IN PURSUIT OF THE MILITARY EXCELENCE.

THE INCOMPLETE AND SLANTED THEORY OF SHIMON NAVEH

The author realizes a methodical and deep critique of the different fighting forms in each of the historical epochs.

It is specially hard and mordant with the form of fight of the Germans during the World War II. His aim is to degrade and minimize it, to reduce it importance and validity in the history of the ground operations. Depriving this way the evolution of the American theory on the those operations, of any intellectual influence or debt with the doctrine of the German war.

The one that the author considers to be more opportunist and tactics, that complete and scientific. And he thinks that it was favored in its results by the lacks and the mistakes of its enemies. It is possible that an academic analysis of the form of German fight, approaches to give this verdict.

But, the evidence is the touchstone of the reality without appearances. And the case is that the Germans triumphed widely and extensively with that one, during the first stage of the World War II in Europe: 1939 1942. During which, his enemies could learn of the tactics, technologies and the German operational strategy. Since it extended too much in the time, on having multiplied the theatres of the war.

Imagen relacionada

And that, in the last phase of the war: 1943-1945, the Germans were exceeded, overwhelmed and, finally, defeated. To what contributed the qualitative and quantitative differences in the logistic flows, which supported both armed rivals; the enormous bleeding of the German commands and cadres, which turned out to be irrecoverable and reduced the qualities of his units; and the quantitative demography of the Allies.

Naveh grants wide quality and esteem to the military doctrine of the Soviets. That he considers to be scientific, because it was following a linear process of arguments, logic and results (that for a long time, were only longed for or foreseen). And that was adapting and guiding specifically and really, to an army of slightly educated masses and nourished by a resounding demography. That always had an insufficient logistic support, when it was not precarious. The mechanization of the infantry to collaborate with the tanks, was always a longing and a hope, more than an average real capacity.

Resultado de imagen de germany military power ww2

At the first times after the Bolshevik revolution, even directed by the young theorist of the deep maneuver, general Mikhail Tujachevski, the Russian armies remembered «slow and exhausting hordes» in their marches. That were living for the sustenance from the own or strangly territory where they were advancing. The men more relatively educated, always scanty, were enlisted in the technical weapons: artillery, engineers, aviation. Or in the most effective and necessary branches for the penetration and the exploitation of the enemy operational rear: tanks, Guard infantry.

Finally, Shimon Naveh concentrates his efforts, summary and praises in the long process of development of the American AirLand Battle doctrine and his following updates. Whose kindness and efficiency got reality in the air and ground offensive against the Iraqi regime in the War of the Gulf of 1991, looking for the liberation of Kuwait from the power of Saddam Hussein. War that was the touchstone of that doctrine supposedly culminada.

Initiated the ground offensive, the American forces and his allies rapidity faced to practically all the Iraqi forces that were occupying and defending Kuwait. From the Persian Gulf operated the naval forces, that threatening with an amphibious disembarkation on the narrow coasts of the emirate. From the south, the American marines took charge in fixing the Iraqi forces of the south flank of the defense. Confirming this way, for the Iraqis, that the assault front of the allies would be the south and east.

Resultado de imagen de soviet polish war THE SOVIET POLISH WAR OF 1920.

But, at the south of Iraq / Kuwait, the bulk of the Allies mechanized forces penetrated in whirlwind along the western front of the Iraqi deployment, blind and static. Immediately afterwards to be divided this allied deployment in several advance spears, over all the Iraqi units of this flank.

The campaign was a great atrition operation: of the strongest against the strong, for the major technological means and capacities of the Allies. Where a simultaneous assault was looked, to the Soviet style, to all the steps of the enemy order of battle and in the depth of his defensive rigid deployment. In the south of this one there existed armored or motorized Iraqi divisions, ready to counter-attack any allied penetration. Towards the center and north, there was the thickness of the Republican Guard, ready to counter-attack any operational Allied action.

Where a simultaneous attack was looked for, of the Soviet style, to all the levels of the enemy order of battle and in the depth of his defensive rigid deployment. In the south of this existed armored or motorized Iraqi divisions, ready to counter-attack any Allied penetration. Towards the center and north, was the bulk of the Republican Guard, ready to counter-attack any Allied operational action.

The concentrations, maneuvers and actions neither were searching, nor had, a gravity center of the efforts. That was successively defined and applied as the campaign was developing. But, using the already mentioned advantages, the allied forces were seeking to fix and crush the enemy units at their range, by a direct and almost joint form. Creating really this way, a battle of encircle and annihilation, of the family of Cannas and Tannenberg, where the liquidation of the siege was done by parts and was uniformly accelerated in the time.

Resultado de imagen de soviet polish war SWEEPING THE RUSSIAN HORDES.

The Iraqi divisions at the east were submitted to the central and direct control of Saddam Hussein and his Central Staff. That depriving them of initiative, flexibility and freedom of action. If not, some Allies’s corps or divisions could have been put in difficulties by the action of some great Iraqi unit. After the beginning of the ground attack and having the Allies the air supremacy in the campaign, the Iraqis were deprived of the operational exploration. So, the surrounding maneuver of the Allies by the east and towards their rearward, was concealed to them.

The operational Strategy in the Irregular War.

Naveh, nevertheless, does not approach, far from it penetrates and analyzes, a type of war that already existed from a lot of time ago. Before the genesis and ripeness of the American operational strategy. And that is the guerrilla warfare, word taken from the Spanish by all the languages. The one that, pompously, the Anglo-Saxons called war of IVth generation. Though it is almost as ancient as the human conflict. The modern technological armies find difficulties to face this form of fight. Using the means, the doctrine and his regulations, the order of battle and the trainings with which they are provided.

The guerrilla war is synonymous of long and deeply rooted conflict in the civil society, where it appears and develops. It is of low military intensity, except in its last stage (if she reaches it) and of great ideological politicization and polarization of the rivals. These characteristics do that inevitably the civilians are involved in her and that the military conflict is arbitrary, hard and cruel. There face positions and antagonistic interests, which, in the use of the violence, derive towards her limits and that of the suffering of whom involve her.

The author might speak about the application of the operational strategy in the guerrilla warfare. Or used in the direction and the operations of the elite units (marines, rangers, SEALs, etc.), that realize counterinsurgency missions. Here, the gravit centers of the efforts, globally coordinated, include the economic, military, political and social areas. And will exist in these fields and will be applied in a harmonic, joint and coordinated way. Working for a common and convergent effort, using different combinations of means in the different cases that appear.

A central counterinsurgency command will exist, that must bring together and direct the efforts, means and actions. In agreement with the specialization of the means that act and the actions and the aims that are looked for in each of the mentioned levels or fields of action. A characteristic of the acts and their effects is that they must be convergent. Looking for the multiplication and increase of these and the synergy of the first ones. This way, in any action, from a level of forces, budget or looked for results, will act the Counterinsurgency Command.

As examples, in the military area will be gravity centers the semipermanent bases, the communications between the bands and with the countrymen, including the logistics, and the movements of the rebels groups. The static defense will be kept in the centers and means necessary for the effort of war. Others will have to defend by a system of garrisons for the defense of the territory. That will be supported by a military system of mobile patrols and of reconnaissance and of ground attack aviation. The special units will realize deep incursions of attack, exploration and harassment in the areas in dispute with the guerrillas or in power of these.

The Will of Defense of a Society.

And the Strategy, the Operational Strategy and the Tactics, as Levels of its Military Actuation

The Ideology or Concept and its Range.

The “will of defense” of a nation is its capacity to cause, create, develop and maintain defense forces. The strength of the defense forces, in turn, rely on the necessary support of the economy of the country and the diplomacy of the state. The will of defense is an expression of the will of being and the vital capacity, even biological, of a society. This concept overcomes and perfects the so called hybrid war or of V generation. That implies and supposes the employment of all his «orthodox and heterodox means of intervention» by the social belligerent group.

IMPRECISE ALLEGORY OF THE FIFTH GENERATION WAR.

As the term implies, will of defense is healthy, normal and sufficient when defense forces and the strength of the country’s economy and the quality of state leadership and diplomacy are proportional and adapted to the political objectives of society. These must also be adequate to the possible threats that the country may have to oppose, both within and out the country, within its geopolitical region or other sources of threat. This capacity and its performance in different situations stems from a correct “national moral”.

The will of defense is shaped normally in the Armed Forces, in its capacity of specific instruments of the defense function. The resources of the Armed Forces include the human resources, psychological and intellectual resources and material resources. The basis for the will of defense, the source from which these resources flow is the society itself.

At the level of human resources, troops must have suitable training, the combat readiness and a certain esprit de corps. Human resources are shaped by doctrine, military direction and military moral. So, they can carry out the military operations withstanding the effort and the wear of them, while maintaining their conviction in the missions to which they are assigned.

Materials resources must support the military theory of the Armed Forces and have the necessary technological sophistication to serve the military’s objectives. They include the weapon systems and all the military hardware. All of these resources flow from a society that provides, maintains and nourishes them.

Which is operational about this natural phenomenon of the society’s capacity of defense?

In a modern society, the chain of transmission of the popular will to the Armed Forces, passes through a series of intermediate sociological gears of authorities and institutions. In them, crystallize and fulfill the popular will, albeit with all the shades, errors and deviations, derived from the degree of imperfection of society’s institutional system and of some authorities.

CHINESE INTERCONTINENTAL DF-41 MISSILES.

This implies that a direct military attack on the civil populace, does not debilitate the will of defense already shaped within its Armed Forces. So, military action is better focused on undermining the will of defense of the enemy armies, not on the society from which it springs.

To do this, the immediate goal would be the enemy’s Armed Forces, followed by the political system of the enemy’s country including its political objectives, plans, and alliances, as well as its military and auxiliary industries. Only finally would the focus of attack or pressure be on civilians of the enemy country.

The civil population, which is not intrinsically organized but is dominated by the ideological and institutional apparatus of the state, is capable of absorbing tremendous military blows. Examples of this are the bombing raids that Germany and North Vietnam endured for years. Ultimately, only the invasion of Germany forced its surrender. There is also the case of Iraq which was submitted to a kind of military siege in which its people were impoverished. Still, the Iraqi regime was even stronger than at the end of the allied invasion in the winter of l991, having suppressed internal opposition from Shiites and Kurds and having attracted the support or admiration of its resistance in the Arab world. Despite the first war against Iraq and the following siege, Iraqi’s did not rise against their political institutions and the content and expression of Iraq’s national will of defense was not altered. In the most radical case of a nuclear war, great civilian losses would occur initially, yet if the Armed Forces remained relatively intact due to defensive deployment and protection measures, it could prolong the defense of its country and even win.

This brings us to time as the environment in which the will of defense is expressed, and whose “effective factor” is “national moral”.

In effect, the will of defense is constructed in the time. And to destroy it requires actions within time. Those engaged in insurrection come to understand this point well. That a prolonged war directed at the source of the will of defense, the country’s people, will in effect attack the country’s national moral.

The National Moral, source of the Will of Defense.

The “national moral” is the collective conviction of how best to live by following historically-proven trends of peace, progress, own satisfaction, service and justice. This certainty is assumed by a society as its own vision, or conception of its destiny.

When individuals or groups do not subscribe this vision, or when they pervert it, the quality of national moral can deteriorates and often produces messianism. But, without illusion and enthusiasm, societies cannot achieve or create beneficial enterprises. Enthusiasm is a force of spirit, which conquers moral and ideological entropy (that is inevitably generated in societies), enlightened by a «reasonable illusion«.

THE DOCTRINE OF XI JINPING «illuminating» Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. IT WAS INCLUDED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. ONLY MAO AND DENG XIAOPING DESERVED SUCH AN HONOR.

When leaders also are in tune with the right social trend, and with the wishes of their people, a moral community is established between leaders and their people, that harmonizes and promotes national and social feelings. This process is the origin and creator of the national moral of societies and is at a different qualitative level than that of purely biased, ethnically-based or group-based interests.

There is an ideological creation from the people and to the people, which reason is that it most be in favor the people. Still, this process remains subject to deviations and historical aberrations.

The process of creating the national moral are positive when leaders act collectively with honesty and inspire their people to follow «correct ways» of living, within all the possible ways of living available to them. This implies and demands a certain ideological control on the part of the state’s leadership, which is one of its main functions. Abuses of this responsibility are best represented by Hitler’s Minister of Propaganda, Mr. Goebbels; the political deputies and the party structure for the proletarian dictatorship with Stalin, etc.

The natural organs for forming and transmitting the “national moral” are far removed from official propaganda offices. The reason is that the natural organs that generate national moral are found in the nuclei of society’s collective action and in its natural and institutional leaders. That is to say, the spaces in which national moral is created are homes, schools, churches, political parties, unions, working centers, and associations in general, etc.

After the battle of England, Churchill said that the future generations would say that «that one was our more glorious hour». This was possible thanks to an unbreakable social discipline, which was not ensuing from the study of manuals of civic education, but of the follow-up of a model spread by infinity of personal testimonies. The diffusion of the moral model of the citizen owed in a great extent to the educational labor of the Anglican Church.

The own Montesquieu admitted that the republican virtues only existed in the tales of the antiquity. This way, they were attractive to a leader minority, but his adoption by the citizens could not be done by legal or constitutional mandate. The moral theoretically proposed values, were seen as something artificial and remote. Without real connection with a practical and known moral code, highlighted with alive examples that could be follow.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The modern Hybrid Warfare. 2nd Part.

The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

(CONTINUATION)

The abuses against the civil population are always counter-productive in a counterinsurgency struggle and more in an internal revolt. Sometimes, the hurries to form new troops lead to a deficient or incomplete training of these. They are not vaccinated against the stress, specially here the mental one, nor against the frustration of the not fulfilled plans or of the enemy ungrateful surprises. This leads to discharge almost inevitably the anger and the enervating impotence in the civil population, intermingled voluntary or by force with the rebels.

Russians in Syria. First, they devastate and then his infantry advances to sweep away and occupy. The Syrian civil dead do not matter for them.

With embarrassing frequency, when the human or technological «sensors» of Russia, Arabia Saudi or the West countries detect some probable activity from Iraqi, Syrian, Huttis or Zaidies rebels or the foreign “muyahidin”, first they devastate the building, the «block», the zone. Then they go to sweep up and to do the «body count», for their statistics. Sometimes, among the rubbles, they can get the corpses of an Arabic innocent and numerous family. They abuses of the attrition, which is indiscriminate and perverse when the enemy fuses with the civil people. They neglect the unexpected active patrolling, which needs proportionally less material and human means, but more trade, moral courage, freedom of action and creativity in the low and intermediate commands and NCO and in the men.

A necessary complement of the regular net are the false rebels bands. These would be destined to operate in zones inclined to the insurgency, from where some of their members come from. Their activity and concealment would be favored by the decentralized character of the rebel groups. Their missions would be to obtain information, to prove the loyalty of the civil ones and to annihilate small enemy groups or lone suicidal terrorists. They should not be bigger than a reinforced squad or section, except in combat special occasions.ç

Two disembarkation vessels of the Black Sea’s Russian Fleet load troops for Tartus’s Syrian port. «To defend the national Russian interests in Syria».

There were prominent the practices of counter insurgency of the Portuguese in his immense colonies of Africa, between some of which there were a distance of 3 thousand Km. Raising great logistic problems like for a small nation, which was not possessing excessive resources or friends. It was important the politics of «national integration» (with mottoes as «Portugal is not an European nation» or «It is not a small nation»; «Portugal is a big multicultural nation»). And that was practiced by the Portuguese troops, on the basis of the respect the population, the lack of unnecessary or necessary not explained reprisals and the improvement or the development of the autochthonous civil population. Counting with the «economic, of education, of civil engineering, logistic means» available, always loins and in penury. That is to say, the Portuguese «means of intervention» were acting together in an operational «mix». Done in accordance with his capacities and the functions and national aims of this Hybrid War, directed by a central coordinating command.

But, the population understood the politics of «sincere approximation» and it reasonably helped the Portuguese troops to isolate and border on the «irregular bands» of the different rebel movements in the most distant or inhospitable regions of the different countries. That could not gain the battle for «the hearts and the minds» of the Angolans and other peoples.

Column of Portuguese troops on the verge of continuing the march.

This made a «impasse», a dead point, in the military development of the colonial classic «guerrilla wars». The rebels bands could not create stable «guerrilla bases». That could allowing them to have a cozy rear and a permanent and sure refuge. And to indoctrinate, to grow and fortify and to spread over the different regions of each country. Depriving the military enemy, little by little, of the domain over the native and their lands. And the Portuguese could not surround and annihilate the guerrillas placed in the remote zones of the territories. Which simply slipped and changed of sure location.

The first that saw this perspective of his future were the Africanists and the metropolis officials. And this led, finally, to the «revolution of the carnations» of April 25, 1974, to the overthrow of the Marcelo Caetano’s corporate salazarist regime and to the decolonization of Portugal. For whom the long wars meant an intolerable bleeding of humans and materials resources, in the perspective of an indefinite stagnation.

But, when the colonial independence came (Angola, Guinea and Mozambique), as consequence of this point of balance reached, the valid speakers to negotiate it with the Portuguese were relatively not much, badly prepared and with a weak and superficial organization, which was not supported without the foreign «socialist» help.

The diplomatic Warfare, the normal and the heterodox.

One of the «means of intervention» of a world or regional power to obtain his «national and strategic aims» are the «Foreign Relations«. That has a concept qualitatively more extensive than the Diplomacy. This refers to the State or government affairs, that treat 2 or more nations (alliances). And the diplomatic «function» is to negotiate by the political way what communicates to him his State. department or secretary. Asking and receiving successive instructions, if it was necessary, to support and continue the negotiation. And being kept or not in his execution and protocol relations, within the qualities of discretion, prudence and tact that characterize his trade.

The international Diplomacy gets entangled.

The Foreign Relations also include other relations and more heterodox actions. That is necessary to look for, to keep and to support in the exterior to obtain our national aims. This way, a function of the foreign relations is to appear for it, new opportunities and more secondary ways or routes and «means of intervention«. The Foreign Relations collaborate directly, since always it has been done, using the means and the in force national strategy, with the Intelligence, the Economy and the national Armed Forces. That is to say, acting together in a «mix» of functions and means of intervention, the war always has been Hybrid from the Prehistory. Creating new opportunities and ways, to apply and use the whole creative and potential capacity of the State, to achieve his strategic and operational aims.

A succinct example between thousands of situations. The «central operational command of combined war» can request to Foreign Relations the search of dissident or domestic enemy in a potential enemy country. Located one o more of these, there are valued his capacities, circumstances, implantation and operational possibilities. This way, FF. RR. would present a report to the central command in the shape of a «founded resolution”, involving in it. That is, valuing schematically the existing cases and being decided by one or two, depending on his qualities and our general or punctual convenience.

Prince Klemens Wenzel Metternich (1773-1859). As diplomat was more important in his achievements, that Napoleon in his wars.

These dissidents or enemies will be politicians or also armed rebels. In the first case, our nation might grant to them asylum, scholarships, economic support and advice to his groups. In the second one, in a phase of major confrontation, we could also send supply and armaments, advisers and trainers and «special operations» or of «foreign volunteers» units, to support and/or reinforce them in his insurgents activities.

The Propaganda as a «mean of intervention«.

At the beginning of the 16th century the «reformists and heretical» ideas of the priest Martin Luther propagated in the center and north of Europe, with the help of the press. The origin of the word propaganda arises during the Counter Reformation. It is a reference to the spread of the catholic faith. With the Jesuits in the forefront of this task of catechizing. Facing to the deviations from the preexisting orthodoxy, taught by the Lutherans, Huguenots, Calvinists, Erasmists, etc. Today, the Propaganda Fide is the Vatican Catholic Congregation for the Evangelization of the Peoples.

It is not up to the I World war when the term acquires a negative or pejorative significance. It originates in the popular indignation towards the systematic efforts of the belligerent powers in that one, to manipulate in his favor the ideas and, with it, the attitudes of all, the neutral, enemies and its own population. This might be the certain modern origin of the “false news«, tendentious, insidious, sectarian, equivocal… That the Spanish-speaking snobs name «fake news» now .

This way, in the 30s of last century, the propaganda «of war» or «national» evoked in the majority of the persons the vision of malevolent forces, which were supposed strange and alienating, trying to wash their brains. The need arisen with the outbreak of the World War II, to cooperate to the effort of total war with all the available means, in an imposed conflict that was threatening the survival of the democracies, and the new advance in the sociological and psychological fields during the period between the wars, they will go progressively and firmly to the acceptance by the Western nations and his Armed Forces of the application of the psychological warfare.

The Roman Palace of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide.

The propaganda always handles basic, essential information, that are easy and simple by definition. This is due to the fact that his «aim» (the «target») is always large and numerous: the population of a certain country or region, or a religious, economic, racial or socially different extensive group. They are those that it is necessary to inform, convince and, according with the cases, to protect.

The National Economy as a «mean of intervention».

The Economy is an important and classic “mean of intervention» of the State and of the Nation. It means and involves in the effort of war the capacity of obtaining and producing all kinds of goods and services, intermediates and finals, that the technologies and processes in effect in each stage are capable of get and obtain.

Reagan and Gorbachev.

The Economy is tied here directly with the applied, specific education, of the skilled workforce, who is needed and could be achieved in a nation. The own aptitude to obtain goods or services (even with tourism, raw materials, trade) appetizing to other nations or social groups, will serve for the direct exchange or for barter of the goods and services in which a society is showing a deficit. As an example, energy or specifically qualified workforce.

Also, in cases of need and usefulness, a nation can decide to assign more productive resources to the production of a certain good. But, all more it is required specialization in the production, the performances, both neat and economic (as cost of them) will be minor. By virtue of the laws of the diminishing performance and of the increasing costs that suffer these «specialized reconverted productive processes«.

It is very easy to use the cement in producing military goods of static defense (bunkers, defensive armed lines) and not to raise buildings with it; it is relatively easy to convert the industrial vehicles factories of into armored vehicles plants. And it is very difficult to obtain great performances from a dairy changed in an arms plant.

It is evident that all this process of restructuring the capacity of production of a nation, will require the control by a political determined and firm command. And the confirmation and the support of a temporal laws of war, which decide and support it firmly. Approved by a sufficient majority of the Legislative Power.

Paradigmatic is the example of the USA and the Soviet Union, of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, in the decade of the 80 in the 20th century. The armament career that imposed the first nation collapsed the economy of the second one. That could not continue, with his economic capacity without competition (in the productive capital), nor incentives (to the workforce), the pace to which it was forcing to produce the goods and planned services. And a whole economic social politics system, as the “real socialism”, implosion and ruined. Taking with him, in a few years, the whole political military framework mounted by Moscow. In order that it was his influence sphere, his western tampons «defense» and his political social empire, after the World War II. Years later, a Soviet ex-diplomat opened his heart: «we did not have even to eat…»

The Cybernetic War, a characteristic “mean” of the modern Hybrid War.

A «mean of intervention» against the enemies or to change or to influence wills, which was not known, for unthinkable, until a few years ago, is The Cybernetic War.

The cybernetic attacks can go to the software or the hardware of the personal IT, managerial or institutional systems. The software is the «logical support» of an IT system, which makes possible the accomplishment of the different tasks. This «logical support» includes the operating system and the applications or IT programs that those realize. The hardware is the machinery or the set of physical components of the computer. This way, summarizing, the software generates instructions that are executed by the hardware or physical support of the system.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The modern Hybrid Warfare.

The Multifunctional, Total or Multisubject Wars.

The modern Warfare.

Till now, the wars were making between big and small «nations». They were the only capable of generating a «will of defense». This made concrete in the Armed Forces and in the economy, the diplomacy and the people support of their societies. Looking for the defense of their strategic and national interests and their survival. A procedure or protocol existed for the war declaration and for the signature of the peace agreement. The one that was not respecting the honor procedure was considered to be infamous. And if he was turning out to be defeated, could wait for a severe punishment. President Roosevelt, on Monday, the 8th of December, 1941, at 12:30 pm. hour of Washington, in his speech before the American Congress assembled in Joint Session, and transmitted by radio to the nation, was declaring: «Yesterday was a day marked by the infamy…I request you declare the existence of a State of War between the United States of America and Germany, Italy, the Japanese Empire and all their Allies». And at the end were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Resultado de imagen de george clemenceau

The contemporary wars lasted a few years. After which, exhausted the industrial capacity and the will of defense of the defeated nations, not necessarily invaded or occupied, these were accepting their defeat and the peace was signed. When the armistice or the peace conditions were too leonine and humiliating, they were originating new vital defense «impulses or take-offs» in the defeated people. Seeking to overcome and avenge the received damages and offenses. Those were the sure germ of a future war within a generation, measured in around 25 years. Just remember the treaty of Versailles or «Diktat» against Germany, signed on June 29, 1919, promoted by Georges Clemenceau, called the Tiger. Whose last payments referred to interests of the already liquidated principal debt, the reunified Germany has just done at the end of September, 2010, approximately 90 years after accepted.

The threat of the use of the atomic weapon in the war between the industrial powers, removed indefinitely the historical and recurrent danger of a war of interests of any class between them. The civil and military leaders of all of them, have exhibited throughout more than 65 years an exquisite tact, supported by the nationals diplomacy and economy, in the international relations and in the resolution of the raised conflicts. No «minor» relative question was deserving to assume the risk of an uncertain, costly nuclear warfare and without clear «victors». In any case, the big hegemonic powers or the principal ones in a strategic zone, were solving regionally his ideological and of interests fighting. And they were doing it by means of regionally limited sectoral wars.

Resultado de imagen de cuba en etiopía Cuban «internationalists» Forces supporting Ethiopia against Somalia in 1977.

Where were fighting their partners and like-minded, local, not atomic and subsidiary nations, even out of their strategic natural zone. There we have the case of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, after the decolonization of the first one. Also the fight in the Horn of Africa between Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Ethiopia, Cuba and Siad Barre’s Somalia. The latter’s overthrow, after his defeat in the war for getting the Ogaden Desert in 1991, precipitated Somalia in the chaos in which still is. And we have the Israel and the Arabic bordering countries case, which threaten her from time to time with her elimination and with throwing to the sea the surviving Jews.

The modern communications have rushed, marking character, into the contemporary wars: the wireless or waves of wide spectrum; the road networks and the diverse engine vehicles. A special challenge, which appears in all the coercive conflicts, not necessarily armed in all his phases, is the so called cybernetic war. Made concrete in the attacks to the «enemy» across the universal wireless communications network. These aggression are capable of penetrating the first and second levels of security lines, most known or common. And to commit an outrage against the databases and the processes of the normal computers of companies, individuals and institutions. Until a few years ago, only the developed states had access to this vanguard technology. And this also connects the 3th and 4th generations wars: the employment of the cyberattacks is not already only in hands of the big powers. As example, driving mad the computers of the hostile plants of enrichment of the uranium 235. Today, small nations and groups of fanned rebels or of conceited little rascals, with certain knowledge and lean resources, can realize successfully cybernetic assaults at certain level.

Resultado de imagen de guerra guerrillas Vietnam North Vietnameses regular Forces equiped with Soviet design’s PPSh-41 sub machineguns.

In the last decades, the wars are showing in very asymmetric levels of means and efforts confronted. So much is so, that the Americans call them wars of 4th generation or asymmetric wars. But they are nothing more than the old guerrilla wars of the History. And, often also, of national liberation. Let’s not forget that always the rebel and insolent enemy is despised. He is judged by the laws of armed sedition and attack against the National Security. From May, 1808 Napoleon so had in consideration the Spanish. Or the European powers to the nascent nations in Africa and Asia, after the World War II, from Algeria up to Indonesia, passing to Angola (the Portuguese were saying that she was a national province) and Vietnam.

Birth and Situation of The Hybrid Warfare.

The First Generation of wars would be marked by the development and consolidation of the State concept. The wars of The Second Generation would be characterized by the commitment of the societies in the Cause or the Mother land. His model is the French Revolution; there appear the manufacturer and transport revolutions, which made possible the extension of the operations theater, not so much the maneuvers speed, and they extended the spectrum of the objectives. In them were used literally armies of masses, where the shock had great importance and independently that the cavalry or the infantry was the principal weapon. In the wars of Third Generation, at the end of the 19th century and in the 20th, the modern technology supports and modifies the actions. And the factor that contributes to the definition of the wars of Fourth generation is the globalization and the return to the man as decisive actor.

Resultado de imagen de guerra guerrillas Afganistan contra URSS The Soviet tanks fight against an evasive and fleeting irregular enemy in Afghanistan. Who will win?

Russian Now, closing the historical and definer curl, the wars of V generation are called hybrid or multi functional wars, which, really, always have existed. With the major or minor participation of each one of the «available means of intervention» (Foreign Relations, regular and irregular Armed Forces, Economy, Cybernetics, etc) in the social group, to obtain the «functions of intervention» search for. Forming a “means” mix, adapted to all situations and confrontation theaters.

Not for nominating nowadays with an exotic and new word, preferably foreign, one makes this way a «mean or a function of intervention» fresh and promising. The problem is that the ignorance of the history, still the recent one, impoverishes the new concepts, ideas and situations of conflict. Without winning in application, efficiency and cognitive capacity with it. With this, only it falls or repeats the previous history, returning to learn it. And that, as in a spiral screw, only changes the phenomenon temporal «plane of execution«. Where are kept safe and now partly secret, the different «essential parameters» of the phenomena of the conflicts and fights.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet «experience» of fight against the insurgency between December, 1979 and January, 1989, as invading and oppressive military force, supporting a regime of his orbit, turned out to be a complete disaster for the U.S.S.R., on not having obtained any of his strategic or national aims. But, in Syria, the insurgents were settling themselves and controlling some nearly definite territories. And they were defending them well until the year 2016, after the intervention of Russia…

And the Russians from his successful, but very short experience there, praise nowadays the employment of a «center of coordinating control» in each operations theater. That would be entrusted to coordinate, in a convergent and global effort, the specific means at the disposal of the command of the theater. Every «mean of intervention» will be specialized here depending on the tasks to completing.

Resultado de imagen de rusia guerra de siria Russian Forces fight in Syria in support of al-Assad’s regime.

The tasks to coordinate in the theater, to stimulate the policies adapted to the interests of Russia and to the coexistence and the peace, would be: of military ordinary or special character and of advice; diplomatics; of cooperation with civil administrations and governmental forces or others present; of reconstruction and support of the population. Here would intervene the diplomats, civil engineers, technical personnel of administration, educators, units of rural policemen, economic advisers and sociologists. Forming mixed «functional packages» to integrate in the » coordinating center » of intervention and collaboration.

To all that the Russians call the Valery Guerasimov’s doctrine. Though it is not more than a collection of policies, trends and actions of before and now.

The military forces will be destined to the regular operations of assault and defense. Included the custody of sensitive aims, so much personal and industrial groups, as of structure and infrastructure; the establishment and defense of control positions, both fixed and itinerant; the assault to the bases, concentrations and movements of important enemy forces; the combat and/or recognnoissance patrolling that covers the territory in hands or threatened by the irregulars and the occupation of enemy taken positions.

The American multi subject doctrine is contained in the concept, the regulations and the updates of the Modern Air Land Battle. And they apply in his politics and actions the same «means of intervention» that all the great powers. The general James Mattis, Secretary of Defense until Thursday, the 20th of December, 2018, in which it was fulfilled the glass of his discrepancies with Trump. For his not consulted order of retreat of the contingent of 2 thousand American soldiers in Syria.

Mattis explained in his letter of resignation, in a condensed, easy and deep way the ideas of the Pentagon on the hybrid or multifunctional war. In order that Trump could understand it. «Our strength is joined to the strength of our system of alliances. And, in similar form, we must be unequivocal and decisive with the countries which interests and trends are opposite or are in tension with ours«.

Resultado de imagen de seal navy The SEALs.

Almost all the «means of intervention» of the State, used to obtain his national aims, already were present in the panoply of means at his disposition, a long before this new name of the Hybrid War. The «functions of intervention» were developed by «means» adapted to the real possibilities of his epoch. And they were obtaining the looked aims, though they were very specific. There we have the actions of the SAS (Special Air Service) as «special forces of punctual intervention with limited objectives” in the enemy rearguard. Fighting against this one and to support and help the local «forces of resistance to the occupant». In the USA we have to the SEALs, the Rangers, the Delta force and the Special Forces, among others. In Germany is the GSG 9 group. In Australia and New Zealand they have the same name that the British corps.

The strategic and tactical needs of the war and the functions of the «means of intervention» are slightly variable. And his variability is a function of the improvements in general training, scope, speed, capacity of shock and fire on the enemy, communications between «means», protection of these, etc. That offer the successive technologies applicable to the «means».

And all the colonial metropolis, fighting in the wars of liberation raised after the World War II, developed with variables degree and fortune, methods and policies of civil development, of link the overseas natives to the nation, of «gaining the hearts and the minds» of the autochthonous population.

The Guerrillas Wars.

The pompously so called fourth generation wars are the counterinsurgency wars or guerrilla warfare or irregular wars or armed revolts or liberation wars or organized banditry, which always have existed, coexisting with the conventional variants of warfare. They are those that the USA has lost or not gained lately: Vietnam, The Lebanon (peace disembarkation of “marines”, then demolished in their barrack) and Somalia (the uncontrollable and unforeseeable wasp’s nest of «all against all» by the local lords of the war and the Islamic militias). They are uneven wars (they call them now «asymmetrical warfare») against an enemy of lower technological military level, relative to the regular enemy forces, always rooted in the own or occupied civil population and slight militarily intense but very extensive in the space and the time.

The wars against the armed irregular are by its Nature long, painful and difficult. Its prolong character originates from the need that a popular force, departing almost from nothing, develops and spreads. Managing to moral or militarily defeat a regular own or of occupation army. The difficulty and the cruel evil arise from the high civil component that takes part in them. They are wars located in the home courtyard, in the own or occupied rear.

It is necessary, therefore, to avoid the prolongation of the conflict, which is mining the conviction of the own forces and allowing that the enemy should spread, strengthen and prevail.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

News on Modern Conflicts. Novedades en Conflictos Modernos.

Utilizamos esta Sección de Novedades para dar a conocer en avance los próximos artículos que irán apareciendo en las distintas «categorías» de temas de esta página, dedicada a los conflictos y crisis modernos.

ACTION INTERFACES as Zones of TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT against the Enemy.

The action interface is a spatial concept that defines the zone and space where we develop violent action against the enemy and his means, following tactical criteria adapted to the nature of our objectives. The effective action factor in the action interfaces is the combined arms or inter-arms system.

In a penetrating attack, for example, the surface of the interfaces is quantitatively limited and these are selected in the enemy’s depth, according to their critical points and those that hinder the advance of our forces, for example, observatories and anti-tank firing points. In defense, we quantitatively increase the potential interfaces in our depth and in a somewhat laminar way.

The interface is what makes tactical action and the destruction of the enemy possible, applying a pure, chosen, selective and favorable attrition. The absence of interfaces, on the contrary, gives a certain security to any force. With the presence of the enemy, even close by, being a threat.

Terrorismo, Guerrillas y Violencia

El Terrorismo es una compleja operación Política y Violenta de amplia Variedad de acciones. Sus acciones violentas deben ser deliberadas, Continuas o Sistemáticas y buscando Influenciar a una amplia audiencia (mucho mayor que los afectados Directamente por dichas acciones violentas) y generando miedo, hasta miedo insuperable, en dicha “población blanco u objetivo”. Para que realicen y tomen las actitudes y acciones que los terroristas buscan.

Así, una acción aislada o sin interés político no es terrorismo. Será vandalismo,odio vesánico, brote psicótico… pero no es, ni será técnica o jurídicamente terrorismo.

Terrorism, Guerrillas and Violence

Terrorism is a complex Political and Violent operation with a wide Variety of actions. Their violent actions must be deliberate, Continuous or Systematic and seeking to Influence a wide audience (much larger than those directly affected by the violent actions) and generating fear, even insurmountable fear, in the “target or target population.” So that they carry out and take the attitudes and actions that the terrorists seek.

Thus, an isolated action or one without political interest is not terrorism. It will be vandalism, mad hatred, a psychotic break… but it is not, nor will it be, technically or legally, terrorism.

Inteligencia militar y nacional, fallos y resultados.

Los servicios de inteligencia de los grandes países suelen acertar muchas veces en sus opiniones y pronósticos.

Los trabajos concretos de inteligencia a los que se dedican unos pocos agentes modernos, suelen terminar con un éxito parcial o total.

Los trabajos complejos con ramificaciones y desarrollos, que esconden un futuro estimable, pero, no seguro, fallan estrepitosamente. Por esta particularidad compleja y futurible. Y, porque la capacidad de observar y medir un parámetro del alma humana es algo inaprensible, dudoso e incómodo. Seguidamente veremos varios casos concretos.

Las razones para que se produzca la divergencia de aciertos entre los casos singulares y la proyección al futuro (solución prevista) de los asuntos complejos, trascendentes al tiempo, están en parte en la dificultad de su concepción, el riesgo que se corre en aventurar y en la exposición no contrastada a los mandos. Evidentemente, existe aquí una dialéctica entre el ocultamiento realizado y el proceso cognitivo e intuitivo de su imaginación, desarrollo y proyección (solución estimada).

Military and National Intelligence, failures and results.

The intelligence services of large countries are often correct in their opinions and forecasts.

The specific intelligence tasks to which a few modern agents are dedicated usually end with partial or total success.

Complex works with ramifications and developments, which hide an estimable but not certain future, fail miserably. Because of this complex and future peculiarity. And, because the ability to observe and measure a parameter of the human soul is something elusive, doubtful and uncomfortable. Next we will see several specific cases.

The reasons for the divergence of successes between singular cases and the projection into the future (foreseen solution) of complex issues, transcending time, are partly in the difficulty of their conception, in the risk that is run in venturing and in the non contrasted exposure to the commands. Obviously, there is a dialectic here between the concealment carried out and the cognitive and intuitive process of its imagination, development and projection (estimated solution).

HAMAS ATACA A ISRAEL EN 2023.

Los distintos atacantes llevaron a cabo un “ataque de enjambre” sobre posiciones en el centro y sur de Israel. Varios, de los principios o normas de las fuerzas militares en un ataque convencional fueron desatendidos. Por ejemplo, la unidad del objetivo y la unidad del mando de las fuerzas y el mantenimiento de una estructura, de un despliegue para todas las fuerzas atacantes. Aquí, cada pequeña “unidad de acción” islamista tenía su propio jefe y su particular objetivo. Y, es el conjunto de acciones del “enjambre atacante” el que define la estrategia y el complejo objetivo real de Hamas.

LA GUERRA DE MANIOBRAS. EL CONCEPTO DE LA BATALLA AÉREO TERRESTRE MODERNA. UNA INTERPRETACIÓN DEL MARISCAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

Un ejemplo poco conocido de la trascendencia omnipresente de la logística y de su línea de comunicación (más o menos ramificada) en las operaciones y muy importante por sus resultados finales, es la operación denominada DONBASS (la gran zona operativa) por los soviéticos, desarrollada entre el 29 de enero y mediados de marzo de 1943, al sudoeste del río Donetz. Ella forma parte de lo que los alemanes llamaron la batalla del DONETZ: el último éxito estratégico de Von Manstein, que fue malogrado por Hitler en Kursk.

THE MANEUVER WARFARE. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODERN AIRLAND BATTLE. AN INTERPRETATION BY FIELDMARSCHAL ERICH VON MANSTEIN.

A little known example illustrates the omnipresent transcendence of logistics and the line of communication (more or less branched out) in operations and their final results. Between January 29 and mid-March 1943, the Soviets developed an operation called Donbass at the southwest of the Donetz. This operation forms part of what the Germans called the battle of the Donetz. And was Marschal von Manstein’s last strategic success. Which wasted by Hitler in Kursk.

Valery Gerasimov, comandante militar ruso en Ucrania.

Con todas las derrotas acumuladas padecidas por el Ejército de la Federación rusa en su “operación militar especial” en Ucrania desde el 24 de febrero de 2022 hasta ahora, Vladimiro Putin no descansa, se irrita y no tiene paz.

Su último “as en la manga” es el general de ejército Valery Gerasimov, nacido en la ciudad rusa de Kazan, hace 67 años y jefe del Estado Mayor General desde 2012.

Una edad casi ideal para el trabajo que se le viene encima. Definido por organización, cambios estructurales, disciplina, flujo suficiente de medios y mano dura.

Valery Gerasimov, Russian military commander in Ukraine.

With all the accumulated defeats suffered by the Army of the Russian Federation in its «special military operation» in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 until now, Vladimir Putin does not rest, he is irritated and has no peace.

LA PSICOLOGÍA DE LOS TERRORISTAS ISLAMISTAS

La civilización y sus estructuras vital y social en sus interacciones con los individuos y su psicología.

El fallo de los yihadistas en integrarse en un «grupo con creencias y virtudes (los valores permanentes) compartidos». Que le den identidad, sentido y pertenencia a sus vidas.

¿Por qué se comportan así? ¿Cómo tratar a los recuperables? ¿Cómo combatir a los vitandos o recalcitrantes?

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIST TERRORISTS

The civilization and his vital and social structures , in his interactions with the individuals and their psychology.

The failure of the jihadists in joining a «group with shared beliefs and virtues» (the permanent values). That give to their lives identity, sense and belonging.

Why do they behave this way? How to treat the recoverable ones? How to attack the hatefuls or recalcitrant terroris

THE PERSECUTIONS TO THE MODERN CHRISTIANS.

There is taking place in the last months a real «planetary conjunction». It is about the «temporal coincidence» of a bloody and fierce pursuit of the Christians, whose «green outbreaks» are in the Arabic Islamic countries. That is coincidental with the solvent, quiet and cunning action of the European «trendies», against the virtues of the European societies. Both actions are surely a «cosmic part» of the so called «Mysterium iniquitatis» or agree to the Darkness.

THE MILITARY SURPRISE AS ART AND HETERODOXY

Almost all the technologies, tactics and operations directed to obtaining the tactical or operational surprise over the enemy, can be benevolent considered at the edge of the regulations and existing procedure. That are practised in the different countries and groups of them or supranational alliances.

Between other reasons, to fight only according to the «book» is usually too much acquaintance and predictable. In addition, many of the general «knowledge» gathered in them are shared by different blocs and nations, even antagonistic. And it is necessary, to respect the regulations and ordinances and to look for the aim indicated by the command, as the goal to obtaining.

But the creative and decisive action must follow the one that we call the «way of the surprise«. As guide, compass, of our decisions and actions. Looking for that fleeting and juicy opportunity that arises in the development of the mutual actions between the armed rivals; those careless or vulnerable enemy weaknesses, in conditions that we can create sometimes, equally more unforeseen and unusual. To obtain our goals with more forcefulness, efficiency, elegance and rapidity. Achieving it with fewer loss of time, of men and of means. Let’s remember the basic and universal principle of the economy of the means.

Sure that following always the «book» they will be able to approach and to take to good term the common operations. But, apart from the fact that the enemy has an essentially equal doctrine and regulations, a way of fighting will be first known and then learned or dominated and, probably, up to overcome finally by the enemy. The triumphant Germans in the first period 1939-1941, with the extension of the war, allowed the knowledge and the learning of his war of combined weapon by his enemies. That finally overcame them in technologies, tactics and operations and drove them to their thunderous defeat in 1945.

And this «guide» is of special need and affection in the bureaucratized and crystallized armies. Where the unforseeable, not guilty failures, are not only a contingency to be overcame by the set. But they can be also an administrative or political weapon against the persons in charge. And where the follow-up of the «book» and the superiors orders to the letter, armour and protect the low commands of the responsibility of their acts and results.

Martin Van Creveld said that was the anteroom, before the final unworkability and prostration, of «the military organizations that were not getting up-to-date and renewing». Martin Van Creveld was expelled as lecturer, many years ago, from Israel’s Military High College.

Then, the results will be obtained increasingly at the cost of the wear and the men means and materials losses. Tending to triumph then the rival that more demographic and economic capacity has.

There arises then a corollary of this way of thinking the military thing. The zeal to avoid human falls, extended to all the modern armies or of IIIrd generation, will lead to the preventive, protective and therapeutic employment of the own heavy fire. Looking that the own forces do not have to fight at close ranges. This is called military modern technology and is highly regarded by the national armament industries. This is not more than the perversion and trick of the heavy fire. Whose functions or tasks, in increasing order of action and efficiency, are: to blind, to disturb, to neutralize or cover and to destroy the enemy in the different fighting forms and situations.

And the action over the aim will tend to the physical destruction, as guarantee of the security of the men. In the actual civil wars in Iraq and Syria, we have the examples in the exagerate and methodical bombardments on the enemies. Armed and civilians; real and suspects.

The Military surprise, looking for the enemy dislocation and shock

During his operations, the enemy deployment is conforming in the direction and with the intention that he has decided and determined, for his military echeloned means and for his logistic routes. This way, he is showing his «cards» to his rival, depending on his action tempo and he is commiting, according to those.

Our surprise can create «per se» a new «exposed flank«, another more or less critical «vulnerability» in the enemy. That he was not considering yet, that he was not waiting, nor was prepared to defend her by some of the fighting forms. That are the attack and the defense, in their varieties and combinations.

Our surprise «penetrates» in the enemy deployment, seeking to shock and dislocate functionally or positionally it. And, at least, to cause him losses, to occupy profitable positions for our operational development, to diminish his tempo or operational pace and to confuse, delay and disturb him in his plans and deployments. Using for it, by our part, the minimal means expense and seeking to achieve the maximum possible effect on the enemy. With which we optimize the effort of our actions, following the general principle of the economy of the available means.

When the enemy reacts, to offset and overcome the effect of our surprising action, he is adapting necessarily to our intention. And, if that one is serious, he moves away more or less from his interests and plans. With his reacting movements for the rejection and the attack to our forces, the enemy is disregarding his intention and his mission. In relation to these, the enemy is removed from them and also unbalanced. This way, a right conceived, planned and realized surprise can «prepare» the enemy for us. So, he face in disadvantage, with fewer available resources and a worse deployment, our offensive principal action. That would be already more direct, massive and orthodox.

In such a way that exist a whole range of possible effects to obtaining over the enemy with our surprising actions. That will change also according to the means destined to obtain our surprise, the conception, the preparation and the accomplishment of it and the available time, considering also the set of our operations.