launched when the enemy has passed the climax of his assault, has suffered losses and the situation can be recovered by us. The support heavy fires must seek to stimulate the maneuver of the unit. Their tasks must be blind, disturb or neutralize the enemy forces, more than destroy them. Because the last mentioned turns out to be costlier, very difficult to obtain and needs much more time to be gotten. And time is a precious tactical and operational independent and essential factor. Finally, the combined weapons or inter arms systems and the engineers or pioneers are used constantly in the war of maneuvers. And the last ones, in the principal effort, though also they supply his specialized means to all the subunits of their parent unit.

Something on the more Common, Dangerous and Frequent Guerrilla Warfare.

Nothing says specifically the new military theory about the guerrilla warfare. It is a shame. Because the Western countries face more frequently the danger or the challenge of a war of “fourth generation” or “asymmetrical”. That one of “third generation” or conventional modern mechanized war. And not by changing her name to the guerrilla war, the “prism and our knowledge”, with which we can «observe, analyze and define, decide the procedures and actions and put them into practice «, they change or improve.

We must indicate that this is an eminently mobile, subterranean and active war. With multiples objectives to reach. But highly different from those of the wars of the three first generations. Objectives subtle, but fruitful; more difficult to determine, but forceful in their results; more politicians and social that pure military and always compounded by these tree branches. But, as always, the goals must be confronted or defended or converted or taken. Like it is necessary to defend a strengthened position or to take a hill. But, the means and the ways are different and more various. Here the “meat mincer” of the modern supposed highly precise “heavy fire” of support, does not serve either.

The propaganda constitutes a strategic basic aim of all the taliban and al-Qaida rebels, with which the agencies and the western communications means collaborate filled with enthusiasm. Any successful and showy rebellious attack or ambush is immediately broadcast to the world. This always debilitates the will of permanency of the USA and his ISAF allies. His legions called by his families, want to return, to enjoy the varied and superfluous consumption goods and the exotic vacations. The Spartan mothers, something unthinkable nowadays, were saying to her children when they were going out in campaign, when the benign station came and they leave the winter barracks: «you shall return with the shield or on the shield». When they were fleeing, the big and heavy shield of the Greek hoplite, capable of resisting the tremendous blows of the Sarisas or long lances of 5 m., principal weapon of their phalanxes, was a hindrance and they were rejecting it.

The insurgents taliban and al-Qaida nets are secret or latent and operate aggressively only against the mobility of the army and the police, which they surprise, are a nuisance, cause damages, kill and mutilate. The attacks from several directions creates bags of fire and enfilade zones on the enemy. This produces besides a synergistic and enervating effect in the attacked forces. That is similar to the result of multi traumatize or to that of multiple nº 8 or 9 pellets in a minor hunting piece. They lack of enough punch to give decisive blows or to finish off an important enemy. They erode a military unit (not a small unit or isolated elements), but they do not annihilate it.

Against the prepared military positions established in depth they are not effective, though it exists afraid of the guerrillas and a lot of money is expended protecting them. Their bands lack important combat capacity and are also easily canalized towards approximation avenues with registered heavy fire and medium grazing fire. For the moment, they lack engineers’ training, which would allows them the punctual break of the static protector barriers. And of superior training, to use the crawling individual approximation, without time limitation, in their diverse missions out and inside the military and police camps and facilities. The big and large military forces bases only serves as refuge and rest for them. But removing them from their guerrillas civil and military goals. And isolating them from the Afghan people.

The logistics is a great disadvantage, especially the supply of equipment and no handmade goods. They possess many small active rears or bases, many full surrounded by their enemies, which activities can be detected always. The supply of the bands is provided by the support organization.

The patience must be a characteristic of all the implied in this irregular war. Also it is necessary for to be effective, to reach a minimum of trade and seniority. In the zones most favorable to the bands, it is very easy that the operations of search and siege are initially closed in emptiness. It is necessary to go gaining and selecting their zone population, as we have said before, in order that the military trade and the people loyalty combined should produce its military and social incomes. The successive victories of the Afghan National Army and Police will be gaining to them the favor of the people. Because all they want to be emotionally with the winning side. And because the interests of the Afghans are volatile, unlike and yet contradictory, based on the loyalty to the family, to the clan and to the tribe.

In this type of war the armed forces cannot defend from the enemy all its possible targets. Besides, never there would be enough remaining troops to keep the initiative and to carry out a multiple, flexible and mobile offensive action against the armed rebels. Here there are no linear fronts to establishing and cozy, protective and supplying operative rears. What exists are armed enemies groups, their logistic support and information groups and many groups of sympathizers with and surrounding them. That are integrated all according to the different personal courage of their different members. And all of them widespread and established through a big territory without limits or classic rears.

You can see more on military strategy, operational strategy, tactics and skills on guerrilla warfare, in its “Appendix” in my book “On the Nature of War”.